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Abstract
My goal in this work is to outline a specifically legal harm principle that is derived from
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle in On Liberty. I will do this by providing a close reading of On
Liberty and comparing it to what he says in chapter V of Utilitarianism. I believe that these two
works provide a foundation for a harm principle that defines the domain and limits of the law.
While this goal is not new, I focus on Mill’s general harm principle and the two maxims that he
believes make it up in order to construct a relatively clear legal harm principle which becomes a
part of his general principle. I believe that this may also make clearer what Mill’s view of the
limitations of speech are and that he would allow that certain sorts of hate speech are not only
within the domain of the law but that they could legitimately be prevented through the law.
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A Note on Citations
Much of this work will rely on John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Utilitarianism. I will,
therefore, use abbreviated in text citations for his works. I will use the following abbreviations
for these texts:

Works by John Stuart Mill will be referenced by abbreviated title, chapter, and paragraph
number. Ex. (OL II: 14)
(OL)

Mill, On Liberty.

(U)

Mill, Utilitarianism.

(A)

Mill, Autobiography.

Preface
My goal in this work is to outline a specifically legal harm principle that is derived from
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle in On Liberty. I will do this by providing a close reading of On
Liberty and comparing it to what he says in chapter V of Utilitarianism. I believe that these two
works provide a foundation for a harm principle that defines the domain and limits of the law.
While this goal is not new, I focus on Mill’s general harm principle and the two maxims that he
believes make it up in order to construct a relatively clear legal harm principle which becomes a
part of his general principle. I believe that this may also make clearer what Mill’s view of the
limitations of speech are and that he would allow that certain sorts of hate speech are not only
within the domain of the law but that they could legitimately be prevented through the law.
In the introduction I will focus on preliminary definitions and concepts that help to frame
the overall project. I will look at liberty and why liberty is seen as such an important value. I will
also describe what the criminal law is and why—because of its coercive and invasive nature—it
is important to focus on understanding its limits. I will then propose why I believe the harm
principle is a likely starting point for understanding the limits to liberty interference.
After framing the issue in the introduction, the first section of this work will focus on
what I call Mill’s general harm principle. I will attempt to parse out Mill’s goals with his
principle and discuss the ways in which his principle is a very general principle that describes all
manners of liberty infringement from the most basic to the serious. Doing this requires
examination of the limits of the general harm principle regarding individual liberty as well as
separating what Mill believes is the inviolable self-regarding sphere of liberty from the harm
principle. This section serves as an exegesis of Mill’s general principle in On Liberty.
The second section will focus on defining a specifically legal harm principle that I
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believe can be found in On Liberty though Mill is not focused on this task. I believe that Mill
leaves several clues as to where he believes the domain of the law and the extra-legal domain
come apart. By looking at what he says in On Liberty regarding harm and rights I will argue that
chapter V of Utilitarianism can give us the rest of what we need to get a legal harm principle
from Mill that is not only consistent with the general harm principle but is extracted from it and
serves as an important principle within it.
The final section will serve as an application of the legal harm principle. I will focus on
the issue of speech because while Mill spends a large portion of On Liberty defending the right
to free speech, he also recognizes its limitations. Mill’s corn dealer example (OL III: 1) shows
that, in principle, Mill allows for limitations to the free expression of speech. I will use this to
then argue that Mill could claim that certain types of controversial hate speech fall within the
domain of the law. I believe that the legal harm principle allows for such a discussion and
furthermore, that a Millian justification can be had for actually limiting hate speech through the
law.
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Introduction
The Importance of Liberty and Autonomy

I.1 The Importance of Liberty
Robert Paul Wolff in A Defense of Anarchism and John Stuart Mill in On Liberty note
that one of the most important issues within political philosophy is determining whether the
moral autonomy of individuals is compatible with the legitimate authority of the state. 1 While
there are many definitions of individual liberty or autonomy, it can most easily be described as
the ability to choose how one shall live one’s life or the ability to self-govern. Legitimate state or
governmental authority, on the other hand, is the right to govern or to have others obey orders,
laws, or rules. There is an undeniable tension that exists between these two essential
philosophical notions. The prevailing argument which illustrates the strain between these two
concepts is as follows: if it is the case that individuals are and should be considered autonomous
agents, then this means they are self-governing agents. If they are self-governing, autonomous
agents, then these agents have sole authority over their own actions. This legitimate authority
implies the right to govern. If they are the sole legitimate authority over their own actions, then it
seems inconsistent that there are others (i.e. the state) that have legitimate authority (i.e. the
right) to dictate how individual agents behave. If an outside agent (i.e. the state) has legitimate
authority over another individual, then this means that the outside agent (the state) has the right
to govern and the right to be obeyed when governing. If this is the case, then individual agents
are not autonomous after all. 2 This tension with autonomy and government is inherent in (most,
if not all) societies which 1. have a body of laws and a system of government that forbid its

1

Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (New York: Harper Torch books, 1970) 3–4; John Stuart Mill, On
Liberty, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1956) I: 2.
2
Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, 3–4.
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citizens, who are presumed to be autonomous, from performing certain acts and 2. such
government is thought to have a genuine right to be obeyed. While I am not concerned with
arguing over how states gain authority or if the authority they have is rightful or not, I am
concerned with how liberty serves as a moral limit on the sorts of actions that the state can
prohibit and how a penal law can be morally justified when it leads to the coercion and liberty
invasion of its citizens.
At this point, it is important to note that there are different conceptions of liberty. The
anarchist, such as Wolff, claims that liberty is absolute and consists of the ability to do what one
wants, when one wants. Furthermore, since the only way in which the state is able to obtain
authority over its citizens is by encroaching on this ability of its citizens to do what they want
when they want, then such authority to rule is never legitimate. 3 However, while the liberal, such
as Mill, agrees that there is tension between liberty and authority, one of the primary reasons to
support governmental authority is to obtain security and protection against the threat of others—
which actually helps to maintain and even expand liberty. The liberal argues that the anarchist
concept of absolute liberty comes with too many problems. If everyone were absolutely free to
do whatever it was that he/she wished to do, as the anarchist demands, then agents are free to
assault and murder others. 4 This absolute liberty does not seem likely to produce any kind of
working society and actually restricts much more than it expands liberty. Each agent would lack
security of person and property and would have no recourse to prevent threat other than to
produce threat in kind. This unbridled liberty, therefore, seems undesirable and not very
valuable—at least not very valuable to all agents, only the strongest among them would tend to
benefit.

3
4

Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, 3–4, 51.
Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973) 22–3.
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To remedy this problem with unrestrained liberty, liberals and most other theorists often
propose a more limited version of liberty which allows for the greatest amount of liberty for each
individual that is consistent with the same amount of liberty for others. 5 These autonomous
agents choose to sacrifice certain freedoms for security and protection. This understanding of
liberty, while giving up the ability to do whatever one wants, when one wants, is a much more
secure and even robust version which, in actuality, would allow for a more extensive liberty
base. This wider liberty is gained by employing a state to which agents give certain authority to
restrain certain liberty-invading behaviors. This authority allows for agents to go about
unmolested in exchange for refraining from molesting others. 6 Hence, there is a reason or
motivation to give up absolute liberty for the sake of security and a more limited, albeit
expansive, liberty. This tradeoff of absolute liberty for protection is not unqualified and there are
still moral limits that the government must maintain to claim moral legitimacy. Mill’s method of
determining acceptable infringement of liberty, which is the primary focus in what follows,
comes in the form of what has been labeled “the harm principle” which states that “the sole end
for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others” (OL I: 9). This dissertation serves as a commentary on how this principle can be
used as a method of protecting, preserving, and maintaining liberty generally and I will further
argue that the harm principle can be used to derive a legal principle to determine limits for the
law as well. Yet before this principle is even defended and/or analyzed, a natural question that

5

This concept is often associated with John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), 60.
This interpretation borrows heavily from the social contract tradition as represented by Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,
(1651); John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689); and Jean Jacque Rousseau, On the Social Contract,
(1762).
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arises is: why is there such a presumption of liberty and autonomy?

I.2 The Presumption of Liberty
As legal philosopher Joel Feinberg 7 notes, “whatever else we believe about freedom
[liberty], most of us believe that it is something to be praised, or so luminously a Thing of Value
that it is beyond praise.” 8 Indeed many other values that we have, it seems, presume that we also
have a certain degree of liberty. H.L.A. Hart claims that
The unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice may be held a value in itself
with which it is prima facie wrong to interfere; or it may be thought valuable
because it enables individuals to experiment—even with living—and to discover
things valuable both to themselves and to others. 9
Mill also argues that liberty is one of the highest social and individual values. He believes that
certain liberties, namely the liberties of speech, thought, and certain sorts of non-harmful actions,
make up individuality and this is “one of the principle ingredients of human happiness, and quite
the chief ingredient of individual and social progress” (OL III: 1). The ability to choose what we
are going to do and how we are going to act is a way to decide what sort of person we are going
to be. It is what makes us good or bad people, moral or immoral, or good or bad citizens. Liberty
and a presumption of liberty, all things being equal, allows for and contributes to social and
individual progress, many people see the liberty of choice to act/think/speak (or not) as one of
the key elements of social and individual progress. It seems, then, that there is a presumption of
liberty and autonomy built into our everyday concepts, values, and the idea of the “good life.”
It is noteworthy that even critics of liberalism, and not merely the above quoted liberals,

7
Feinberg believes the presumption of liberty is so important that he developed a four-volume series, The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law, which delves into the moral restrictions on the criminal law. Feinberg’s work was
invaluable and much of what follows was influenced by these texts.
8
Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 20. ‘Freedom’ and ‘liberty’ will be used relatively interchangeably.
9
H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) 21–2.
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place a high degree of importance on liberty and the presumption of liberty seems to be a
common ground for most theorists—indeed, even the anarchist agrees here. Similarly, those who
hold that Mill’s harm principle, which will be examined in this work, is insufficient and that the
state can legitimately interfere with liberty for reasons over and above harm do not claim that
liberty is insignificant. Such critics of liberalism—and the harm principle specifically—such as
Patrick Devlin, Sarah Conly, and Michael Moore, still hold liberty as one of the most significant
values. 10 They also believe that coercive interference and obstruction of liberty and autonomy
must be justified; however, where they differ is in deciding what actually justifies interference in
liberty. Many critics of the liberal harm principle believe that while liberty and individual
autonomy are important values, this does not mean that there are not other important values that
may trump the presumption in favor of liberty.
Feinberg claims that
while it is easy to overemphasize the value of liberty, there is no denying its
necessity, and for that reason most writers on our subject have endorsed a kind of
‘presumption in favor of liberty’ requiring that whenever a legislator is faced with
a choice between imposing a legal duty on citizens or leaving them at liberty,
other things being equal, he should leave individuals free to make their own
choices. Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special
justification. 11
And most theorists, liberal or not, believe this to be the case. So, when the state interferes with
our liberty, it interferes with our ability to lead our lives as we see fit. But remember, to a certain
extent this interference is justified in order to provide security and a greater amount of liberty

10

For Legal Moralists see: Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965);
James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967);
Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert P.
George; For Legal Paternalists see: Danny Scoccia, “In Defense of Hard Paternalism,” Law and Philosophy 27
(2008); Plato, Republic. Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
11
Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 4 vols. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1984) 9.
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overall. Yet, once this system of government is put into place, it is important to ensure that the
laws that are enacted do not restrict liberty further than ensures security of person because when
liberty is restricted by an outside force it interferes with the autonomy of agents and while such
agents give up some liberty to such an authority they do not give up all or even most liberty.
Hence, it is especially important to justify liberty invading practices by the government. Mill and
subsequent liberals focus on the importance of maintaining individual liberty from illegitimate
outside (state and/or social) interference. But it is not clear when such interference is illegitimate.
So, the question arises: when is such interference unjustified or illegitimate? One way to help
address this question is by determining the proper domain of the law. Part of my goal in
developing a legal harm principle is to address this domain question.
Because we find ourselves living in a society with others and we value liberty highly, we
are generally willing to give up certain sorts of liberty so that we are protected against serious
infractions and limitations on our liberty that tend to occur when agents live together. I am not
working from within any sort of theory, such as social contract, and am not concerned with how
governments gain legitimate authority (this is an important question). I am going to presume that
governments have some sort of authority and what I am concerned with is the idea that
governments—when they already exist (as they do)—have moral limitations because of the
importance of liberty and finding those limitations helps us to preserve a robust and valuable sort
of liberty. In other words, because there is such a presumption of liberty and because agents are
autonomous, there must be some principled reasons, like Mill’s harm principle, that either justify
governmental interference with liberty or else that excuses it.
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I.3 What is the Criminal Law?
While there are many ways in which others may interfere in the liberty of individuals,
generally the most imposing way in which the government can infringe on liberty is through the
penal law. States offer protection to its citizens by enacting laws, specifically criminal laws,
which coercively interfere by punishing those who do not follow its dictums. In this work, I will
focus specifically on the criminal law as a particularly insidious form of coercion and liberty
invasion. Following Feinberg and other legal theorists, I will not focus on all legal forms of
liberty invasion like the many relatively “subtle uses of state power, like taxation, indoctrination,
licensure, and selective funding,” 12 and other types of law such as tort and regulatory law. My
focus on the criminal law stems from the desire to derive a specifically legal harm principle in
order to provide 1. a relatively clear and principled method for legislators to use to determine if
acts fit within the legal domain which can then be considered for criminal regulations, 2. a
defense for applying Mill’s harm principle as a basis for a legal harm principle, and 3. an
interpretation of the harm principle as a legal principle that is robust and useful in delineating
wrongful interferences of liberty from acceptable interferences. By focusing specifically on the
criminal or penal law, we can better understand the domain in which some of the most costly and
serious invasions of liberty belong and why they commonly involve steep consequences for the
behaviors in question. The focus on criminal law also enables us to focus on an aspect of liberty
invasion that has a tendency or at least has the potential to be particularly difficult to escape.

I.3.1 The Criminal Law’s Reach
The criminal law’s steep consequences do not end when the violator “serves his time”

12

Feinberg, Harm to Others, 2.
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and indeed tend to persist into his/her life after punishment. The official punishment for crimes,
as invasive as they are, are not necessarily the most problematic invasions of liberty. Many of the
consequences and liberty invasions that follow the proscribed punishment are problematic and
often not justified. As Feinberg notes,
Penal statutes can reenforce social pressures, and also create effective restrictions
of their own. The threat of legal punishment enforces public opinion by putting
the nonconformist in a terror of apprehension, rendering his privacy precarious,
and his prospects in life uncertain. The punishments themselves brand him with
society’s most powerful stigma and undermine his life projects, in career or
family, disastrously. These legal interferences have a prior claim on our attention
then, not merely because of their greater visibility and theoretical accessibility,
but also because of their immense destructive impact on human interests. Given
the inherent costs of criminalization, when a particular legal prohibition oversteps
the limit of moral legitimacy, it is itself a serious moral crime. 13
As this quote suggests, because of the sort of coercion, punishment, and consequences involved
in the criminal law, special justification is often called for. John Stuart Mill claims that there are
always questions as to “the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far
liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the
undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been
committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards” (OL V: 5). My discussion focuses on
what Feinberg calls “the moral limits of the criminal law” 14 and attempts to address how we can
utilize the harm principle to determine which acts may legitimately be included in the criminal
law while maintaining a proper respect for liberty. More specifically, Mill’s harm principle in On
Liberty will be analyzed, discussed, and clarified to show how it may serve as a principled way
to determine which acts fall within the domain of the criminal law. While many theorists,
especially Feinberg, rely on Mill to concoct a morally acceptable legal principle that restricts

13
14

Feinberg, Harm to Others, 2.
See Joel Feinberg’s four volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.
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liberty, Mill does not have such a narrow focus and analyzes the interference of individual liberty
on a broad scale which includes all manner of liberty infringement from pleading to education,
from shunning to imprisonment. I will begin my search for a principle with Mill as well,
however, I will follow Feinberg’s lead and attempt to derive a specifically legal principle, unlike
Mill, to focus more specifically on those liberty infringements that are on the more severe side of
the spectrum (i.e. imprisonment, fines, forced community service, and other sorts of
punishments).
When discussing and developing a normative theory of the criminal law, there is
frequently a division made between “real” crimes that are a part of the criminal law and crimes
that are not a “proper” part of the criminal law. However, it is not necessarily clear what it means
to be a proper part of the criminal law. There are two potential interpretations of proper: one is
descriptive/categorical and the other is normative. In this section, I will focus on the descriptive
understanding of the criminal law, or what is—or what it means for something to be—an actual
part of the criminal law. In the rest of this work I, in turn, focus on understanding and developing
a normative moral system which identifies the limits of the criminal law by outlining the
“principles, values, and aims that should guide legislatures in making such decisions.” 15 In other
words, I will discuss what may be a part of the criminal law, not what is a part of the criminal
law or what criminal law means.

I.3.2 Distinguishing the Criminal Law and the Moral Law
It is important to note that there is a real distinction between the criminal law and the

15

R. A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, SE Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros (editors), “Introduction: Towards a
Theory of Criminalization?” in Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 2. The distinctions made in the remainder of this section follow Duff, et al.
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moral law. 16 These are not and should not be equated. R. A. Duff, et al., make the point that the
moral law is not what binds us as citizens to a country, state, or political institution. And while
morality does not bind us to such an institution, the institution can be understood to abide by
certain moral principles in order to claim legitimacy. 17 We must keep in mind that any work on
legal theory is also a work in political philosophy which ought not be separated from the political
world in which we live. We must realize and consider that a morally corrupt and bankrupt
individual may well be an excellent citizen because not only are the moral law and criminal law
distinct, but the collective civic values that the state ought to concern itself with do not and ought
not cover all of morality. 18 However, this does not mean that we can ignore the moral elements
that aid political entities in living and cooperating under a coherent system of laws that serve
collective interests. 19 Indeed as Arthur Kuflik states, “Liberalism requires that citizens who
disagree with one another on a number of morally significant matters nevertheless coexist and
cooperate within a political framework of basic rights protections.” 20 This Rawlsian or
Scanlonian understanding of society is common in that many of us recognize that we live among
a variety of individuals with different conceptions of the good, morality, or the good life and that
we must all live together under a minimal set of rules that most individuals would be reasonably
expected to endorse or, as Scanlon would say could not reasonably reject. 21
Still, since I am primarily concerned with the criminal law, much will be left unsaid on
other parts of the law, such as regulatory infractions and tort law. Because I am singling out the

16

I will talk more about this distinction in section 2, chapters 3–4 when discussing rights.
Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 19–20.
18
I will discuss this distinction more in Chapter 4.2.
19
Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 19–20.
20
Arthur Kuflik, “Liberalism, Legal Moralism and Moral Disagreement” (Journal of Applied Philosophy 22, no. 2
(2005)) 185.
21
Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 20; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1998).
17
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criminal law as distinct from other types of law, there is some clarification needed that indicates
which types of acts are properly called criminal and which fall (or ought to fall) under some
other category of law. The law, as it is written in many countries today, is difficult to clearly
classify; however, there is something that can and needs to be said about analyzing the morality
of the criminal law proper as distinct from other types of laws (some of which may, as a matter
of fact, be part of an already existing body of criminal law) because there is a very real
distinction between the types of behaviors that are properly characterized as criminal and those
which do not have the same qualities necessary to make a behavior criminal. A crime is most
colloquially understood as an act that the law prohibits us from performing. So, we understand
that murder, rape, theft, and arson are crimes. It is a behavior that the law prohibits us from
performing. However, this prohibition alone is not enough to describe the criminal law. There
are many things that we see ourselves as being prevented by the law from doing, such as parking
on a street facing the opposite direction from traffic, practicing medicine without a license, and
tax evasion and yet these are not crimes in the primary sense alluded to above. There is an
important distinction between those prohibitions that are a “proper” part of the criminal law and
those that are not.

I.3.3 Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita
There are two common interpretations of how the criminal law is divided. 22 The first is
between mala in se and mala prohibita. Mala in se describes “conduct that is wrong
independently of its being regulated.” 23 This aligns with Feinberg’s claim that the crimes

22

When laying out the general understanding of the criminal law in the next several paragraphs, I follow much of
what R. A. Duff, et al. outline in their introduction “Toward a Theory of Criminalization?” in Criminalization: The
Political Morality of the Criminal Law.
23
Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 3.
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covered within the criminal law are those in which
‘punishment is used in the first instance’ and not merely ‘as a last resort,’ where
punishment is clearly for something other than (or in addition to) mere
disobedience to authority as such, and it can be specified what punishment is for
independently of the rules of legal institutions set up for some purpose. 24
These are acts which do not need the law to exist in order to define the behavior and can be
thought of as acts which are “pre-legally wrongful.” 25 However, using the concept of pre-legal
wrongness may not be as helpful as it seems because there are some things that seem pre-legally
wrong that ought not to be covered, such as lying. 26 The pre-legal wrongness is a part of what
makes an action prohibitable but cannot serve as the whole picture for what it takes for an act to
be legislated through the criminal law proper.
Mala prohibita, on the other hand, is “conduct that is wrong only in virtue of its being
regulated.” 27 This distinction is an important one when dividing crimes into those that fit into the
criminal law “proper” and those that are, for instance, mere regulatory infractions, as it is not
always clear in the vernacular what we mean when we say something is a crime (part of the
criminal law proper) and many things that are not a part of the criminal law are often understood
or labeled as penal crimes when they fit more accurately into another category.

I.3.4 Punishment and Penalties
The second common contrast of crimes that fit into the criminal law and those that do not
is “between offenses that are deemed punishable and those to which mere penalties are

24
Feinberg, Harm to Others, 21. Feinberg’s discussion here seems to follow the division of mala in se and mala
prohibita offenses but he is talking of “primary” and “derivative” crimes.
25
Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 8.
26
Ibid., 8.
27
Ibid., 3.
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attached.” 28 This contrast and the contrast between mala in se and mala prohibita are often
conflated and they are, in a way, related. For instance, contempt of court (mala prohibita) is not
something that is punished as a crime in the same way that murder (mala in se) is punished. If
one unjustly kills, they are punished harshly, generally with imprisonment. Something like
contempt of court or tax evasion is a behavior that may result in a warning, a citation, or a fine
but is not usually punished as a crime in the first (or subsequent) instance. So, when someone
violates the rules of the court, the individual may be warned and then fined and may eventually
be jailed, but this punishment is only meted out as a last resort or backup sanction. The “crime”
in this case amounts to disobeying authority or attempting to undermine a regulatory system. In
this way, it is not the behavior that is being punished but the disobeying of authority, which must
be built into the system in some way to allow for efficient and practical regulation and
government. As Feinberg correctly points out, “if we are going to confer authority on designated
officials in order to make some governmental program or institutions work, we are committed
thereby to granting them enforceable powers, since unenforceable authority is, in effect, no
authority at all.” 29 Without such authority to be obeyed in these cases, the institutions, programs,
and appointed officials lose authority which in turn could lead to a collapse of these important
institutions which would then lead to greater amounts of harm. For instance, if a court system
does not have authority, then one can argue that a miscarriage and failure of justice ensues
because the perpetrators of crime are unable to be punished. Further, one may also believe that
the purpose of the court system is to compensate victims, so if the court system does not have
authority then the victims are not compensated for harms done against them. 30
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There are many different non-penal sanctions that the law does and should appeal to for
certain acts that we (incorrectly) call crimes; however, those acts that are considered crimes in
the pre-legal sense that initiate penal sanctions as the primary mode of punishment generally
interfere with liberty to a greater extent than non-penal sanctions and have punishments rather
than penalties. These types of crimes are the main focus of this work. It is important to note that I
will not provide a guide to what sorts of punishment can or should be used, i.e. I am not
advocating or endorsing imprisonment, fines, capital punishment, etc. My goal is not to say how
the penal law should respond to violations or what is the appropriate punishment (though in
some instances I will highlight a balancing test that should be applied to make the punishment fit
the crime, so to speak), 31 only what it may say or at least consider as acceptable behaviors to
consider as crimes. I will attempt to provide a guide for determining when it is acceptable to
limit someone’s liberty through the criminal law, not how the criminal law should actually
punish.

I.3.5 Regulatory Infractions and Crimes
According to R. A. Duff (et al.), there are generally three primary differences between
regulatory infractions and those crimes that are a proper part of the criminal law; they are that
[1.] they do not attract the formal censure that attaches to criminal convictions;
[2.] while they may be sanctioned by fines, or disqualifications from the activities
in which the infraction occurred, imprisonment is not a possible penalty; and
[3.] the procedures through which they are dealt with are simpler than those of a
criminal trial. 32
While these three differences often indicate the division between regulatory infractions or tort
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law and the criminal law proper, there may be a backup threat of criminal proceedings which
make the regulatory infractions, and those actions like them, seem more serious or on par with
those acts covered by the criminal law. However, for the most part such crimes are handled
through the many different non-criminal penalties at the government’s disposal. Clarifying this
issue, Feinberg explains that “it is not the central purpose, the raison d’etre, of the law of torts to
punish contempt of court, any more than it is the purpose of legal marriage to prevent adultery;
but it is the whole point of the law of criminal homicide to prevent and punish wrongful
killings.” 33 Tax evasion and contempt of court, draft dodging, escape from prison, driving
without a license, etc. are crimes that are secondary or that are only comprehensible under a
preexisting system of rules and regulations. Murder and rape can be understood as crimes
independently of such systems. As Feinberg notes, “one can wrongfully kill whether or not there
is a criminal law of homicide, but one cannot commit contempt of court unless there is already in
existence a complex legal structure (the court system) whose rules already confer powers and
immunities, and define authority.” 34
While there are notable differences among these divisions of law, it is not always clear
which action falls under which type of law and indeed, oftentimes a single policy can discuss and
combine several different types of law, notably criminal law and a regulation such as
immigration. 35 This further muddies the water when one is attempting to understand the
distinctions. However, discovering principles on which legislators ought to base the criminal law
is entirely possible and indeed may help to clarify how laws should be drafted. Again, the
purpose of this work is to look to those crimes that can be categorized as falling under the proper
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domain of the criminal law and to explain how the harm principle can serve as a principle for
determining legitimate governmental coercion. This is to limit the discussion to a manageable
range of topics as well as to distinguish between parts of the law that have multiple purposes and
very well may have alternate principles that serve as a guideline for performance.
Critics may claim that by limiting the discussion to only those acts which would require
penal legislation, we are ignoring acts and behavior that are counterproductive to liberty and a
cohesive and harmonious society. However, while this may be the case, and while there are
many ways in which the law can attempt to “change, alter, and limit the behavior of its
citizens,” 36 such as through incentives, taxes, or appealing to civil or tort law, the penalties that
result from such practices are generally far less invasive of liberty and also fall outside of the
realm of criminal law. But again, this does not mean that there is nothing the law can do to curb
such undesirable behaviors and that preventing such acts is not an interesting study; it is just a
separate issue from the focus of this project. I wish to focus on the harshest of the legal penalties
(legal/penal coercion) because if we can justify the most invasive restriction on liberty, it not
only makes those less invasive restrictions clearer, but may also provide us with a greater basis
for justification of coercive legal measures because, as Mill says, “unless the reasons are good
for an extreme case, they are not good for any case” (OL II: 9). 37

I.4 The Case for Principles
All practical reasoning involves the application of principles to the facts. The
principles, in turn, must be clarified and tested tentatively against hypothetical
possibilities. ... But the principles at hand, at least as simply stated, are rarely
clear. They must be fleshed out; otherwise they are mere rhetorical slogans, empty
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of meaning. 38
Not all criminal laws that restrict the liberty of people are morally legitimate. Defining
and defending principles which are supposed to justify such coercion is thus critical to
determining their moral legitimacy. There are several attempts to justify state coercion of
individuals that appeal to a variety of principles, notably legal paternalism, legal moralism, the
offense principle, and the liberal harm principle (the latter is the primary topic of the current
work). However, why is it the case that the state must rely on principles at all? For instance, it
seems that one way to ease the tension between liberty and authority is to look at each individual
case, determine the main concern that arises, and then create a solution to resolve the tension.

I.4.1 Consistency of Application
One of the main issues with a case-by-case method of dealing with the law is that it lacks
a consistency of application that one generally demands of the law and social justice in general.
For instance, if one were to decide in each circumstance which acts were crimes and which were
not, there would be instances of the same act being both a crime and not a crime in different
cases. 39 If there are not principles that are appealed to in the law, it is easier to have lapses of
justice and fairness which are key components of the law. The law is created to dictate rules for
everyone equally. Because the law is created as a system of rules that apply universally, for the
law to unpredictably apply to some cases and individuals and not to others causes serious issues.
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As Gerald Dworkin notes
It is by now widely accepted that those who act and claim moral justification for
their conduct must be prepared to accept as legitimate certain universalizations of
their action. There must be consistency in conduct, a refusal to make special pleas
in one’s own behalf or to consider oneself an exception to general principles. 40
If we allow for rulings on a case by case basis there is a greater possibility that exceptions will be
made unjustly. 41 For instance, if two agents are convicted of the same crime, and the situation is
roughly the same, most believe that the same consequences ought to follow. 42 This is not to say
that the law cannot provide exceptions to certain rules, for instance there is a law against
speeding, but ambulances are allowed to speed if there is an emergency. 43 An important thing to
keep in mind with such exceptions is that they are not arbitrary and they are reasoned and
universal exceptions that most people would accept as legitimate. While the law can make such
exceptions, when the law is applied to those that are not legitimately excepted, a similar result
ought to obtain. 44
However, based on a case-by-case examination, oftentimes it may be that grave
irregularities result. This may occur if one gives certain groups or individuals preference over
others without just cause. When we consider the law, however, there is a necessity for
impartiality. The reason for this is that in order to be effective, the law must provide clear
guidelines and rules so that agents know and understand ahead of time what behaviors and acts
are or are not acceptable. In addition to this, the concept of justice or fairness is an important
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component of the law. If an agent does not know which acts will result in a penalty or which acts
will fall under a certain law, then that agent is constantly at risk of performing acts that are,
unbeknownst to the agent, criminal. And even if the law is written in a clear and concise manner,
a case-by-case basis will still result in an unfair and erratic application.

I.4.2 Fair and Unbiased
In addition to the necessity for clear and consistent application of principles, such
principles must be applied to fair and unbiased laws. For instance, if a legislator enacted an
arbitrary law that all and only those people of Celtic descent are forbidden from riding bicycles,
then the law would no longer be impartial or consistent. It would depend upon facts that agents
do not have any control over and that are not relevant to the behavior in question. This
observation is not based on a sophisticated philosophical understanding of legitimacy or
relevance but is fairly straightforward and normal understanding of relevance and fairness. 45
Not only are there problems of this sort, but also knowing that a particular act is wrong
does not provide any guide to figuring out what it is that makes such acts wrong. As Socrates
pointed out in Euthyphro, it is not a question of whether a particular act is impious, but rather
what impious acts have in common such that they are thought to be impious. In other words, a
particular act of murder is wrong, but understanding what features it shares with other instances
of murder such that actions of this type can be made wrong according to the law is what is
necessary. 46
In order to have a well-functioning system of laws, laws need to be reasonably clear and
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appeal to principles which provide reasons that promote consistency and impartiality. Mill states
that contrary to what he believes should be the case, “there is, in fact, no recognized principle by
which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested” (OL I: 8).
Relying on principles to decide when government interference is acceptable is important and
something that is needed; yet, the protection of the rights of individuals, 47 such as liberty, is
rarely decided on matters of principle but rather is decided on the whims of those in power or
those who are in great numbers. Mill believes that utilizing and relying on the harm principle is
the best, and really only, way to determine when interference in the rights of individuals by
others (government or otherwise) is acceptable (OL I: 9). He argues that it is really a matter of
intuition and feeling that tends to decide when rights are protected and when they are not. If
people do not like something that is happening in a particular instance, only then do they tend to
decide that that particular behavior ought to be stopped, almost regardless of whether it infringes
on the rights of others (OL I: 7). Generally, people want their own rights protected but when
someone else is doing something they do not like, they tend not to care or they tend to ignore that
it would violate the others’ rights. 48 By utilizing principles, there is a clear and accessible way to
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By this I do not mean there is harm or threat to actual “rights” but rather that there is harm to individuals that
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violations or infringements of rights. Interestingly and importantly, he states this as a universal principle which
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determine what is expected of citizens and what rights are protected. Appealing to principles
provides a consistent and clear guideline for agents and law-makers alike. This is not to say that
such principles are absolute and never conflict, but rather that there needs to be principles or
reasons that always count as good reasons for or against a particular law. As Feinberg claims,
liberty limiting principles are those that always provide a “morally relevant reason in support of
penal legislation even if other reasons may in circumstances outweigh it.” 49 This allows for
consistent reasons to be considered in enacting legislation. This way everyone has a clear idea of
what laws are legitimate and which actions are allowed. Principles such as these allow for
consistency of application and a concept of fairness that is necessary in a legal system where
liberty is a significant value and that has a presumption of liberty.

I.4.3 A Formal Theory of Justice
In other words, what we are attempting to produce is a formal theory of justice. In the
above discussion, the formal theory that is appealed to is derived from Aristotle when he states
that like cases ought to be treated in a like manner and dissimilar cases ought to be treated in a
dissimilar manner 50 “(and in direct proportion to the differences between them).” 51 While this
principle is helpful, it does not exactly outline what it means for cases to be similar or what
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makes things dissimilar. Since every case or situation differs in some respects it is important to
determine the relevant differences in order to justify treating cases similarly or differently. When
(relevantly) like cases are treated alike it is just, when (relevantly) like cases are treated
differently it is unjust. Injustice then, Feinberg claims, amounts to “unfair discrimination,
arbitrary exclusion, favoritism, inappropriate partisanship or partiality, inconsistent ruleenforcement, ‘freeloading’ in a cooperative undertaking, or putting one party at a relative
disadvantage in a competition.” 52 Feinberg points out that writers such as Isaiah Berlin believe
that this principle is not merely “one among many ethical principles vying for our allegiance, but
is rather an instance of a more general principle that is constitutive of rationality itself.” 53
However, whether or not the principle—that like cases ought to be treated the same—is a part of
rationality does not really need to be decided in this work and I will remain neutral on this point.
But it is interesting and useful to point out that this principle plays an important and, in some
cases, necessary part of justice, impartiality, and the law.
However, again, the formal principle alone is not enough and a variety of material
principles are necessary to understand and interpret the formal principle of justice which does not
provide which reasons are relevant in a given situation. There are a variety of material principles
of justice and there does not seem to be one overarching or supreme principle of material justice
that applies to all cases. Indeed, Feinberg claims that “there is no one kind of characteristic that
is relevant in all contexts, no single material principle that applies universally.” 54 Instead he calls
for utilizing H. L. A. Hart’s understanding of material principles which rely on “a shifting or
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varying criterion.” 55 Such criterion would be interpreted through the context in which the
principle is applied. In other words, as Hart claims, “There is therefore a certain complexity in
the structure of the idea Justice. We may say that it consists of two parts: a uniform or constant
feature [formal principle] … and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when …
cases are alike or different [material principle].” 56 Relevant differences are going to depend on
the contexts of the case in question. 57 This does not mean we should reject formal principles of
justice altogether, only that interpreting the cases to which the principles apply is difficult. 58

I.5 A General Harm Principle and a Legal Harm Principle
As Feinberg claims, the liberal, at bottom, must endorse the presumption in favor of
liberty. However, there are a variety of ways in which agents can adopt this presumption and
even the paternalist and moralist endorse this presumption which “could be thought of, at one
extreme, as powerful enough to be always decisive, and at the other, as weak enough to be
overridden by any of a large variety of liberty-limiting principles, even when minimally
applicable.” 59 However, because of this, the presumption in favor of liberty alone cannot be what
determines a liberal. To have any relevance, then, the liberal is “one who has so powerful a
commitment to liberty that he [or she] is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged libertylimiting principles as narrowly as possible.” 60 Indeed, John Stuart Mill claims “the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
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his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant” (OL I: 9). This principle serves as the cornerstone of what follows. I will attempt to lay
out the various parts of the harm principle and this dissertation will serve as a commentary on
and defense of Mill’s harm principle.

I.5.1 Deriving a Legal Harm Principle
In addition to explicating Mill’s harm principle, my goal is to define a “legal harm
principle” that is derived from Mill’s general harm principle in On Liberty in order to defend the
liberal position as a particularly useful and robust method for interpreting legitimate uses of the
penal law. This legal harm principle will resemble what Feinberg calls the “Extreme Liberal
Position” in referring to the idea that the only morally legitimate criminal prohibitions by the
state are those based on the harm principle. 61 I will defend this by outlining Mill’s harm principle
as clearly as possible and highlighting its nuances in order to defend its use in constructing a
specifically legal principle. This approach, while not uncommon, is still criticized as a mistaken
endeavor because some critics, such as Bernard Harcourt and Piers Norris Turner, claim Mill is
not trying to define so narrow a principle that it applies only to the law. 62 According to this view,
attempting to articulate a legal harm principle is missing the point of what Mill is really doing—
attempting to outline all instances of interference in liberty, not solely legal interferences. While
this criticism does highlight the ultimate goal of Mill’s view in On Liberty, I do not believe it is
problematic to attempt to parse out where Mill would fall on such a principle. I will argue that
one is able to reasonably derive a harm (sub) principle that applies solely to the law relying on
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what Mill has to say about harm and his harm principle.
Mill believes that invasions of liberty based on legal moralism and legal (hard)
paternalism, 63 the two most commonly proposed alternatives to the harm principle, are never
legitimate means of state coercion because the level of interference with individual liberty and
personal autonomy is too great a sacrifice and is not morally justified. While rejecting the above
conservative liberty-limiting principles is always a concern of the liberal, it is not the primary
aim or focus of this work and while these principles are mentioned occasionally, the primary
motivation is to delineate a liberal legal harm principle that is derived from Mill’s more general
one. I will then focus on the issue of speech, specifically hate speech, in the third section to
analyze how I might apply my legal harm principle.
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Chapter 1
Limiting Liberty: Situating John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle

1.1 Mill and the Harm Principle
When considering which acts ought to be covered by the criminal law, it is likely that
many people will list similar acts as being appropriately covered. For instance, most people hold
that if I stab you, steal from you, deliberately destroy your property, 64 threaten you, or beat
you—in other words, if I harm you—I should be held criminally liable and punished. Famously,
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty claims that the only legitimate interference in the liberty of an
individual is to prevent harm to others (OL I: 9). In essence, this is an endorsement of the liberty
limiting principle 65 that has become known as the “harm principle” and though it may not have
originated with him, it is most frequently associated with Mill and liberalism. 66
However, while associated with liberalism, it seems that whatever a person’s moral or
political background, he/she generally believes that causing harm to others, whether in their
person or their property, is wrong and should be punished, often through the law. 67 As Gerald
Dworkin notes, “there has been a remarkable consensus that whatever other principles might be
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required for an adequate theory of criminalization, some form of a harm to others principle is
required.” 68 But, because of the shared and almost universal presumption of liberty 69 and the
idea that individual autonomy warrants prima facie respect, it falls on those who support any
liberty limiting principles—even one that is relatively universal and interferes with liberty to a
lesser extent than other such principles—to defend why such coercive measures are legitimate
interferences in individual autonomy.

1.1.1 Distinguishing the Harm Principle from Other Liberty Limiting Principles
Because there are many ways in which individuals and governments may interfere with
the liberty of others, proper legislation needs to distinguish and highlight acceptable levels from
unacceptable levels of interference. The harm principle, then, as defined by Mill is “that the sole
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
or action of any of their number is self-protection” (OL I: 9). Mill continues this definition by
expanding what he means by self-protection. If I want to protect myself or the community wants
to protect itself, then “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (OL I: 9). This
means that the only appropriate interference of the liberty of citizens by the government or
individual citizens is to protect oneself or others from harm or the likelihood of harm. 70
While it seems that Mill does not go into as much detail when defining his principle as to
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what he means by harm as we might like, he does give a rough idea of how harm can be
prevented and who may prevent it. 71 He suggests two overlapping categories. The first category
involves how individuals or society may interfere in instances of harm to others: “physical force
in the forms of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion” (OL I: 9). The second
category discusses who may interfere in the liberty of others for the sake of self-protection: the
individual or society collectively. 72 Society collectively can include either governmental
interference or social interference more generally (the latter being extra-legal 73 or nongovernmental). 74 Furthermore, the individual or society may interfere in the liberty of others to
protect “any of their number” or “any member of a civilized community” (OL I: 9) from harm.
These latter terms would—and I believe ought to—include a wide range of individuals, such as
immigrants, refugees, visitors, and even non-terrestrial beings (if such were to exist), and would
apply to all instances of liberty invasion.
While this discussion of harm indicates that agents may interfere in the liberty of others
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when someone is inflicting harm directly on another and acting in a manner that is likely to cause
harm to others, Mill is explicit that this does not cover an agent harming himself, consenting
agents engaging in behavior that may cause harm to themselves, or even agents performing
immoral (but harmless) acts. 75 Mill claims that an individual’s
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant [for interference in
an agent’s liberty]. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or to forbear because
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the
opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons
for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case
he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him,
must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct
of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign (OL I: 9).
In other words, Mill does not allow for others to limit which acts an agent may or may not
perform unless such acts cause or risk harm to another. And while he does allow for the
legitimacy of certain types of intervention in non-harmful situations, it is only in the form of
verbal persuasion or education and not tyranny, physical, or even moral coercion. 76 However, it
is important that Mill stresses that this principle only applies when the agent in question harms or
risks harm to others and does not apply in instances of harm or risk of harm to the self or any
other act which only concerns himself.

1.1.2 Alternate Liberty Limiting Principles
The qualifications that Mill presents in the above quote ultimately serve as a rejection of
many of the principles that are suggested as alternative (or perhaps additional) liberty limiting
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principles. As noted, theorists generally agree that harm or likely harm to others ought to be a
legitimate reason for interference; however, some theorists do not believe that the harm principle
goes far enough. 77 The most common theories that are suggested as supplements to the harm
principle are legal moralism, legal paternalism, and as Gerald Dworkin argues, moral
paternalism which can be thought of as a form of moral perfectionism which seeks to understand
and develop an objective concept of the good life and aid agents in striving toward that life
(which often utilizes paternalistic principles to achieve its goal if agents are not performing those
acts necessary for reaching “the good life”). 78

1.1.3 Legal Moralism and Legal Paternalism
Again, while the harm principle allows for interference only in cases where there is harm
or likely harm to others, legal moralism allows for interference in the liberty of others in order to
prevent acts that may be considered immoral, but not necessarily harmful, such as homosexual
sex and other “deviant” but consensual sexual acts. These acts are usually considered to be
offensive to others but not really harmful to others. 79 They may argue that the harm that occurs is
to the participants but this is not harm to others. Legal paternalism increases those actions and
behaviors covered over and above those included in the harm principle by allowing for
interference in the liberty of another for that agent’s own good, which is usually interpreted as
preventing self-inflicted harm to the agent, such as mandating seat belts or laws against suicide,
or benefit to the agent, such as being required to pay into social security (though the latter sort of

77
See, Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010);
Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Sara Conly, Against
Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) among many others.
78
Gerald Dworkin, “Moral Paternalism,” (Law and Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2005): 305–31.
79
See chapters 1.2.6 and 5.4.1 for discussions of offense.

32

interference generally does not apply to criminal law).

1.1.4 Moral Paternalism
Moral paternalism is often a version of perfectionism and, according to Dworkin, allows
for the interference in the liberty of another to improve that agent’s moral good or well-being (as
opposed to preventing self-inflicted or consensual physical harm) or to prevent harm to the
agent’s moral character or soul. 80 This can be understood to mean either improvement to or
salvaging of one’s moral character or prevention of harm to one’s moral character, an example
would be something like making people volunteer at a charitable venue to promote generosity, or
not allowing them to consume certain products such as drugs or alcohol.
It is interesting to note that most, if not all, of the theorists who advocate these additional
liberty limiting principles include some type of harm to others principle in their arsenal but wish
to also restrict more behaviors through the criminal law. For this reason the harm principle seems
to be the most common ground for discussion and best place to begin.

1.2 Defining the Private Sphere of Liberty
As noted, Mill’s principle relies on a notion of harm to “others” serving as the only
legitimate means of interference in the liberty of individuals and Mill distinguishes his principle
from other liberty limiting principles such as moralism and paternalism which consider harm to
self in addition to harm to others as legitimate grounds for interference. However, while it may
seem intuitive or obvious what “harm to others” means, Mill purposely outlines what he intends
the sphere of other-regarding actions to encapsulate so as to ward off potential criticisms that
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stem from the idea that “no man is an island” and all acts are other-regarding in some manner,
even seemingly self-regarding behaviors. Mill’s distinction here also serves as a way to address
the legal moralist and paternalist who attempt to increase controllable or prohibitable behaviors
beyond that of the harm principle. For instance, many people claim that they are affected when
someone else does something immoral or when they are offended by something another does. Is
it the case that this is harm to others and properly covered? Mill addresses these concerns by
drawing a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts as they relate to the harm
principle, preventing harm, and the limits of the law and society at large (OL I: 9, I:12, I:14, IV,
V: 6). 81

1.2.1 Self-Regarding Versus Other-Regarding Acts
Mill divides actions into two (very rough) categories, those that are primarily selfregarding and those that are primarily other-regarding because in understanding the scope of
authority over individuals, Mill claims that “to individuality should belong the part of life in
which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests
society” (OL IV: 2). Mill asserts that in any case in which an individual does not significantly,
primarily, or chiefly affect the lives of others by his/her action, then “there should be perfect
freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences” (OL IV: 3). Even in the
case where the individual is in error as to what is morally right or even what is harmful to the
agent, it is better for society, according to Mill, that he/she be left alone to act in whatever
manner he/she sees fit (so long as there is not harm to others) contrary to what both the moralist
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and the paternalist would likely claim. Those in society who are concerned for the moral wellbeing of the individual may offer advice or plead for a change, others who condemn the acts of
the individual may choose to separate themselves from the individual; however, it is not the case
that others are permitted to “make his life uncomfortable” or actively seek to control the actions
of the individual (OL IV: 7). For Mill, even moral coercion is not an acceptable form of
interference in those actions that are primarily self-regarding. If, on the other hand, harm is likely
to be caused to others, then it is acceptable for the individual to be prevented from performing
the act.

1.2.2 Is the Self- and Other-Regarding Distinction Helpful?
Despite his attempt to delineate what exactly he means by self- and other-regarding acts,
Mill’s distinction here has resulted in a great deal of criticism, much of which Mill himself
addresses (OL IV). Indeed, David O. Brink believes that the self/other-regarding distinction is
unhelpful despite Mill’s effort at exposition.82 However, I believe this discussion is incredibly
helpful in making a distinction between those acts that can be regulated and those that cannot.
For instance, we know there are two (admittedly rough) categories and that one, the selfregarding, is never permissible for legislation. The second category, the other-regarding, may be
eligible for regulation but that does not mean that it must be regulated.
For instance, as Brink points out, there are seemingly other-regarding acts that are merely
offensive, Mill does not believe that they should be regulated, but this does not mean that they
are not other-regarding only that they are perhaps not harmful. In discussing offensive behaviors,
Mill indicates that this sort of behavior is primarily self-regarding even though people take
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offense to it (so there is some aspect of other-regardingness) because the actions of the individual
do not impact/harm the interests of others. For Mill we do not seem to have a significant interest
in not being offended. To cite some of Mill’s examples, after discussing the Muslim aversion to
eating pork he claims
the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest
degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the
Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The
people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious,
but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these
perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against nonCatholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other’s liberty in
things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible
consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to
suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger
case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal
immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those
who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of
persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and
that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of
admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the
application to ourselves (OL IV: 15).
This highlights the idea that every group has actions or ideas that offend them and that they think
are immoral. However, when we look to examples of things that we do that others think are
impious, it provides a striking and clear case in which we believe it should not be prohibited. As
Mill says, “no stronger case can be shown” for why prohibiting immoralities is a “gross
injustice” (OL IV: 15). What Mill seems to be doing is using this distinction between offensive
and harmful conduct to refine the categories. So, conduct that is other-regarding becomes a
candidate for prohibition only insofar as it is also harmful. If conduct is only self-regarding it is
not eligible, even if there is harm to the agent performing the act. Mill states that “but with
regard to the merely contingent … injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which
neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable
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individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake
of the greater good of human freedom” (OL IV: 11). 83 So, there are divisions that may not be
decisive because even some other-regarding harmful behavior may not be legislatable, i.e.
offensive conduct or “immoral” conduct.
While these distinctions may not be decisive, I do not think they are “false” or
“unhelpful” as Brink believes. 84 Part of the reason why Brink believes the distinction is false or
unhelpful is because he is reading Mill as claiming either that “the harm principle is equivalent to
letting society restrict all and only other-regarding conduct” or that “on this view it is … perhaps
always permissible to regulate other-regarding conduct.” 85 This is much too strong of a claim
and Mill does not make it. Brink’s claim here would include too much because all and only
other-regarding conduct would also include other-regarding beneficial acts, such as charity. This
clearly affects the interests of others but it is a beneficial act and not harmful. Thus, the harm
principle would not cover nearly as much as Brink suggests in this quote. If Brink meant all and
only those harmful other-regarding conducts, even this would be too broad of a claim as Mill
would say that there are certain instances of harmful other-regarding conduct that should not be
prohibited because the harm of prohibition would be more invasive than the initial harmful
behavior. However, Mill would say that all harmful other-regarding behavior is eligible for
discussion as to whether it should be prevented or not. 86
Where things get messy is when one admits that the distinctions are not sharp, always
clear, or mutually exclusive. Mill admits that acts that are primarily self-regarding or primarily
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other-regarding are to be considered. But when we look at the distinctions, we find that it may be
the case that an act is primarily self-regarding but does affect others in some ways, i.e. a single
man gambling away his money is primarily self-regarding, but it does affect his family through
their disapproval, his bad influence on children, etc. However, the significant interests of the
others are not affected. They have no claim on his money, he has not promised it to them, etc.
So, this falls in the category of primarily self-regarding conduct. Analogously, while some
conduct may be merely offensive and not harmful, some behavior is harmful and offensive, so
even these categories are not mutually exclusive. So, there are really two sets of overlapping
categories, those related to harmful/non-harmful conduct and those related to other-/selfregarding conduct. Indeed, Brink notes that for Mill “only other-regarding conduct that is
harmful can be regulated.” 87 This highlights the two important components of the harm principle
but fails to recognize that the self-/other-regarding distinction is not meant to be a sharp or hard
distinction just as the offensive/harmful distinction is not always sharp. And while these
categories individually may not provide a final conclusion as to which conduct may be interfered
with or not, they are useful in the categorization process. This failure to draw a conclusive
division may be what Brink meant by Mill’s self/other-regarding categories being “unhelpful,”
but I think that many distinctions involve such sloppy language and diving in and dividing the
conduct provides helpful clues as to what conduct is appropriate and which is not for legislation.
Therefore, examining what Mill says on the matter is a useful endeavor.

1.2.3 Social Obligations and Other-Regarding Acts
The main criticism of the distinction between self- and other-regarding behavior has been
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the focus of a debate over what it can mean for an act or “part of life” to involve only the
individual to the exclusion of others (OL IV: 8). This characterization of the division is
problematic for the reasons stated above, namely it does not have to involve only the individual
but must primarily involve only the individual. However, Mill further clarifies what he means by
other-regarding conduct when he claims that while there is not a social contract that binds
individuals together, the fact that all citizens receive protection—and I would add many
benefits—from living in a society or state creates an obligation “to observe a certain line of
conduct towards the rest” (OL IV: 3). This obligation serves to outline the realm of “otherregarding” conduct which amounts to those actions which directly and significantly affect the
interests of others. Such conduct, according to Mill,
consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain
interests, which either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding ought
to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be
fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for
defending the society or its members from injury and molestation (OL IV: 3).
The second obligation that he states describes the responsibilities that citizens have to the
protection of the state. For Mill, this is part of the obligation that agents incur upon utilizing the
protections that society grants in times of peace. The first condition, though, is generally
considered to define those acts which agents may or may not perform precisely because they
interfere with the rights and liberty of others against their will. The limits that the government
may impose on the liberty of citizens is based upon preventing them from harming others.
However, he notes that there are certain acts and behaviors that do not violate or infringe
on rights 88 or significant interests of others but “may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due
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consideration for their welfare” (OL IV: 3). These acts, he claims, may be “justly punished by
opinion, though not by law” (OL IV: 3). 89 These acts may very well contain some of the
aforementioned “offensive conduct” that Mill discussed as being primarily self-regarding. It is
not the case that it does not interfere in the interests of others, surely none of us want to be
offended, but the interference is not of a significant interest that one has. To prevent such
conduct it seems, for Mill, would fail a balancing test and would be overly invasive of individual
liberty because such conduct falls into the primarily self-regarding sphere that still affects others
to some degree. 90 We do not have a “right” not to be offended and some offensive acts may be
considered “wanting in due consideration” for others but are not intrusive of significant interests
of others. 91

1.2.4 Division of Acts
So, there are at least three types of acts and these types of acts may be regulated in
different ways. The type of acts are: 1. those that interfere with the liberty/rights/significant
interests of others. These are other-regarding acts that interfere with the significant interests and
rights of others. 92 2. Those that do not interfere with the rights/interests of individuals but do not
properly respect the welfare of others. Mill claims that these may be “hurtful to others, or
wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their
constituted rights” (OL IV: 3). These are other-regarding but, for Mill, fall on the line between
primarily other-regarding and primarily self-regarding. These are minor infractions which are
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still other-regarding but do not cause the sort of harm that is relevant for the criminal law. 93 As
indicated above, some offensive behavior may fall into this category though it seems that Mill
would classify most offensive behavior as primarily self-regarding. And most important for
Mill’s discussion here, 3. those acts that primarily affect the individual (or others with their
consent) and are self-regarding. These are clearly self-regarding but may also include some of
the offensive behavior that does not harm others.
The latter domain is frequently criticized as a chimera because all important actions
affect the feelings and lives of others to some degree. However, this seems to be missing Mill’s
point. He is not saying, and does not pretend, that the actions of individuals do not affect others,
what he is doing here is providing a delineation (an admittedly sloppy one) as to which sorts of
acts are acceptable to restrict in order to preserve the liberty of others while also granting the
most robust liberty to those who would be restricted. But it is this third category of self-regarding
acts which are of central importance for a liberal iteration of the harm principle because Mill
believes that they may not be prohibited under any circumstances because they do not harm
others. The second category, Mill seems to suggest, may be covered by extra-legal social
pressures. They may be hurtful or harmful but do not violate or infringe any rights. And while
they fail to consider the welfare of others, they may not be prevented by legal means. 94 Here
extra-legal just means those things that are not covered by the law. It does not refer to illegal
coercive interferences but rather things such as social pressures or “moral coercion.” The first
category contains those acts that are generally accepted legitimate restrictions on the liberty of
certain people because those individuals are harming others.
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1.2.5 Direct and Indirect Effects
There is another distinction that Mill attempts to make to clarify his harm principle. This
division can be seen when he claims that “there is a sphere of action in which society, as
distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest” (OL I: 12). This sphere
contains acts which affect the individual alone “or if it also affects others, only with their free,
voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation” (OL I: 12). Mill, nevertheless, admits that
many may still disagree that the aspect of an individual’s life that both affect and do not affect
others are indeed distinct. Critics may claim that there can be no actions that harm, affect, or
involve only a single individual. The critic may claim that “it is impossible for a person to do
anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least to his
near connections, and often far beyond them” (OL IV: 8). When Mill claims that it affects only
the agent in question and not others he means directly and not indirectly.
Many actions, if not all, affect others to some degree indirectly. This means that others
are affected but only obliquely through the agent him/herself. In other words, anything that an
agent does will affect others; however, the manner in which others are affected matters when
performing an act. If someone merely dislikes or disapproves of an act that the agent is
performing, this affects that person but not appreciably and it definitely does not interfere with
the other’s significant interests. What a co-worker, friend, lover, child does, believes, and thinks
affects those around him/her 95 but if a person chooses, for instance to partake in a juice fast, this
does not really affect those around him/her directly (but rather indirectly) even if others think
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that juice fasts are foolish or harmful to the body. 96 The same goes for drinking an alcoholic
beverage, which is the example that Mill favors, because while it may be the case that people
dislike or disapprove of drinking alcohol, it does not harm or significantly affect those others in
the usual case. These are examples of primarily self-regarding acts. They may be immoral, they
may be offensive, but they are not significantly harmful to others or do not harm their significant
interests.

1.2.6 The Self-Regarding Sphere
Mill lists several categories which he believes to be part of the self-regarding sphere. The
first is the inner “domain of consciousness” including the “liberty of thought and feeling;
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,
moral, or theological” (OL I: 12). This domain also includes the separate but related area of
public expression and freedom of press. (Mill spends considerable time defending the thesis that
freedom of thought and speech are of fundamental importance and I will come back to this
topic.) 97 The second area of the self-regarding sphere is the “Liberty of tastes and pursuits; of
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like … so long as what we
do does not harm them” (OL I: 12). The second aspect contains those actions like drinking
alcohol or going on a juice fast. It may also contain other, more controversial, things like
euthanasia, suicide, and doing drugs. These acts are often perceived as harmful to the agent who
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performs them (and those who voluntarily participate in the acts with them); however, they are
primarily self-regarding acts and are undertaken voluntarily. The third aspect of the selfregarding sphere covers the “Freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others”
(OL I: 12). The third self-regarding aspect of liberty covers consensual acts and is also
significant when considering issues such as Ku Klux Klan or white supremacist rallies or other
such gatherings that stray dangerously close to legislatable other-regarding behavior. 98 Acts like
engaging in prostitution or promiscuity, engaging in homosexuality, and attending book clubs or
other meetings are part of this arena.
There is also additional criticism related to such acts because of behavior that may follow
from participating in these acts. For instance, it could be the case that agent A decides to visit a
prostitute. His visit to the prostitute affects not only himself and the prostitute (a willing,
consenting, adult participant), but also perhaps his brother, child, friend, sister, mother, neighbor,
etc. (OL IV: 9). In many cases, it is not direct harm of others but indirect harm that critics
describe. Indirect harm caused to “near connections,” such as embarrassment, failure of a role
model to behave accordingly, disgrace of a family, or even most instances of offense (that are not
also harmful), are not enough to transform an act from a self-regarding to an other-regarding act
because it is not the case that the “harm” caused in these cases is sufficient enough to infringe on
an individual’s liberty. 99 To do so would have negative repercussions for liberty and individual
freedom.
If, on the other hand, through this self-regarding action, agent A inflicts direct harm on
others, such as passing on AIDS or other sexually transmitted diseases to offspring or other
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sexual partners, use of funds that would prevent the care of dependents, physical harm to others,
or the breaking of a vow, then his behavior may be subject either to the law or social pressures.
For example, if agent A spends her child support money on gambling or some frivolity, and is
thus unable to take care of her child, it may be the case that her behavior should be censured and
she should be held liable. However, in this case, Mill stresses that it is not the act of gambling
that is reprehensible, but the failure to fulfill the parental duties that is the actual problem with
the act. So, again, it is not exactly clear that even in cases of direct harm to others due to an
individual’s acts that the act that people may attempt to prohibit—gambling—is morally
unacceptable because it is often corollary behavior that makes the act wrong—the failure to pay
child support. In other words, gambling as an act should not be prohibited because it does not
harm others but failure to pay child support is really what causes the harm and that behavior, not
the gambling per se, should be prohibited (OL IV: 10). When a society condemns certain acts,
such as prostitution, gambling, and drug use, as harmful, it is often not based on the selfregarding action, but some other act that may be prohibited by law or morality. Thus, Mill argues
that many acts that are typically reviled as impermissible for others to perform are really selfregarding actions that in themselves are not wrong, and the law or the state has no justification
for prohibiting them simply because they flout custom or have the potential in some cases to lead
to harmful acts. 100

1.2.7 The Individual Case
While the above-mentioned actions themselves are generally harmless to others, if in
individual cases negative consequences to others follow on a regular basis, for instance a certain
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individual consistently abuses a spouse or fights others when under the influence of alcohol, such
a case may justly warrant interference in this case because the predictable likelihood of harm that
would follow. Mill claims that
The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent
precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely selfregarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention
or punishment. Drunkenness, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject
for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person,
who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence
of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself;
that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if
when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he
would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making
himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a
crime against others (OL V: 6 Emphasis added).
However, if there is no harm to others then such things “cannot without tyranny be made a
subject of legal punishment; but if … a man fails to perform his legal duties to others … it is no
tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation” (OL V: 6). Yet, it is important to emphasize that the
legitimate restriction would be for that particular individual or to use Mill’s words “personal to
himself” and not for everyone who participates in the action in question. So, if the individual is
known to be violent when consuming alcohol, that individual can legitimately be prevented from
drinking alcohol. Additionally, on this account, gun laws which restrict certain violent felons
from using firearms or those with psychiatric illnesses would be acceptable on a Millian account
because they cease to be primarily self-regarding and begin to fall into the realm of otherregarding conduct.
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1.3 The Harm Principle, Self-Regarding Acts, and Consent
1.3.1 The Magic of Consent
In dividing acts into those with which it is permissible to interfere and those it is not, acts
that are both harmful and other-regarding seem to clearly fall into the permissible realm of
interference in the liberty of others. For instance, you punch me in the face. This is harmful and
other-regarding. This act would be covered by the harm principle and could be prohibited. But
what about boxing? On the surface, boxing is you punching me in the face but it is not generally
thought to be an acceptable realm of interference. Why not?—because of the magic of consent.
Consent takes acts that on their face seem to be unacceptable and transforms them into
acceptable and legitimate acts which are protected by Mill’s self-regarding sphere of liberty.
Here is another useful illustration: someone removes a perfectly healthy kidney from my body.
The kidney is healthy and non-diseased, kidneys are useful to me, and thus I have an interest in
keeping my kidney. To take my kidney would be harmful and other-regarding and would rightly
be prevented by the harm principle. However, if I freely consent to you taking my kidney, it
seems that it is no longer an unacceptable act with which others may interfere.
When discussing such self-regarding acts, Mill claims “there is a sphere of action in
which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest;
comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it
also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation”
(OL I: 12 Emphasis added). The harm principle states that acts that cause harm to others are a
legitimate reason for interference in the liberty of individuals. Acts that harm only the self or
other non-harmful self-regarding acts are not legitimately interfered with and we see that when
Mill considers and outlines self-regarding acts, his third category of self-regarding acts includes
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agents uniting of their own free will. While this third category of self-regarding acts seems to be
other-regarding (after all, it seems that if my actions involve another that means it is otherregarding), Mill focuses on the idea that they are consensual. Indeed, one of the concepts Mill
builds into the harm principle is consent and when someone offers his/her valid consent to what
would ordinarily be considered a harmful act, the consent transforms the act so that it is no
longer legitimately prohibited as a harmful other-regarding act.
In a way, consensual acts between several individuals transform the act so that, for Mill
and most liberals, these consensual acts are not really other-regarding and now fall into the
primarily self-regarding sphere. It is perhaps better thought of as several individuals performing
self-regarding acts together, this still has an other-regarding component but it is not an
impermissible sort of other-regarding act. This category of actions is specifically delineated by
Mill’s third category of self-regarding conduct, namely the “Freedom to unite, for any purpose
not involving harm to others” (OL I: 12). This category concerns all consensual acts. Consent
effectively legitimizes certain acts that, without consent, could be legislatable as coercive otherregarding acts. This consent takes these acts out of the sphere of legitimate interference and
places them firmly into the inviolate self-regarding sphere.
For an act to be consensual, all parties must voluntarily grant permission. If they are not
consented to by each party they may be harmful other-regarding acts. But, when an agent
consents to an act, the act becomes a part of the self-regarding sphere. When something is selfregarding and not harmful, others are not permitted to interfere in the liberty of those acting
agents. The harm principle is concerned with determining legitimate coercive interference in the
liberty of others. Because of the consent, these acts are no longer a concern of the harm principle
since the acts are now transformed into self-regarding acts, which are not properly regulated by
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the harm principle (the exception of course, is unless such consensual group actions would harm
innocent nonconsenting third parties). And while consensual acts do involve others, since there is
consent, they seem to revert back into primarily self-regarding acts that are done with others
(who are also doing something that is primarily self-regarding). Consensual acts are not
regulatable because they are not interfering with the person’s interests; in fact, it seems that we
are respecting the interests of the agent in question when we do not interfere with consensual acts
and to prohibit such behavior would be to go against the agent’s interests.

1.3.2 Consent and Personal Autonomy
In part, consent plays such a significant role in legitimizing certain sorts of conduct
because of the value that Mill and other liberals place on the concept of liberty and personal
autonomy. While Mill does not speak in terms of “autonomy” he seems to provide an account of
personal freedom and autonomy that speaks to subsequent liberals. Indeed, even the Kantian
philosopher Onora O’Neill claims that “contemporary conceptions of rational autonomy … owe
more to John Stuart Mill than to Kant” and “they rely on background theories that see rational
action as guided by individuals’ desires, preferences, beliefs, and ‘identities.’” 101 My
autonomous realm is an inviolable realm in which others may not impede without my direct
consent, i.e. it is a primarily self-regarding realm. If another interferes with me, they are doing
something wrongful, i.e. something that unjustifiably sets back my interests, harms me, violates
or infringes my rights, and that person’s actions may be subject to the law. 102 On the other hand,
if I consent to an act, I cannot legitimately complain to the government or law when the act
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occurs. 103
Consent seems to be a common and necessary determining moral factor in permissible
and impermissible human interactions. It determines the difference between battery and sport, in
fist fighting vs. boxing, for instance, of theft and gift, rape and sex, and more generally, perhaps
most importantly for this analysis, between wrongful harm and legitimate voluntary acts. 104
Consent represents a norm for determining permissibility. When an agent consents to an act, the
act is no longer legislatable because it is taken from the harmful other-regarding sphere and
placed in the self-regarding sphere. Yet once again, it is the act of consent that serves as a
legitimizing factor. But not all instances where there appears to be consent legitimizes the shift
from the other-regarding sphere to the self-regarding sphere. When consent does have this
legitimizing ability it is considered to be valid consent. For this shift to be legitimate the consent
must be valid. If the consent is invalid, then there is not a legitimate shift into the self-regarding
sphere. But what exactly makes consent valid? 105

1.3.3 Valid and Invalid Consent
Generally, there are three conditions that distinguish valid from invalid consent: 1. mental
competence, 2. voluntariness, and 3. not being deceived (sometimes understood as being
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informed). 106 If any of the three components are missing, the consent is invalid. Mill himself sets
forth criteria along these lines when he argues that the “freedom to unite” only extends to those
“of full age, and not forced or deceived” (OL I: 12). And later he claims that “there is no room
for entertaining any such question [relating to interfering with an individual] when a person’s
conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they
like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding)”
(OL IV: 3). These components determine when acts are consensual or coercive (not valid
consent). In other words, if an individual does not have the relevant understanding of the
situation, the act is coercive. If the person is physically or verbally forced, the act is coercive. If
the person is too young/immature mentally, the act is coercive. In all of these cases, we could
justifiably interfere.

1.3.4 Mental Competence
The first criterion, mental competence refers to agents being able to adequately
understand what is occurring. There are different reasons why a person would lack the necessary
capacity to make a decision, some of these capacities are a permanent condition and others are
temporary. A person who is mentally ill or mentally disabled is considered incompetent to
validly consent in many circumstances. Determining the degree of the impairment is important,
as in some cases those with mental impairments are not impaired to such a degree that all acts of
consent are automatically invalidated. However, while severe mental diseases or disabilities are
often permanent or develop into a semi-permanent condition (consider senility), this is not
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always the case and indeed some mental diseases or disabilities can be reversed using medicine
or are merely temporary conditions (consider intoxication or a concussion).
The most clear-cut and common instance of someone with a “temporary” case of mental
incompetence is in children who are under the “age of consent.” At one point in all our lives we
were unable to give valid consent to an act because we were unable to fully comprehend the
nature of the situation or to make an informed decision about it. As we grow and mature, we gain
the ability to comprehend situations and provide valid consent. This ability varies in all
individuals and each individual may gain the ability at different times. The law attempts to
reflect this when it determines ages of consent. There are different ages set by law for different
situations depending on the impact the decision could have on a minor’s life (such as sexual
intercourse or the legal drinking age) or even society at large (as is the case with setting a voting
age or the legal drinking age).
Unfortunately, the age of consent that is set by law can oftentimes be problematic as it is
generally used to determine mental maturity and some individuals mature at differing rates. 107 It
is important to recognize that while age of consent laws attempt to capture the reality that those
without mental maturity ought to be protected, the law itself does not determine actual mental
maturity. Nevertheless, setting an age under which one lacks the ability to consent is both
essential and beneficial because it protects the interests, well-being, and liberty of children who
oftentimes cannot adequately protect themselves. However, once a person “comes of age” they
are generally deemed competent to consent, thus making the incapacity merely temporary. 108
This position regarding the age of consent is reflected in On Liberty. For instance, Mill
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claims that
it is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children,
or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external
injury (OL I: 10).
This would also apply to the above cases of those with severely diminished mental faculties that
are permanent disabilities since those individuals “are still in a state to require being taken care
of by others” (OL I: 10). Paternalistic policies for such individuals are acceptable for the law in
general and the criminal law may only consider paternalistic policies if they apply to such
individuals. Other cases that affect the ability of individuals to validly consent to otherwise
harmful acts include the use of drugs and alcohol as well as temporary mental disturbances.
These cases are some of the more difficult cases in which to determine valid consent because the
nature of the incapacitation as well as the degree is not always clear.

1.3.5 Being Informed or Not Being Deceived
Receiving all the relevant information is the second necessary condition for valid
consent. This allows us to make an informed decision so that we do not unintentionally give our
consent to something which we would not have otherwise. 109 Protecting citizens from the harm
of such fraud is legitimate. What it means to receive all the “relevant facts” before validly
consenting is difficult to outline. David Archard argues that “the person does not need to know
everything, only everything that would make a real difference to whether or not she
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consented.” 110 Some facts are easily understood to be relevant and others not. The relevant facts
can include a number of things but tend to include “what is being consented to, prior or
background information bearing on that which is consented to, or what may transpire in
consequence of the giving of consent.” 111

1.3.6 Voluntariness
The last necessary component of valid consent is voluntariness which in some cases is
closely related to the second knowledge criterion but in other ways surpasses simply being
properly informed. When an agent is properly informed, that agent is able to assess whether or
not to give valid consent. The less we know, the less free we are in choosing to consent.
However, there are cases at the top of the scale in which there is no choice given to consent, such
as when force, threat, or coercion is used. In all three of these cases valid consent is never
legitimately given because of the lack of voluntariness.
Interferences that prevent this sort of interference are legitimate. All the same, there are
cases in which an agent appears to “freely” consent to something which on the surface seems
valid (i.e. there is no outward coercion or threat perceived) but upon further inspection is actually
a case of other-regarding harm and can be condemned using the harm principle. 112 There are
certain cases in which an action or choice falls somewhere on a line between completely unfree
(compulsion by physical force) and free (completely voluntary). Compulsion and force are ways
of acting toward a person without permission, there is no consent involved, it is something done
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to a person, not something to which there is any choice. 113 However, there are many other ways
in which consent can be invalidated which have to do with illegitimate forms of coercion.
Consent is important because it helps to delineate when a person’s rights have been violated or
infringed. 114 For any act of consent to be valid, it must be free and informed, as well as given by
an agent that is mentally competent. If these criteria are not met, the act is coercive and the
consent is not valid. If the consent is not valid and there is harm to others, then the government
may be permitted to enact laws to prohibit such a violation of another’s rights. If the consent is
valid then it falls within Mill’s sphere of self-regarding liberty and outside of the domain of the
harm principle.
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Chapter 2
A “Simple” Principle?

2.1 Mill’s Very General Harm Principle
While Mill believes that all coercive actions, whether by the individual or the
government, can be governed by “one very simple principle”—the harm principle—it seems he
does not always distinguish which behaviors are acceptable for the law to cover and which are
not (OL I: 9). In other words, it is not always clear which acts he considers to warrant
interference by the government and which acts are merely within the domain of public extralegal 115 coercion or even completely independent of coercive intervention by anyone, even when
harmful. 116 He makes claims such as
Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may
be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the
unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of
mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make
himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in
what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and
judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that
opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation,
to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost (OL III: 1).
This passage suggests that there is a distinction and a line to be drawn between acts that are of a
certain type which warrant some kind of interference by others (harmful other-regarding) and
those that are not (self-regarding), but he seems to make a further distinction between those
other-regarding acts that warrant legal interference and those that warrant merely extra-legal
social interference. In other passages, Mill suggests that there is indeed a division between legal
and extra-legal social coercion. For instance, he claims in some instances “the offender may then
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be justly punished by opinion, though not by the law” (OL IV: 3). And that “if anyone does an
act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal
penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (OL I: 11). However, he does not
actually clearly set that line because he was not directly concerned with doing so in On Liberty.
In other words, Mill is concerned with the harm principle as a principle which is “entitled
to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and
control” (OL I: 9). His goal is general in that it does not matter “whether the means used be
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion” (OL I: 9
Emphasis added). But even here he recognizes that there are different criteria governing extralegal social coercion and legal coercion. I believe that to understand the differences we really
need to describe two separate principles, Mill’s “general harm principle” which dictates all
behaviors which become the business of others when considering coercive intervention and a
“legal harm principle” which determines which behaviors become the business of the state.
While I am not alone in recognizing this distinction—indeed Feinberg’s harm principle
and four-part Moral Limits of the Criminal Law depend upon such a distinction 117 and later
theorists such as Simester and von Hirsch depend upon it as well 118—I wish to draw attention to
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the fact that it is a distinct or perhaps a sub-principle that Mill does not make explicit in On
Liberty. Part of the reason it is important to make this distinction explicit and to look to what
Mill says regarding both his general principle and a specifically legal one is that confusions tend
to be introduced when we fail to acknowledge or emphasize this difference. It seems that many
argue over whether he is primarily concerned with the law or extra-legal social pressure when
defining his principle. 119 However, he is primarily concerned with neither and distinguishing
between acceptable legal interference and extra-legal social interference is a separate but
intimately connected issue with which he was not particularly concerned.
It seems that if we want to understand what Mill means by harm being the justifying
criterion for interference and, further, what Mill intends to serve as a division between those acts
that warrant interference by law and those that do not, we need to do a bit more interpretive work
since he does not lay out a plan for dividing interference in this manner. As the above statements
by Mill suggest, he acknowledges that there is some sort of division between what the law can
and cannot cover but he does not lay out exactly what that division is. As I will outline in
chapters 3 and 4, it seems that if we want to understand where the lines are drawn to separate the
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legal harm principle from the general harm principle and legal interference from extra-legal
interference, we should focus on his discussions of interests, liberties, and rights. 120 These
concepts, I will argue, aid in developing a full understanding of what is to count as the sort of
harm or risk of harm that ought to be regulated by the state through the penal law.
When determining which acts fall under the legal domain for restriction and which do
not, I will argue that it seems that the legal harm principle only covers those things that are of a
certain type to justify the legally mandated punishments that accompany its restrictions. It seems
then, that the first question for Mill in On Liberty is: “is there harm to others?” 121 If the answer to
this question is “yes,” then society may intervene to prevent it—though this does not mean they
should on balance. Mill often claims that it may be better not to intervene in some cases. 122 From
there, a second question that seems to follow is: “if society may intervene, in what manner
should they do so?” or “If the harm is enough to warrant interference, then when is legal
interference appropriate?” Mill lays out some vague criteria that I believe we may use to derive a
legal harm principle that is both broad and useful and I will address the criticism that it covers
too much or not enough. 123 When assessing Mill’s understanding of harm in chapters 3 and 4, I
will attempt to make the distinction between the general harm principle that Mill outlines and the
legal harm principle that I am forwarding in order to understand how the harm principle can
become a principle to determine criminal legislation. However, before delving into this
quagmire, there is a bit more preliminary work that must be done to understand what Mill’s
general harm principle covers.
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2.2 Harm to Others: Necessary and/or Sufficient Condition for Justifying Coercive
Interference?
One of the first things that is often discussed in order to understand Mill’s formulation of
the harm principle is if/how the principle uses harm to decide the permissibility of the coercive
interference of others. In other words, is harm or the likelihood of harm a necessary and/or
sufficient condition for the legitimate interference in the liberty of others? Though there are
different interpretations on where Mill stands relative to this question, part of this confusion rests
on a few different conflations of what Mill is doing in On Liberty. There are two primary
interpretive difficulties that we need to address to sort out the confusion.

2.2.1 Some Interpretive Confusions
First, we need to understand that Mill is not focused on the legal question only. Mill does
not separate his discussion of the general harm principle and the legal harm principle. Once we
are clear on that, we can recognize that some interpretive difficulty is a result of theorists failing
to make this distinction or failing to maintain adherence to this distinction. The second thing we
need to keep in mind is what the scope of the harm principle is for Mill. This will help us to
understand what he is actually trying to do. Mill is attempting to lay out the domain or the
jurisdiction of society in interfering with individual liberty and is only then looking at potential
justification of the interference, though he does mention and discuss both in various contexts. For
instance, he seems to argue pretty strongly in his formulation of the harm principle that harm or
likelihood of harm is necessary but it is not always clear if he thinks it is sufficient for both
deciding the jurisdiction of society and justifying interference in liberty. And when we introduce
the potential of a legal harm principle, there is further confusion as to whether harm is sufficient
for justifying coercive legislation specifically because Mill is not attempting to actually create or
60

outline the conditions for a legal harm principle (OL V: 3). 124 I will proceed in my investigation
by highlighting and focusing on the various confusions and conflations that arise when
discussing what the conditions of the harm principle are attempting to define and then I will
propose a solution as to how the confusions may be solved.

2.2.2 Necessary Condition for Justifying Coercive Interference
To me, it is pretty clear that when Mill formulates the harm principle he means for harm
or the likelihood of harm to be a necessary condition for justifying coercive social interference in
the liberty of others as well as for determining the jurisdiction of social interference. Indeed, Mill
appears to define the harm principle in such a way that harm or the likelihood of harm is a
necessary condition for allowing interference in the liberty of individuals and the harm principle
serves as the only legitimate principle governing coercive human interaction. Brink claims that
“Mill clearly says that harm prevention is a necessary condition for restrictions of liberty to be
permissible. [But] It is not clear whether he thinks that harm prevention is sufficient to justify
restrictions on liberty.” 125 So here Brink is highlighting one of the difficulties that arises, namely
that between conditions for restrictions on jurisdiction and justifying such restrictions.

2.2.3 Jurisdiction Versus Justification
As Brink notes, in places Mill gives the impression that harm is sufficient “to make the
conduct eligible for regulation” 126 but it is not clear that harm justifies such regulation. Again,
part of the reason for this confusion is that Mill was not concerned to make this distinction. For
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instance, when talking of the social obligations that citizens have toward one another—not to
injure the interests of others (harm them) and to bear one’s fair share in the labors and
sacrifices—Mill states that these societal obligations “society is justified in enforcing, at all costs
to those who endeavor to withhold fulfillment” (OL IV: 3). This suggests that society is justified
in enacting and enforcing laws (at all costs this suggests) as well as less invasive forms of
interference that prevent harm or risk of harm. This seems to introduce and discuss a sort of legal
harm principle as distinct from the general harm principle. But this does not include all harm or
risk of harm because Mill claims that the sorts of acts which society is “justified in enforcing, at
all costs” are “certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding
ought to be considered as rights” (OL IV: 3). Since not all instances of harm to others are rights
violations or infringements, it seems that at least in this case harm or risk of harm as such is not
sufficient to justify legislative interference (or maybe even extra-legal interference, we do not yet
know). So, it seems that certain sorts of interference may always be justified, namely those that
protect others from rights violations, and thus may be sufficient for justifying interference. 127
This seems to suggest that harm or risk of harm as such may not be sufficient for justifying
coercive intervention.
A further confusion is then introduced when Mill claims later in the same passage that
“As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society
has jurisdiction over it” (OL IV: 3). If society has jurisdiction over all harmful (prejudicial) acts,
then it seems that harm or risk of harm is a sufficient condition for justifying coercive
interference in the liberty of others. However, deciding the jurisdiction of society is different
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than justifying coercive interference. The harm principle decides that harm is necessary and
sufficient for the jurisdiction or domain of coercive interference but this does not mean that it
justifies all instances of coercive interference even if there is harmful other-regarding behavior
(which presumably is the domain or jurisdiction of the harm principle). 128 Brink makes this
distinction clear when he claims that “for society to have jurisdiction over harmful conduct
means that the conduct is in principle eligible for regulation or perhaps even that regulation of
that conduct is in fact permissible. But neither of these claims implies that regulation is required
or obligatory.” 129 This seems correct. However, he then says that this “demonstrates that Mill is
not committed to a simple version of the sufficiency of harm for restrictions on liberty.” 130

2.2.4 Mill’s Two Maxims
I believe that there is a passage in chapter V of On Liberty that can clear up some of these
issues. Mill claims that the “doctrine of this essay” is divided into “two maxims” which together
define the harm principle and must be “balanced” in order to determine “which of them [the
maxims] is applicable to the case” (OL V: 1–2). First, he has the general harm principle to decide
the domain of acceptable coercive interference (when society has jurisdiction) which he says is
other-regarding harmful behavior. He claims that his first maxim holds “that the individual is not
accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no other person
but himself” (OL V: 2). This defines the self-regarding realm which is not open to discussion of
interference in liberty (unless it interferes with the interests of others).
This is the main limitation on coercive interference because there is no harm to others. In
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the second maxim Mill defines the other-regarding sphere as an appropriate domain for
discussing coercive interference as well as justifying it. He claims that “for such actions as are
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected to either
social or to legal punishments, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for
its protection” (OL V: 2 Emphasis added). This latter part of the second maxim suggests that
there is something further needed to justify the actual interference once the domain has been
established. So, individuals may be subjected to the law or extra-legal intervention if certain
other things are considered. This is one of the places in On Liberty where Mill seems to
recognize the need for sub-principles, such as the legal harm principle. He actually seems to use
his second maxim, which is itself something like a sub-principle, to build these sorts of
subsidiary principles into the general harm principle which may expand the scope and usefulness
of the harm principle as a method for determining legislation.

2.2.5 Jurisdiction
So, I suggest that the discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions in relation to the
harm principle rests on a confusion as to what the harm principle’s main goal is. The harm
principle, while worried about justifying coercive interference, nevertheless focuses on
determining the proper jurisdiction of the harm principle first (determining if society may
interfere not saying it ought to). However, this is not to say that Mill ignores the need for
justification when defining his harm principle. Indeed, he claims that while harm is necessary for
determining justification of liberty invasion, there are several other balancing factors that may
decide if society should interfere. When Mill claims that “… if society is of the opinion that the
one or the other [social or legal interference] is requisite for its protection (OL V: 2),” or that
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“the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it,
becomes open to discussion (OL IV: 3),” it is these sorts of claims that breed confusion as to
whether harm or risk of harm serves as a sufficient condition for justifying interference in the
liberty of others or serves as a sufficient condition for determining the jurisdiction of society,
especially legislative interference.
When Mill introduces considerations of balancing to determine when society ought to
interfere, he is building criteria for justification. So, when discussing “prejudicial” or harmful
conduct he is specifying the domain or jurisdiction for discussing coercive interference. Once the
acts are in the domain of the harm principle, Mill suggests that there are certain sorts of harm to
others that are acceptably/justifiably interfered with by the law and those that are not. He claims
that all agents have an obligation to refrain from conduct that injures the interests of others “or
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought
to be considered as rights” (OL IV: 3). This begins his demarcation of a legal harm principle as
distinct from the general harm principle. As will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, it is in these
cases that we may interfere with the liberty of others through the law.
Mill claims there are other cases in which we are not able to interfere using the law.
These acts that may not be limited may include those that are “hurtful to others, or wanting in
due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted
rights” (OL IV: 3). Mill then claims that someone who acts in a manner that is hurtful (but not a
rights violation) “may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by the law” (OL IV: 3). So,
it seems that while Mill is claiming that with the harm principle harm or risk of harm is both
necessary and sufficient for putting the act into the domain of discussion of interference by
society, he is not really making any claims as to whether harm or risk of harm is sufficient for
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justifying coercive interference. This is not to say that he does not suggest that it is not sufficient
when he highlights several alternate considerations that would counter-balance or deny the
justified interference in liberty as he does in the passage above.
For instance, Mill states that just because harm can justify intervention does not mean
that it always justifies it (OL V: 3). If anything, Mill specifically states that he does not believe
that harm is sufficient for justifying societal interference when he says that “it must by no means
be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone
justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference” (OL V:
3). In other words, harm or risk of harm to others is the only thing that can justify interference,
but this does not mean that it will justify interference in each case or even most cases;
countervailing reasons often arise.

2.2.6 The Importance of Separating Justification from Jurisdiction
However, Brink suggests that there is a problem if Mill does not hold that the harm
principle is a sufficient condition for justifying interference because
if Mill wants to defend one very simple principle about restrictions on liberty,
then harm prevention had better be a sufficient, as well as a necessary, condition
for restriction. Because if harm prevention were only necessary, then it looks like
we would need additional principles to determine if regulations were appropriate.
So there is at least prima facie reason to treat Mill, at this point, as claiming harm
prevention is both necessary and sufficient for restricting liberty. 131
Indeed, later he claims that
if Mill rejects strong sufficiency then this compromises his one very simple
principle. For only strong sufficiency shows that the harm principle is the
complete guide to the regulation of liberty, telling us when regulation is
permissible and when it is required. Even weak sufficiency [pro tanto or prima
facie] implies that the harm principle must be supplemented with some other
131
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principle, such as the utilitarian principle, in order to determine if regulation is
permissible, much less required. 132
However, while Brink earlier highlights the difference between jurisdiction and justification, 133 it
seems that here Brink is failing to make this distinction clear. Once that distinction is made we
can see that harm or risk of harm may be a sufficient condition for determining the jurisdiction
of the harm principle but not for justifying legislation, which is what Brink seems to be
discussing here. It need not be a sufficient condition for the latter because for the principle to be
“simple” it need only have harm as a sufficient condition for determining jurisdiction not
regulation because the harm principle as such is not even attempting to determine what
legislation or regulation should or could be enforced. Mill is only, at this point, concerned with
whether it is acceptable for society to interfere or not, and he is not really concerned overall in
On Liberty to settle how society is to interfere (though he frequently discusses applying the
principle of utility in the balancing of harms to make such a consideration). 134
The harm principle is a very general principle and does indeed provide a basic guide to
determine if society may interfere. Further principles may be necessary to determine how and
when they should interfere. This, I believe, is what theorists, including Brink, often overlook.
While Brink recognizes Mill’s mixed motivations he neglects to maintain this distinction and
claims that while Mill is interested in “restrictions on liberty in various contexts” Mill is
“perhaps most interested in cases where the state uses civil and criminal law to forbid conduct
and applies sanctions for noncompliance.” And “it may be worth remembering the variety of
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restrictors and restrictions that concern Mill. But the central case that concerns him, it is still fair
to say, is that of legal prohibition by the state.” 135 This view is mistaken. It seems that in our
desire to apply the harm principle to legal regulations—which would be a useful tool—we miss
the fact that Mill is not actually trying to do that with the harm principle. Though Mill seems to
acknowledge that the law is appropriate in some situations and extra-legal means are appropriate
in others, he does not use the harm principle to yet solve that problem. We do in fact need a
secondary or sub-principle that determines how and when society can interfere but that is not to
say that Mill is mistaken when he claims that this is the only principle necessary to determine
“the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public
opinion” (OL I: 9 Emphasis added). Because here, he even states that he is not concerned with
which types of coercion is used, only that coercion occurs.

2.2.7 The Use of a Separate Legal Principle
Introducing a kind of legal harm principle that acknowledges and relies on the general
harm principle that Mill supplies and interpreting Mill’s view on when and how society may step
in would be beneficial and address Brink’s and other theorists’ concerns while also noting that
Mill is less specific (because that is not his primary goal) on the necessary and/or sufficient
conditions for justifying legislation. This is not to say that Mill is silent on the matter and indeed
his discussions on the law and legal restrictions are part of what breeds confusion. When Mill
discusses the sorts of regulations that may or may not be acceptable or legitimate for the law to
enact, he seems to have specific sorts of harm in mind. This is most clear when he singles out
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“rights violations” as being justifiably limited through the law but harmful acts that do not
violate rights are not justifiably limited through the law though they may be through extra-legal
means (OL IV: 3). 136 He seems to consider the nature of the harm or potential harm, the
seriousness of the harm, and the likelihood of the harm that the regulation would prevent and the
harm that restriction would produce as being the primary considerations one ought to make when
determining whether forbidding or restricting a potentially harmful act is justified through a
particular method. Harm or risk of harm must occur, but the harm or risk alone is not always
enough to justify interference legally or otherwise. Mill allows, as do most theorists, for there to
be additional countervailing reasons not to regulate the behavior. 137
This consideration may seem like a utilitarian proposal; however, preventing harm, on
virtually all theories, is the (or at least “a”) primary concern of the criminal law, regardless of the
theory. 138 Yet, if the harm in question is a relatively minor rights infringement or does not violate
a “right” as Mill states it, then there is little reason to restrict the behavior and the harm in this
circumstance would not provide a reason to enact any kind of penal regulation because the harm
of the regulation in these cases is much more severe than the harm of the acts in question. Many
theories rely on a balance test such as this. 139 Trivial occurrences are, on balance, too minor to be
a decisive measure for the criminal law (though all harm, one could argue is relevant). 140 Such
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trivial sorts of harm would generally not be enough to legitimize legislation and no one really
believes that they ought to be covered through the penal law even if they are included in its
domain. The harm that would happen to individual liberty if such acts were regulated, as well as
practical considerations—like increases in taxes to cover the cost of imprisoning individuals for
minor infractions—would be much more harmful than the initial act. And while it is the case that
other-regarding acts of harm are sufficient for determining the jurisdiction of society under the
general harm principle, there is a threshold of harm to others under which even Mill believes
individual liberty ought to prevail against the interference of others. This is seen when Mill
argues that in some instances of harm to others the individual him/herself may be the best means
for preventing the harm because any interference by others in any manner would be more
harmful than the initial harm. 141
Brink, acknowledging Mill’s utilitarianism, later argues that Mill seems to support a
“weaker version of sufficiency” based on the idea that there is a prima facie or pro tanto case for
regulation whenever one is harmed or is likely to be harmed. 142 He rightly claims that “if the
regulation is more harmful than the behavior in question, it may be best not to regulate, despite
the pro tanto case for regulation.” 143 This seems relatively straightforward and uncontroversial
but still seems to miss the point of what Mill is doing. Again, yes. Mill believes that harm
provides a pro tanto or prima facie case for regulation but regulation is only one means of
interfering in the liberty of others and regulations and the law are only a steeper consequence or
more formal sanction than extra-legal interference which is often the more appropriate means of
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interference according to Mill’s harm principle.
However, if Mill supports a “weak sufficiency,” as it appears, then Brink still contends
that “this compromises [Mill’s] one very simple principle” because the harm principle must rely
on other principles, such as the principle of utility or Mill’s two maxims 144 (to which we know
Mill appeals) and what Feinberg calls mediating maxims 145 (which may include the former two
principles). However, claiming that the harm principle is the primary or “absolute” governing
principle (OL I: 9) does not necessarily preclude other sub-filters or balancing considerations
from aiding in determining the application of the harm principle as it relates to regulation
especially considering that Mill’s overall goal is much broader than just legislation or legal
restrictions and applies to all interventions in liberty. I will discuss this question of application
and mediating maxims in chapter 6.

2.3 Justifying the Harm Principle: The Tyranny of the Majority
Mill claims that On Liberty is concerned with the “limits of the power which can be
legitimately exercised by society over the individual” (OL I: 1). While I, for the most part, am
concerned with the legitimate limits of the penal law (not even of government generally) Mill
concentrates here not only on the limits of government and the criminal law, but also (or
according to some interpretations, perhaps primarily146) on the limits of society and its pressures
on individuals. Mill believes that societal pressures can be as invasive, sometimes much more so,
than governmental intrusion into the lives of individuals because there are pressures that
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individuals can put on others that are more constant than legal strictures, such as customs,
morals, and rules of conduct (OL I: 6), over which the government generally does not, and ought
not, have any say. Mill claims that the oppression that stems from the “tyranny of the majority”
goes further and oftentimes is more nefarious than political oppression because “it leaves fewer
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul
itself” (OL I: 5).
It is important to stop and explain what Mill means by tyranny of the majority because it
brings to mind the idea of numerical majority and it need not be an actual majority. Indeed, when
Mill discusses ideas of liberty he notes that in reality, neither government of oneself by oneself
nor the will of the people is an accurate depiction of what tends to occur because there is a
community in which certain ideas tend to dominate and this may lead to subjugation of others in
the community. He claims that
The ‘people’ who exercise the power are not always the same people with those
over whom it is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the
government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people,
moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part
of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted
as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their
number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other
abuse of power (OL I: 4).
The majority, then, may very well be those with the requisite power, even if they are few in
number. They may manage to make their concerns, opinions, and interests of primary importance
and attempt to quell opposition to the status quo through either social control or, if they have it,
political control. Mill admits that until people stop to think about the influence of custom, for the
most part they tend to be more concerned with abuses of political power (OL I: 5). However,
even if the majority (or most powerful) do not manage to gain political control, those who are
powerful or more numerous or even those that shout the loudest can often manage to exert
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control through customs, morals, and sheer force of will.
This social tyranny, when endorsed as a public morality, can oftentimes be translated into
a principle of law (legal moralism). Because of this, Mill believes that steps must be taken to
ensure protection of certain basic individual liberties. He points out that
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates
instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to
meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political
oppression … Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not
enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion
and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent
from them … There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion
with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as
protection against political despotism (OL I: 5).
In this instance, the law can actually serve as a useful tool in curbing the illegitimate extra-legal
means of coercion that Mill cites by enacting legal barriers which protect against the tyranny of
the majority. However, Mill’s concern is what happens if we were to allow prevailing opinion to
impact and dictate laws because this would then interfere in the lives of individuals with a view
in opposition to the norm. Mill believes this interference would “fetter the development and …
prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all
characters to fashion themselves upon the model of [the majority’s] own” (OL I: 5). This would
be detrimental to society as truth, justice, and happiness for Mill seem to depend on individuality
and the ability to question and reason for oneself. While controversial, I agree with Mill that it is
more difficult to arrive at the truth or to be happy if one is told what to do rather than determine
and reason for oneself what one ought to do. In Chapter II of On Liberty, Mill emphasizes the
idea that freedom of speech, thought, and press are necessary components of liberty and getting
at the truth and thus have a high utility for society which I will return to in chapters 5 and 6 when
73

discussing hate speech. 147 If we allow legal moralism or social tyranny to take hold, then we are
compromising not only society and liberty but the progress of mankind.

2.3.1 The “Good Life,” Diversity, and Liberty
In chapter III of On Liberty Mill claims that the ability to act on those things which one
feels is best is of the utmost importance for humans because if we only allow people to act and
think to fit one particular understanding of “the good life” then we are not really living a good
human life at all and are more like machines or automata. Mill states that “Human nature is not a
machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree,
which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward
forces which make it a living thing” (OL III: 4). Furthermore, it is not only the case that truth
requires individuals to discuss different views and opinions, but Mill claims that to be happy and
live a good life, one needs to be able to choose to be the sort of person and live the sort of life
that is most conducive to what one believes one needs. He claims that
If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not
attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require
different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist
healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical,
atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards
the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. The same mode of
life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and
enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which
suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human
beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation
on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a
corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share
of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which
their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment
is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by
147
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the multitude of their adherents (OL III: 14)?
The idea of fixing the morals and actions of men based on the general tendency or feelings or
views of the average person is problematic when we consider the diversity that many people
recognize as necessary for happiness and watering this down by an appeal to a set morality or
code of behavior that is not one’s own seems not only unreliable but counterproductive. 148

2.3.2 Opinion Versus Principle
But while the progress of mankind and the good life is incredibly important, the main
reason that the tyranny of the majority is problematic is that it is generally based on nothing
more than feelings, intuitions, and preferences, that is to say, there are no real reasons or
principles upon which such rules, customs, or laws are based. 149 Those who are in a position to
dictate what becomes law or custom have “occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things
society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a
law to individuals” (OL I: 7). Such a method for morality and rules (based on morality) seem
problematic because forcing someone to do something for no other reason than you think it is the
good thing to do is mere adherence to habit or custom and provides no set of reasons or
justification to those who do not believe it is the good or right thing to do. Mill claims that
“People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire
to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than
reasons, and render reasons unnecessary.” 150
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An example of this tendency and encouragement can be found in The Enforcement of
Morals by Patrick Devlin. 151 Devlin defines the “right-minded” person as the “reasonable
man.” 152 Yet, he claims, the
reasonable man … is not to be confused with the rational man. He is not expected
to reason about anything and his judgments may be largely a matter of feeling. …
For my purpose I should like to call him the man in the jury box, for the moral
judgment of society must be something about which any twelve men or women
drawn at random might after discussion be expected to be unanimous.” 153
Devlin believes that this understanding of those who decide on the public morality which
influences social pressure and sometimes even legal coercion (which is what Devlin, a legal
moralist, is calling for) is consistent with the way in which society actually makes moral
decisions and should not be a matter of academic deliberation or reasoned thought. This is
because “the man in the jury box is not just an expression; he is an active reality. It will not in the
long run work to make laws about morality that are not acceptable to him.” 154 However, again,
because these feelings are very changeable, frequently based in ignorance, prejudice, and are
irrational, it is difficult to make a case that these are what ought to govern the behavior of
citizens. Mill describes why when he states that
The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of
human conduct, is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be
required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to
act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his
own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can
only count as one person’s preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere
appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people’s
liking instead of one (OL I: 6).

given society feels overwhelming feelings of “intolerance, indignation, and disgust” (17) toward particular acts, they
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These prejudices and feelings of “intolerance, indignation, and disgust” 155 (as Devlin would
describe them) are mere preferences and are as changeable as they are (generally) irrational. And
yet we see even today that these are the feelings on which citizens frequently base their political
and community decisions. To prevent such a gross misappropriation of liberty, legal penalties
ought to be in place to prevent such unreasoned/unprincipled, thus illegitimate, pressures. And
while Devlin is calling for—and Mill is arguing against—such feelings to be the basis of law,
they generally take the form of extra-legal social pressure and are less frequently seen as
physical or legal coercion. While such interference comes in many forms, such as pressuring,
ostracizing, shunning, or even rebuking and nagging, utilizing a principle, namely, the harm
principle, as a method of determining legitimate and illegitimate interference in the liberty of
individuals, is as useful as it is necessary. Indeed, Mill believes that the harm principle governs
both the unofficial social pressure and the legal pressures.

2.3.3 Legitimate Social Coercion
Once an acceptable principle is put into place, some forms of coercion, while invasive
and pervasive, may not always be illegitimate. Indeed, even Mill repeatedly claims that
preventing harmful behaviors is not only part of the law, but it may also be necessary for society
via extra-legal and/or moral pressure to step in and prevent behaviors that are too minor for the
law to safely be applied (OL I: 9, I: 11, III: 1, IV: 3). Sometimes social rules and customs are
reasoned and legitimate and these rules are frequently the best method of preventing harm.
According to Mill, when a person harms someone and the law is too blunt of an instrument to
use or the harm does not infringe the rights enough for it to be considered a violation of
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someone’s rights 156 there are other extra-legal means of interfering such as shunning or
ostracizing or informing others of the individual’s transgressions, i.e. applying morally and
socially coercive, though extra-legal, methods. Though these forms of pressure are very difficult
to escape and Mill argues that they are oftentimes felt more frequently and are much more
present in the daily life of individuals than that of physical coercion, governmental coercion, or
governmental restriction, they are not always unreasoned or illegitimate.
While Mill stresses the pervasiveness of peer pressure, one difference that Mill does not
really make between such community obstruction and physical (or governmental 157) coercion is
the extent, or perhaps more to the point, significance or nature, of the invasion of liberty. It
seems that while it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid peer pressures, one is still able to do
what one wants without much extreme coercive repercussions; however, with physical pressure,
threat of legal consequences, or institutional coercion one has a much more difficult time
avoiding such coercion and it is much more invasive of liberty. If society were able to not only
apply verbal pressures and coercion, but also readily and systematically employ physical or
institutional means of coercion, individuals would be much more likely to have their liberty
invaded arbitrarily. By taking this general ability out of the hands of the general public 158 and
institutionalizing such pressures, regulation into which behaviors and pressures are acceptable
can be created.
Because of this, while Mill’s comments on societal pressures are important and
informative, the examination of the limits of government is especially useful when discussing the
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importance of individual liberty and autonomy because without such legal limits over individuals
within society, society, through its actions, would be better able to control individuals among
them arbitrarily and/or illegitimately using such pressures as morality and custom. Furthermore,
without some structure in place, it seems that individuals would be much more prone to physical
coercion from society as well. However, Mill believes that “the practical question, where to
place the limit—how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social
control—is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done” (OL I: 6). Answering this
question is the purpose of On Liberty and Mill’s harm principle is the result because, he argues
that “All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints
upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in
the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law.
What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs” (OL I: 6).
If the law has limits on what individuals may or may not do to others, then there is some
protection against certain encroachments of liberty by individuals in society. If, as Mill claims,
the tyranny of the majority is such a great concern and even legitimate liberty invasions have the
potential to morph into illegitimate pressures, then it seems deriving a legal harm principle is one
step toward protecting individuals from a more pervasive form of liberty invasion. Thus, if there
is legislation in place to aid individuals in their legitimate expressions of liberty and this
legislation protects them against its encroachment from others, then the societal pressures via
social tyranny are reduced to a more manageable and legitimate nuisance. 159
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becomes terrorized, these become instances of harassment and are very much harmful and would be covered by the
proposed liberty limiting principle discussed. Other instances of societal pressure becoming more invasive of rights
occurs when the (legal and legitimate) contrary behavior of the individual leads others to directly impact the agent’s
interests, such as job prospects (i.e. I am not going to hire her, she does undesirable behavior X, say smoking).
Again, though this social pressure could be stopped once it hits such levels through the proposed harm principle
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2.4 The Various Means of Interference in the Liberty of Others
It may be useful to pause here and (very briefly) discuss a rough sort of taxonomy of the
variety of ways that an individual may have his/her liberty infringed since it seems that in many
cases Mill and others believe that the law is appropriate in some contexts, extra-legal means are
appropriate in others, and some contexts preclude the use of coercive interference. There are a
variety of ways in which agents can interfere in the liberty of others. Some are acceptable and
some are not. Mill, while mentioning different types of interference, does not generally indicate
which types of interference are acceptable in which situations nor does he always explicitly
explain the various types of interferences. Because he does not do this (which was not his goal) it
may result in some confusion as to what he believes society may do extra-legally (and
legitimately) to interfere in the liberty of others, what society may do through the law, and what
society may not do. I will briefly discuss some different ways in which society can and does
coercively interfere in the liberty of others in an attempt to shed some light on what Mill intends
the general harm principle to cover and hopefully give an idea of when a legal harm principle
may come into effect.

2.4.1 Legitimate Interference
Some interference is seemingly always legitimate in that it does not infringe on the
liberty of others in a way that would justify coercively preventing it, i.e. it may be considered
“bothersome” but not harmful. For instance, encouraging, pleading, and education 160 are such

because it is interfering in the liberty of the individual to choose to participate in the undesirable behavior. This will
be discussed more below.
160
For Mill on education see, On Liberty, I: 9. When individuals are being educated, they are not fully at liberty and
their liberty is interfered with but not to a significant degree. Furthermore, this may generally happen at an age at
which it is acceptable and even right to educate (i.e. those in their “nonage” who are dependent on others for their
care. See Mill, On Liberty, I: 10. “It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age
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that they are not generally considered to be illegitimately coercive or really, they cannot properly
be called coercive in the general sense. Other sorts of interference in the liberty of adults, such as
persuasion, pleading, encouraging, influencing, and other types of appeals, while a type of
interference and may be considered invasive or “coercive” to some extent when they are done
when another wished that it was not done, are seemingly well within the rights of others and do
not interfere to a significant enough degree to impede others in their liberty (either because
preventing them would be more harmful than allowing it 161 or the acts in question cannot
properly be called harmful or coercive). These are mere intrusions and are more like
inducements than coercion. It seems that Mill believes that this sort of “interference,” which I
will label as inducement, is always or generally acceptable. When describing the harm principle
Mill claims that an agent’s own good or benefit or self-regarding conduct is not to be considered
acceptable grounds for interference but when we dislike something another does “remonstrating
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, [are acceptable] but not
… compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise” (OL I: 9). And later
that “Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people … are the only measures by
which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his [self-regarding] conduct”
(OL V: 2). This points to the line that Mill creates between acceptable interference and
illegitimate interference or those situations in which individuals have no claim to prevent others

which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care
of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we
may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its
nonage”). Though of course, there is a difference between education and indoctrination or brainwashing. Education
may be coercive in that it is sometimes forced upon you, whether you want to learn it or not, but in many cases, it
differs greatly from brainwashing and indoctrination.
161
One instance in which Mill seems to allow for coercive interference in the lives of others even if it is a selfregarding act would be if preventing the coercive act would be more harmful than the interference. In these cases, he
believes that the agent that is coercively interfering should “punish” him/herself because any other sort of
interference would be worse than the initial act.
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from interfering with them—if the sort of interference is a mere inducement. Indeed, Mill seems
to think we may have an obligation to help others see reason or become better people. If this is
the case, then it may be our duty to induce others to do otherwise when they do acts that we
consider to be bad, distasteful, sinful, etc. (OL I: 9–10).
If this is the case, then perhaps getting clearer on what we mean by “coercion” is
important since some interference into the liberty of others is acceptable (beneficial interference
and inducements for example) and some is not (coercion). Because Mill does not really provide
an explanation here, we need to develop conditions that would lead to Mill’s understanding of
the different means of coercion. Mill variously uses terms such as “compulsion and control,”
“power … exercised over,” “force,” “against his will,” (OL I: 9) and “external control” (OL I:
10) to describe coercive interference in the liberty of others. This all involves some sort of
invasive practice that is forceful or threatening and would not generally be considered acceptable
in circumstances in which there was not harm to others. Mill suggests two coercively invasive
sorts of conduct: moral coercion (OL I: 9) and physical coercion. These two forms of coercion
can be used either legally or extra-legally. 162

2.4.2 Extra-Legal Interference
Let us first consider the extra-legal forms of coercion, which are generally less invasive
than legal coercion. A category of extra-legal interference which Mill describes is something like
peer/social pressure or verbal coercion, which he refers to as “moral” coercion (OL I: 9). Moral
coercion is generally negative interferences and interventions in the liberty of others through

162

Again, the term ‘extra-legal’ refers to those things that are not covered by the law or under the authority of the
law. This does not mean “illegal” or outside of the law but instead refers to those kinds of coercive interferences that
others, such as citizens and civilians, perform in a non-legal capacity.
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non-physical means. Shunning, reproaching, ostracizing, and other forms of pressure such as
these are examples of moral coercion. These are “moral” in the sense that they are attempts to
prevent others from performing acts or to perhaps shame them into ceasing to perform acts
which are deemed wrong. Moral coercion may be used legitimately when it is to prevent harm to
others. These sorts of coercion are sometimes subtle but often result in the social tyranny that
Mill spends the first part of On Liberty denouncing. 163 These sorts of interferences in liberty may
then become more insidious when such social pressures become institutionalized and part of the
law when they are unjustified. 164 This sort of coercive influence Mill often argues is not
acceptable because it interferes in primarily self-regarding behaviors and prevents agents from
obtaining the liberty that is necessary for living the sorts of lives that lead to happiness.
While they are sometimes used to invade self-regarding and consensual acts that do not
impact the liberty of others, there are some circumstances in which people cause harm to others
and social pressures, ostracizing, shunning, and morally coercing individuals are the appropriate
methods of dealing with those harm doers because stricter or more serious sorts of interference
and coercion are too strong because they are overly invasive.
The second sort of extra-legal coercion that Mill mentions in On Liberty is physical extralegal coercion. This may happen illegitimately if citizens take the inducements and social
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Mill, On Liberty, I: 2, 6, 14, much of chapter II, among others.
Indeed, when Mill is discussing the idea that ideas should only be free to be expressed when they are expressed in
a mild or temperate manner, claims that not only are extra-legal methods problematic but “still less could law
presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct” (II: 44). And in II: 11 he is discussing the idea that
the law ought not interfere in instances of freedom of speech. At II: 18 he claims that “It will be said, that we do not
now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build
sepulchers to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern
feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let
us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least
for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at
all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force.” And in II: when discussing infidelity and religion
Mill claims that “It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either…”
164
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pressures/coercion further into the coercive realm and “visit others with evil” or physical
coercion (OL I: 9). This sort of coercion interferes with the liberty of others more directly and
obviously and there are more limitations placed on this sort of interference because it is much
more difficult to ignore or stop. However, in certain situations it may be acceptable for “society”
or individuals in society to physically prevent an agent from performing an act that may be
harmful. In self-defense, defense of a fellow person, or during harmful, reckless, or risky
behavior it may be acceptable to physically stop someone from doing something. This is
coercive in that it is exerting external control on another individual but in many circumstances, it
is justified.
In other situations, this method of stopping an agent may not be justified. If for instance,
a person punches another, it would be acceptable to physically restrain the actor that is causing
the harm, but it seems the appropriate response or invasion of liberty would not be to shoot the
harming agent because the level of harm in the first case does not warrant the response. In the
one case, you are preventing harm and invading the harming agent’s liberty in the other you are
causing more harm than you are preventing. That seems to be one of the main criteria for Mill’s
determination of acceptable versus unacceptable interference. Mill even allows for bystanders to
stop an agent that is about to do something risky or harmful to himself (self-regarding harm), but
only to inform of the impending risk. If, once informed of the risk or harm, the agent decides to
carry on, Mill does not allow for further interference. Here I am alluding to Mill’s famous bridge
crossing example where he claims that
If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge
which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of
his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement
of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire
to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger
of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the
84

motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he
is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible
with the full use of the reflecting faculty) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned
of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it (OL V: 5
Emphasis added).
So, it seems in some cases it is acceptable for society to interfere extra-legally and physically
coercively in the liberty of their members in order to prevent harm to others. Other methods of
constraining, restraining, and coercing, seem to be too invasive for Mill to deem legitimate for
extra-legal coercion.

2.4.3 Legal Interference
Analogously, there are two sorts of legal interference, morally coercive and physically
coercive. Moral coercion appears in the law both in terms of beneficial and restrictive
inducements (i.e. tax breaks for certain sorts of behavior). The penal law generally involves
those acts that are physically and financially coercive and in Mill’s estimation seem to be that
this is the proper avenue for the law in general. The law in general, as noted previously, includes
far more than the penal law. There are regulatory laws, such as traffic laws, administrative laws,
civil laws, and tort laws in addition to penal laws that may be used by the government for a
variety of infractions, some harmful, others not. For instance, traffic laws tend to be enacted to
facilitate the smooth running of the roads (which also may aid in preventing harm). Hence, while
it does not harm someone to park a certain direction on a street or in a parking garage these sorts
of regulatory rules help to facilitate the use of automobiles. In these situations, the appropriate
penalty would not be death or imprisonment, but perhaps a small fine (or a warning, etc.). Some
of these may serve as a method to prevent some kind of harm to others but do not interfere too
greatly in the liberty of others, or perhaps I should say do not cause more harm than good. In
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those instances, however, which are very harmful or risk great harm to others, Mill believes that
the law ought to step in and coercively prevent the harm. 165 Those acts that impose great harm
ought to be restricted to prevent greater harm but the punishment must fit the crime and not
interfere too greatly. These sorts of acts that are justifiably interfered with through the law Mill
identifies as serious rights-infringing harm—rights violations.

165

At V: 5 Mill claims that “One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper
limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention
of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before
it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government,
however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly
any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and
fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or
even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive
until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it.” At V: 6 he claims that “The right inherent in society, to
ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely
self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment.”
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Chapter 3
Understanding Harm: Toward the Construction of a “Millian” Legal Harm Principle

3.1 Introducing the “Legal Harm Principle”
In On Liberty John Stuart Mill describes harm very generally in an attempt to assess what
society may consider “its business” or as a proper realm of interference in the liberty of its
individual members. It seems he does not always focus very much on the varieties of harm that
can occur, on defining what exactly he means by harm, nor on devising the appropriate method
for preventing harm to others. 166 Because of this, his description of harm and the harm principle
can be seen as vague, unhelpful, and even insufficient for many purposes. However, it is
important to keep in mind that in On Liberty, Mill is attempting to outline the conditions under
which it is acceptable for society to coercively interfere with the liberty of others, i.e. he is
attempting to determine the jurisdiction of society generally. Because he is attempting to
determine the jurisdiction or domain of societal interference, he therefore considers harm in all
its forms and does not really need to be specific in defining “harm” to others since even minimal
amounts of harm are seemingly within the jurisdiction of society (though society may judge that
it is inappropriate to actually interfere 167).
In other words, Mill wants to know what sorts of actions or what sorts of behavior are in
the sphere of individual liberty or the “self-regarding sphere,” which he considers to be inviolate,
or the sphere of coercion or the “other-regarding sphere,” in which it is acceptable to consider
coercive prevention if there is harm. The short answer to this question is that it may be
acceptable to coerce individuals if there is or is likely to be harm to others. The actual answer is
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For an interesting discussion on this point, see Piers Norris Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle.” Though
Mill does attempt to provide some examples in the final chapter of On Liberty, it is for illustrative purposes and not
definitional. Again, while Mill may discuss these things, it is briefly and is not the primary goal of his work.
167
This is what I will call the balancing principle. See chapter 3.1.2 below.
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often seen as a bit more complicated than that, in part because Mill is describing a general harm
principle which covers any and all acceptable types of coercive intervention from minor social
pressures to legal intervention and while harm is necessary to justify acceptable versus
unacceptable intervention in liberty, it is not sufficient to do so (though it is sufficient to
determine the domain). 168
Because theorists come to On Liberty with a specific agenda, myself included, and Mill’s
principle is so general, it is not always clear to theorists what exactly Mill is concerned with and
they often ask if Mill’s harm principle is primarily concerned with social interactions and
pressures such as custom and morals and is thus attempting to prevent social tyranny 169 or if his
harm principle is primarily a legal principle which is concerned with establishing conditions for
legitimate penal legislation. 170 These questions are missing the point and should not be a
disjunction but rather a conjunction since, as I have been highlighting, Mill is concerned with
both. Nevertheless, these questions are attempting to draw a distinction that I wish to focus on,
namely, when someone causes or risks harm to others and the behavior falls into the domain of
the general harm principle, how exactly do we determine when the criminal law is the
appropriate domain for coercive intervention as opposed to extra-legal means? In other words, I
wish to define the domain or jurisdiction of the criminal law using Mill’s general harm principle
in On Liberty as a platform. Within Mill’s analysis of harm and liberty infringement he provides
several different avenues for exploring what he believes counts as harm and further, I believe he
indicates when the criminal law is the appropriate domain for harm prevention. Using this and
statements in Utilitarianism I can construct such a principle.

168

See my chapter 1 for a discussion on necessary and sufficient conditions for the jurisdiction and justification of
the general harm principle.
169
See Currin V. Shield’s “Introduction” to Mill’s On Liberty.
170
See David O. Brink’s Mill’s Progressive Principles for an example.
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3.1.1 Mill’s Two Maxims Revisited
While Mill’s general harm principle is an overarching and general principle, it has (at
least) two distinct mechanisms in which to prevent harm to others: legal and extra-legal. 171 At
the beginning of chapter V of On Liberty Mill even claims that there are two maxims that
describe the harm principle—“two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this
Essay” (OL V: 1). The first maxim is concerned with separating those acts that can be
legitimately interfered with by society (harmful, nonconsensual, other-regarding acts) from those
that cannot (those in the self-regarding sphere). The first maxim claims that “the individual is not
accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but
himself” (OL V: 2). 172
I believe the second maxim of the harm principle, on the other hand, is used to determine
when and which method of intervention may be used to prevent harm. Mill recognizes in On
Liberty that there are two separate and general ways in which we can deal with illegitimate harm
to others—both of which fall within the domain of the general harm principle—namely, through
social extra-legal coercion and through legal coercion. The second maxim states “that for such
actions as are prejudicial [harmful] to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and
may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or
the other is requisite for its protection” (OL V: 2 Emphasis added). 173

171
Remember, here extra-legal coercion is just coercion that is not done through the law. This does not mean that it
is illegal, only that it is done by those outside of the law, such as individual citizens or society in general. For Mill,
this usually takes the form of social pressures or what he calls “moral coercion” though this can also be physical
coercion by those who are not representatives of the law.
172
I discussed this aspect of the harm principle in chapter 1.
173
I also discussed these maxims briefly in Chapter 1.
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3.1.2 Maxim 2: The Jurisdiction Principle and the Balancing Principle
I believe that what Mill is saying with his second maxim is that once we apply the first
maxim (determining which actions “are prejudicial to the interests of others”) and we see that a
certain behavior is harmful to others, then we determine which domain is appropriate under the
second maxim of the harm principle—individuals “may be subjected either to social or to legal
punishment.” I will refer to this part of the second maxim as the jurisdiction principle. I believe
that Mill uses the jurisdiction principle as a way to divide the domains within the harm principle.
Mill thinks that some harmful acts fall within the domain of the law and some fall outside of this
domain but remain housed within the extra-legal domain (it is harmful but not the kind that is in
the domain of the law). Once we understand which domain is to be used to prevent harm to
others, i.e. apply the jurisdiction principle to determine the domain of the criminal law or the
domain of extra-legal coercion, society then determines if the behavior should 174 be covered by
its proper domain, i.e. society then applies the final part of the second maxim. 175
This latter part of maxim 2, namely when “society is of opinion that the one or the other
is requisite for its protection,” I will call the balancing principle. The balancing principle
addresses the practical question of applying the harm principle to determine 1. whether we
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Because the practical principle involves application of balancing principles, the “should” here always implies
“should on balance” or “should, all things considered.”
175
Here I suggest that there are two avenues for coercion and that once we figure out which type of coercion is
acceptable we can then deliberate on whether we should on balance cover it (i.e. I am addressing a question of
domain, not a question of “should there be a law?”). However, there is another way to understand this. It could be
the case that this means that all harmful acts can be covered by one of two ways (legal or extra-legal) and it is the
job of society to then determine how they are to punish the harmful acts. In other words, there is no proper domain
of the law, it is only society’s opinion on what they would like covered and how they decide they should punish it
that determines whether it is covered by the law or extra-legal means. This essentially removes any kind of
principled approach for a legal harm principle and the only real principle that is applied is whether or not there is
harm under the general harm principle. This, to me, seems to go contrary to Mill’s project as a whole. While his
project is general, he claims a desire for principled legislation in this work and he also seems to provide, as I will
argue in this chapter, that there is a principled division between those acts that can be prevented through the criminal
law and those that cannot.

90

should use legal coercion when a harmful act falls in that domain, 2. if we should use extra-legal
coercion even though it falls within the legal domain, 3. if we should use extra-legal coercion
when it falls in the extra-legal domain, or 4. if we should not use extra-legal coercion even
though it falls in that domain but should instead rely on the individual to punish him/herself. Mill
suggests that the balancing principle is applied by determining whether preventing the acts that
fall within the domain would cause more harm than good, relying on utilitarian considerations
such as seriousness, probability, risk, and importance of harm. In some cases we ought not, for
instance, prohibit the harm to others through the legal/extra-legal domain because the harm of
regulation would be more harmful than the initial harmful act. 176

3.1.3 The Harm Principle as a Multi-Stage Process
So, I contend that Mill seems to recognize the general harm principle as a sort of multistage process in which we first determine 1. whether a given act is harmful, which would indeed
allow society to consider interference since it has jurisdiction over harmful other-regarding acts
(maxim 1). Then, once we determine that there is in fact harm or risk of harm to others, i.e. it is
covered by or within the domain of the general harm principle, 2. we/society next need to
determine how we are allowed to interfere (or not), i.e. whether the domain is social/extra-legal
or legal (the jurisdiction principle). And finally, 3. we/society then determine if we should
interfere, i.e. apply practical consideration and principles such as the principle of utility or other
mediating maxims to determine if regulation/prohibition is more harmful than allowing for the
act to occur (the balancing principle).
Again, using maxims 1 and 2 in On Liberty Mill claims that once we determine that there
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I will return to this balancing principle in chapter 6.6.
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is harm to others, the behavior can be prevented through one of the two domains but on the face
of it he does not seem to clearly delineate a method to determine which sort of interference is
appropriate. 177 He says things such as, acts may be punished “by law, or, where legal penalties
are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (OL I: 11) and “the offender may then be
justly punished by opinion, though not by law” (OL IV: 3). He points to the idea that in some
cases it is not appropriate for the act to be covered, say, by the law, and so extra-legal coercion is
the appropriate method to curb the undesirable behavior and in other cases social pressure is not
enough to prevent the harm to others.
This highlights the fact that we should understand the general harm principle as a multistage filtering process and that further investigation is necessary to uncover the jurisdiction
principle and determine when criminal legislation is the appropriate domain and when it is not.
In other words, the jurisdiction principle is where the need to develop a legal harm principle
enters. The harm principle, as Mill states it generally, does not do this, nor does Mill purport to
do this in On Liberty but it seems that he is aware that the harm principle only really answers the
question of when society can interfere in the liberty of others very generally, and that something
further is necessary to determine which method is the appropriate domain for interference. 178 I
acknowledge that Mill does not define a second principle in On Liberty; however, this does not
mean that one is not present (the jurisdiction principle) and chapter V of On Liberty, as well as
the other passages referenced above, suggest that he acknowledges a jurisdictional divide
between the legal and extra-legal domains and because he claims that he wishes to provide a

177

See Mill, On Liberty, I: 11 “If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him,
by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” and IV: 3 “The offender may
then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects
prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will
or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.”
178
See for instance, Mill, On Liberty, I: 8, I: 11. See Piers Norris Turner for a discussion on Mill’s general goal in
defining harm and the harm principle.
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principled method for determining appropriate interference in the liberty of others, a principled
method for legal intervention seems to be a part of this broad goal (OL I: 7–11). My goal here is
to suggest a division that seems to be present in Mill.
In the previous chapter I laid out Mill’s general harm principle which sets conditions for
the jurisdiction of society generally regarding interference in liberty (maxim 1) and, as I have
highlighted, this principle looks to all instances of harm (even very minor ones) to others in
order to define the general domain of acceptable liberty invasion by society. Once Mill’s general
harm principle determines which behaviors fall into the coercive domain (i.e. harmful,
nonconsensual, other-regarding acts), then the second stage of measurement can occur in which
we determine which general method of intervention is acceptable: extra-legal or legal
intervention. In this chapter, I will focus on deriving such a legal harm principle from Mill’s
general harm principle—the jurisdiction principle. This, then, can provide a useful and principled
tool for legislatures to use when crafting and interpreting whether something should become part
of the criminal law—the balancing principle. 179 In order to make the distinction as to which
domain is appropriate for legislation and, more specifically, understand when the criminal law
may step in to prevent harm, several interrelated terms and conditions that Mill discusses in On
Liberty must be defined. These notions determine whether society in the form of extra-legal
social pressures or the law is the appropriate method of interference in individual liberty. This
determination highlights a more specific and narrow version of the harm principle which I have
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While figuring out the domain of the criminal law (the jurisdiction principle) is the goal of this work, I am not
going to provide a detailed response as to how to apply the balancing principle though chapter 5 will focus on Mill’s
analysis of speech and will apply both the jurisdiction principle and the balancing principle in an attempt to use the
principle in actual cases. Mill states generally that determining whether something should be covered amounts to
figuring out if there is more harm when the acts are regulated or more harm when they are not. In the final chapter I
will address speech and harm and I will offer suggestions as to what I believe ought to be covered or not but this will
not be a detailed analysis of the balancing principle but will give suggested considerations that may be applied in
actual cases.
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been calling the “legal harm principle” or “jurisdiction principle.”

3.1.4 Rights Infringements and the Legal Harm Principle
As subsequent theorists frequently rely on Mill’s On Liberty to determine which sorts of
behavior are legitimately prevented through the law and which are not, it seems that deriving a
legal harm principle from Mill’s own work is important and, (seemingly) according to the
jurisdiction principle of maxim 2 of the harm principle, completely within the scope of his
general principle. 180 A careful reading highlights the instances in which Mill discusses, or at least
hints at, some requirements for a legal harm principle and we can gain an understanding of what
this principle may look like. This, I will argue, is most easily done by looking to what Mill calls
“rights” violations (OL III: 3, III: 9, IV: 3, IV: 6, IV: 7, V: 11). Mill seems to suggest that it is
where harm and rights intersect that we find the boundary line between the domain of the legal
and extra-legal. I will argue that certain sorts of harm, namely rights-infringing harm, determine
the domain of the law. However, just as he does not provide a clear definition of harm, Mill does
not provide a clear definition of rights in On Liberty.
To define the domain of the law, I will do two things. 1. I will unravel and explain the
many (intertwined) concepts found in On Liberty that help to explain Mill’s concept of rights and
2. since Mill does not go into much detail about rights in On Liberty, I will look to chapter V of
Utilitarianism for an understanding of what he means by rights and how they are relevant to the
law. To address the first, I will look to the concepts that seem central to finding this jurisdictional
division. Among the notions in On Liberty that are most significant for understanding rights and
their relationship to defining a legal harm principle are the concepts of interests, duties, and
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See among others, Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law; Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and
Wrongs; Hart, also Law, Liberty, and Morality; Duff, et al., Criminalization.
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liberties and how they interact with and play off one another to give a clearer understanding of
harm. While these ideas are often defined in reference to one another, I will attempt to explore
them each separately in order to show how each idea correlates with the legal harm principle and
thus helps to define what Mill means by “rights.”

3.1.5 Utilitarianism and Rights
To address the second, I will turn to chapter V of Utilitarianism which provides a more
in-depth analysis of Mill’s understanding not only of rights but many of the other terms Mill
relies on in On Liberty. Chapter V of Utilitarianism is not only consistent with what he says in
On Liberty but is useful in providing a framework for the jurisdictional division between legal
and extra-legal coercive intervention because it is in this chapter that Mill discusses his theory of
justice and its connection to rights (as well as utility/the expedient) much more clearly than he
does virtually anywhere in On Liberty. If one reads chapter V of Utilitarianism as a supplement
to and an extension of On Liberty, many questions that are left at the end of On Liberty regarding
rights are answered. Though of course while the whole of Utilitarianism provides a particular
framework for understanding its last chapter and this normally cannot be ignored, I am reading
chapter V through the lens of On Liberty which may alter the interpretive framework. I will rely
less on the arguments in Utilitarianism than others who approach chapter V because what I
really want to understand is Mill’s view on rights, harm, justice, and the law and less what Mill’s
utilitarian commitments are. 181
My argument will not depend on whether or not On Liberty is consistent with Mill’s
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Turner in “Harm and Mill’s Harm Principle” claims that rights-based theories do this and are mistaken because it
does not provide interpretive aid to the harm principle. However, this is only if you are concerned with the General
Harm Principle and not the sub-principle that is concerned with the law.
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utilitarian commitments in Utilitarianism as a whole, but will focus on the consistency of Mill’s
understanding of rights between the two texts; it does not matter, then, which text was written
first and the order of publication does not affect my interpretation or methodology. 182 What
matters for my purposes here is whether the idea of rights found in Utilitarianism can aid in
developing a legal harm principle from the general principle described in On Liberty, which I
believe it can. 183 When discussing the limits of the law, there is talk of rights around every turn.
Understanding what Mill says about rights is key to understanding what Mill says about a
specifically legal harm principle and so looking at chapter V of Utilitarianism will help to tease
out the boundary between the domain of the legal and extra-legal.

3.1.6 A Matter of Domain (or the Jurisdiction Principle)
It is also important to highlight that what I am doing in the next two chapters is
determining a question of domain. I am concerned with what may be covered by the criminal law
(the topic I believe is at the heart of what I have been referring to as the jurisdiction principle)
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Indeed, at times it may seem like I am discussing Utilitarianism as an extension of On Liberty and vice versa, but
really, for my argument it does not matter that On Liberty was written first or that it was likely that Mill had his
Utilitarianism defined before he wrote On Liberty. I am not reading these two texts as a historian of philosophy but
rather in an attempt to get clear on a matter of definition. The timeline of these texts does not impact my argument
and I will often travel back and forth between these texts in order to make my argument. What does matter is that
Utilitarianism chapter V has the potential to fill a lacuna found in On Liberty and can help to explain the legal harm
principle I am attempting to define. In his autobiography Mill claims that On Liberty especially, but all his works
were heavily influenced by his wife. He claims that Utilitarianism was taken from work which had previously been
written during the last several years with his wife, which suggests a continuity of ideas between the two works. “I
took … a portion of the unpublished papers which I had written during the last years of our married life, and shaped
them, with some additional matter, into the little work entitled “Utilitarianism”; which was first published, in three
parts, in successive numbers of Fraser’s Magazine, and afterwards reprinted in a volume” (A VIII: 30).
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In “Harm and Mill’s Harm Principle,” Turner also believes that this methodology is mistaken. He claims that “a
rights-violation reading is not implied or suggested by the relevant passages in Utilitarianism and that such a
restriction would be unambiguously at odds with the text in On Liberty” (304). However, this is only the case if one
is already reading Mill’s general harm principle as a legal harm principle only and not accounting for a more general
goal which covers a multitude of harm and actually incorporates what Turner calls his “expansive” notion of harm. I
believe my interpretation which utilizes those passages of Utilitarianism is able to avoid the pitfalls that Turner
relies upon to criticize rights-based theories. I am also not convinced that Turner is giving a completely fair reading
of some of the theories he attacks.
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and am not providing an opinion on whether such laws should be enacted (the balancing
principle). 184 In what follows I will argue that the boundary between the legal and extra-legal
domain is drawn depending on whether an act of harm is a rights infringement or not. In other
words, I will argue that if an act is a rights infringement, then the legal harm principle may
prevent it from occurring, i.e. has jurisdiction over it. If it is not a rights infringement, then it is
not the sort of harm that can be covered by the legal harm principle (though they may be covered
through the extra-legal domain). Ultimately, the distinction between the legal harm principle and
a general harm principle is determined based on the sort of harm that occurs, i.e. rights-infringing
harm. 185
I will begin by linking Mill’s understanding of harm to invasions of interests and liberties
of individuals. This will help us later to understand how he views duties and rights. I will then
analyze what Mill claims is the relationship between duties and rights. This section will begin to
tie in Mill’s chapter V of Utilitarianism. Understanding this provides clues as to the role that
Mill thinks rights have in morality and justice because some duties are duties precisely because
they are rights and obligations of perfect duties correlate with certain kinds of rights. Then in the
remaining sections I will move back and forth between On Liberty and chapter V of
Utilitarianism to discuss how Mill’s understanding of rights in the latter helps us to inform how
rights are related to the legal harm principle which I believe is an essential piece of Mill’s more
general harm principle in the former.
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Though my final chapter will touch on some of this practical application when discussing speech acts,
specifically hate speech.
185
While I have not yet defended this position, in this chapter I will argue that it is the “sort of harm” that
determines the demarcation of the legal harm principle and the “sort of harm” for Mill is whether it is a “rightsinfringing harm” or not.
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3.2 Harm as Interference in the Interests and Liberty of Others
When Mill describes his general harm principle, he defines it in terms of an idea of “harm
to others.” This idea of harm is supposed to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable
interference in the lives and actions of others. However, if we look for a clear definition of harm
in On Liberty, we find that he does not actually define or describe harm very thoroughly in the
text and in fact uses the term only about a dozen times. Interestingly, Mill more often relies on
other terms to express harm, and indeed uses the term “evil” more frequently than “harm.” 186
This failure of definition is one of the most pervasive criticisms of this text and later theorists
define it to suit their needs. Indeed, while the harm principle “served as a bulwark of liberty and
a limitation on the scope of government power” in the nineteenth century, more contemporary
interpretations have turned the principle into “an engine of social control that is said to justify
major government intervention in all its manifestations … [and] far more content has been
poured into the exception ‘harm or evil to others’” than is justified by the term. 187
There are many issues that arise because of Mill’s less-than-ideal description of harm, as
he sometimes seems to be using the idea of harm pretty widely as any negative effect on others.
Piers Norris Turner argues that such an “expansive” sense of harm is the only one that is
consistent with Mill’s utilitarian goals though it may have negative consequences for his “liberal
commitments.” 188 Yet in defining his self-regarding and other-regarding realms Mill makes a
distinction between harm and offense, which suggests that he does not mean harm to be so
expansive as to cover all negative consequences, only those that affect others and are in the
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OL I: 8–9, I: 11, II: 1–2, II: 4, II: 19–20, IV: 4, IV7, among others.
Richard A. Epstein, “The Harm Principle—And How it Grew,” (The University of Toronto Law Journal, 45, no.
4 (1995): 369–417) 371.
188
Turner, “Mill’s Harm Principle,” 300.
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other-regarding realm. 189
Nevertheless, however we come to define Mill’s idea of harm, as narrow or expansive, 190
it need not really impact or have many consequences for how we come to understand a legal
harm principle. The general harm principle is seeking the jurisdictional line between social
interference and non-interference. Understanding how harm impacts the legal harm principle
forces us to focus our attention on those passages that highlight or hint at a division within the
general harm principle. So, in other words, we already know harm is in fact occurring before we
turn to the legal harm principle. What we need to get a handle on is when the law is the proper
domain of interference. To understand this division, then, it is important to find those instances
where Mill mentions harm—or harm placeholders—in order to determine its specific domain.

3.2.1 Interests
Once we assess the passages in which Mill discusses harm, it seems more relevant to a
legal harm principle, and indeed necessary, to focus attention on what role “invasions of
interests” play because throughout On Liberty he focuses on how these sorts of invasions are
harmful, evil, etc. and it is really invasions of interests that begin to formulate and define Mill’s
understanding of harm that is relevant for deriving a legal harm principle. We first encounter the
idea that certain “interests” are relevant to Mill’s understanding of harm in Chapter I of On
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The issue between harm and offense also arises in the final chapter on speech.
For instance, Turner in “Mill’s Harm Principle” criticizes David Brink, Alan Fuchs, Wendy Donner, Daniel
Jacobson, Joel Feinberg, and John Rawls as utilizing a too-narrow version of harm that he believes is inconsistent
with Mill’s general harm principle while he defends what he calls an “expansive” understanding of harm which
covers “any negative consequence” (319). I believe that an expansive reading of harm does not impact my
interpretation of a legal harm principle because I am not attempting to define harm for the general harm principle but
rather when harm crosses the domain from extra-legal to legal. Whether harm is limited or expansive is not really
detrimental to a legal harm principle because it is only concerned with things that we already know to be harmful
and fall on the more serious side of the scale. Those minor harms that the general harm principle would potentially
include on an expansive account would not be considered as relevant for a legal harm principle as I will show below.
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99

Liberty when he claims that his argument depends upon “utility in the largest sense, grounded on
the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the
subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each,
which concern the interest of other people” (OL I: 11). So, it is not surprising, given Mill’s
utilitarian commitments, that he believes that harm depends on utility. However, the idea that the
utility he is referring to in turn depends on the permanent interests of people is interesting. But
note that it is not all permanent interests that society may interfere with but only those that
concern others. Interests, then, specifically the “permanent interests” related to the progressive
nature of humans seem to be key to understanding what Mill intends to count as harm because if
these interests are encroached, such encroachments are “hurtful” and “If any one does an act
hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties
are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (OL I: 11). He then states that “in all things
which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose
interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector” (OL I: 11). So, one way in
which agents can harm others is by infringing or violating their permanent interests which are to
be protected by society.
When the “permanent” interests of others are invaded, there is harm to them and such
harm ought to be prevented. Mill even claims that in instances where the law and even extralegal coercion is too invasive of liberty—for instance when it is more harmful than allowing the
behavior to occur without coercive intervention—that
the conscience of the agent himself [the individual who is infringing or violating
the interests of others] should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those
interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more
rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the
judgment of his fellow-creatures” (OL I: 11 Emphasis added).
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He repeatedly marks the important or permanent interests of others as being under the domain of
society via the general harm principle. 191 Again, this suggests that Mill believes that “interests”
are central to the idea of harm which he uses as the benchmark for acceptable and unacceptable
interference. Interests, then, seem to be intimately connected to understanding the domain of the
harm principle. 192 Indeed, in chapter III of On Liberty Mill claims that regarding individuality
and the sphere of self-regarding acts, which are outside of the domain of the harm principle, we
ought to be free to pursue our individuality and well-being so long as these are “within the limits
imposed by the rights and interests of others” (OL III: 9). 193 Interests of others again restrict and
bind individuals in their actions.
Later, in chapter IV of On Liberty when discussing the domain of the harm principle Mill
asks, “how much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society
(OL IV: 1–2)?” He responds that “each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more
particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the
individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society” (OL IV: 1–2). If,
then, the interests of society (or others) are invaded, there is harm done because as Mill
elaborates, “as soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,
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See Mill, On Liberty, I: 11, II: 37, III: 9, IV: 2–3.
Following Mill who claims citizens ought not “injur[e] the interests of one another,” Feinberg defines harm as an
interest a person has; however, he thinks ‘interest’ too is vague (OL IV: 3). Interest can be defined as a desire a
person has or as something that is in an agent’s ‘best interest’ or well-being. However, for the purpose of
determining an interest in relation to the harm principle, Feinberg turns to legal writing to clarify its meaning. In the
law, there are different classifications of interest for the degree of harm that is imposed on the victim. The harm
principle covers those harms that are “humanly inflicted” and Feinberg claims these harms are
conceived as the violation of one of a person’s interests, an injury to something in which he has a
genuine stake. … An interest is something a person always possesses in some condition,
something that can grow and flourish or diminish and decay, but which can rarely be totally lost
(SP 26).
This idea of interest allows an analysis of those things that should or should not be regulated by the law. When an
individual’s interests have been compromised, this person has been harmed.
193
In this passage Mill is discussing the importance of individuality. While he is not talking in terms of interests in
this passage, he believes that individuality is an important part of well-being and well-being, is one of the permanent
interests of mankind.
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society has jurisdiction over it” (OL IV: 3). This particular passage seems to confirm my point
that Mill relies on the idea of interests as being a key feature of harm. When Mill claims that
society has jurisdiction when harm occurs and that harm is the necessary feature, then says that
when “any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others” he pretty
clearly seems to be suggesting that harm to others amounts to or is defined as occurring when
“any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others” (OL IV: 3). Both this
concept and harm seem to be equivalent. Mill seems to propose this as a placeholder for harm.
And since Mill is discussing jurisdiction here, he is suggesting a relatively broad understanding
of harm and perhaps Turner is correct to consider Mill as discussing harm as “any negative
consequence” to interests. There are a variety of interests that we may have, some minor and
some major but the general harm principle is discussing all of these. It seems that Mill believes
that any harm to others puts the action into the domain of the harm principle but he then claims
that those significant or more important interests place them within the domain of the law. 194
Mill further argues that society has no jurisdiction in a case “which does not affect the
interests of others in their relations with him” (OL IV: 6). This suggests a wide range of interests,
some which cross the boundary between the sphere of individual liberty to the sphere of otherregarding behavior. While it may be difficult to define the interests that fall on this lower line
and different theorists determine this harm differently, it is not this lower level that is of interest
to me but rather those that clearly fall within the domain of society but rest on the line between
legislatable and non-legislatable.
Finally, the importance of interests regarding the legal harm principle is most clearly
stated in Mill’s maxim 2. 195 Here Mill claims that “for such actions as are prejudicial to the
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More on this in the next section.
See chapter 3.1.2 for a discussion on Maxim 2.
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interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal
punishment, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection”
(OL V: 2). 196 Interests, then are an important part of the very definition of the harm principle, as
he relies on interests in his maxims which are used to define his general harm principle. Interests
of others do seem to be quite general according to Mill, however, this does not mean that all
interests of others are relevant to the legal harm principle (more on this below).

3.2.2 A Division of Interests
Mill refers to interests both generally and more narrowly when he, in places, discusses
those that are “permanent” (OL I: 11) or “important” (OL V: 11). This distinction seems to be
intentional. For instance, when defining harm in terms of invading interests, Mill also suggests
that invasion of certain liberties are invasions of important interests as well (OL IV: 3). This
makes sense if one considers that Mill spends a significant amount of time highlighting the
importance of certain liberties that individuals have. If these liberties are as important to
individuals as he seems to suggest, then humans have a significant/permanent/important interest
in maintaining them against encroachment. This also ties the maxims to the general harm
principle more clearly because if we are talking about individual liberty and freedom of action as
being a dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable interference in the general statement
of the harm principle (OL I: 9), then it seems that when the maxim defines this same line in
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Quote in context: “the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the
interests of no person but himself … for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is
accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the
other is requisite for its protection” (V: 2); He also utilizes talk of interests elsewhere when he claims: “Whoever
undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of
society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society” (V: 4); “A person is
bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important
interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong”
(V: 11).
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terms of interests (OL V: 2), we have a link between the two concepts which ties together much
of his exposition in On Liberty regarding harm.
Because Mill believes that his principle is based on “the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being” (OL I: 11) and his principle is one that looks to protecting the private (selfregarding) sphere of individual liberty, those three divisions of individual liberty he outlines are
important interests he discusses. Mill seems to be describing the sphere of self-regarding liberties
as being part of those permanent and significant interests when he claims that “there is a sphere
of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect
interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only
himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and
participation” (OL I: 12). It seems that Mill argues that certain forms of liberty, certain basic
liberties, then become permanent interests of humans with which society may no longer interfere
and “this, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty” (OL I: 12). These basic liberties are
types of behavior in the private sphere that include “Liberties of conscience and expression,”
“Liberties of tastes, pursuits, and life-plans,” and “Liberties of association” (OL I: 12).

3.2.3 Liberties and Interests
Describing the liberties of conscience and expression is Mill’s concern in chapter II of On
Liberty and
it comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling;
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and
publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs
to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but,
being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in
great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it (OL I: 12).
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Chapter III of On Liberty outlines the harm principle’s relationship to the liberties of tastes,
pursuits, and life plans and this amounts to “framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment
from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should
think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong” (OL I: 12). This is a liberty of personal choice or
autonomy. And finally, liberties of free association in which “each individual, follows the
liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any
purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age,
and not forced or deceived” (OL I: 12). The goal of the general harm principle is to protect these
liberties and interests either through legal or extra-legal means.
Part of the reason why Mill believes that certain liberties in the private sphere are
permanent and inviolable (unless exercise of such liberties threaten harm to others) is that this
type of liberty or freedom is not only valuable but, in a way, necessary for a happy/good life
because it is a key component of such a life. Mill claims that “the only freedom which deserves
the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (OL I: 13). Mill spends chapter III of
On Liberty defending just this. These liberties that are in the private sphere are some of the
interests that Mill believes we have a duty to protect against encroachment from others. Indeed,
early on Mill connects these ideas of liberty, interests, and duties 197 when he is discussing the
history of the tension between authority and liberty and the attempts to curb undue liberty
invasions. He claims
The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler
should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what
197

Duties will be discussed below.
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they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a
recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was
to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did
infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable (OL I:
2).
By framing the text in relation to the historical development of liberty he is better able to
highlight the ways in which these ideas contribute to interpreting the harm principle and its use.
This shows that the goal of “patriots” was to define a self-regarding realm which defines liberties
and important interests of humans as rights, and when these rights were infringed, the ruler (or
those who infringe them) were violating a duty to others and this allows for interference to
prevent the infraction. We thus begin to see the connections that Mill makes between the law,
liberties, duties, and rights very early on. These connections help to define the domain of the
legal harm principle; however, much more needs to be said on the notion of duty because it is
this idea coupled with the idea of rights, both of which are briefly introduced in On Liberty,
which helps to bridge the chasm between the general harm principle and chapter V of
Utilitarianism. This connection, in turn, helps to make the domain of the legal harm principle
more apparent.

3.3 Duty and Harm
In On Liberty Mill argues that agents have a variety of moral duties which they may be
required to do or be punished/made responsible for not doing. He states that there are some acts,
“things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made
responsible to society for not doing” (OL I: 11). 198 While Mill believes that individuals ought to
be required to fulfill their duties, as he indicated above, there are a variety of ways in which this
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This specific passage on duty at I: 11 in On Liberty is particularly intriguing and seems to be a bit difficult to
make consistent with things Mill says about the harm principle. I will examine the full paragraph in chapter 4.
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may be done. This is significant because it contributes to the explanation Mill has for the
different ways in which interference may be legitimate for society more generally (extra-legal
pressures) but not the government (law enforcement) and vice versa. It also allows us to
understand those instances in which it is not appropriate for either society or the law to interfere
(i.e. in the private sphere of self-regarding conduct and even some instances of other-regarding
conduct).

3.3.1 Duty Enforcement and Harm
Mill claims that “if anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for
punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general
disapprobation” (OL I: 11). This is where public pressure comes into effect as a means of duty
enforcement. He further states that in some cases there are reasons, such as expediency or
balancing harm, for not punishing individuals for failing to perform their duty and in many of
these cases the law is not the proper avenue for enforcement and in other instances neither the
law nor society are the proper means to enforce a duty or an obligation, and “when such reasons
… preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step
into the vacant judgement seat, and protect those interests of others which have not external
protection” (OL I: 11). 199 So even if there are not formal sanctions for duty violations, there is
always some means of enforcing the duty, even if it rests on the agent to enforce his/her own
misdeed.
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Quote in context: “there are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility [his duty]; but these
reasons must arise from the special expediency of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the
whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it
in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than
those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience
of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgement seat, and protect those interests of other which have not
external protection.”
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This sentiment can also be found in Utilitarianism V when Mill claims that by stating
that someone does something wrong “we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in
some way or other for doing it; if not by the law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by
opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience” (U V: 14). This links wrongdoing to harm
because if society has jurisdiction then there is harm occurring that is thought punishable. This is
further connected to duty because the sentence immediately following the above quote discusses
how duties are things that we believe others may be compelled to perform and when agents do
not perform their duties, we believe they ought to be punished for it (i.e. it is wrong). So, harm is
related to duty because Mill suggests that if one fails to perform his or her duty to others then it
is wrong and when it is wrong, they ought to be punished because they are causing harm to the
others. However, by dividing duties into those that may be prevented through the law and those
that may not, Mill is claiming that there are certain acts with which the government may not
interfere.
So, Mill seems to think that there are different types of duties and these types inform us
as to the many ways in which agents can be required to discharge them. For Mill, extra-legal
social pressure—such as shunning or reproaching—is often an effective way in which agents can
be induced to do their duty. 200 For instance, Mill believes education is the best tool to “cultivate”
the social and self-regarding virtues and “works by conviction and persuasion as well as by
compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the selfregarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the
better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter” (OL IV: 4).
But if education fails, in some cases “the offender may then be justly punished by opinion,
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though not by the law” (OL IV: 3). In these cases, while agents are encouraged to fulfill their
duties through extra-legal social pressures, the general harm principle is applicable though the
legal harm principle is not (OL IV: 5). 201 This seems to introduce either a hierarchy of duties,
some more important (or perhaps serious) than others, or at least a division among duties. Those
most important of the duties or duties of a certain kind, it seems, are subject to law enforcement
while others are left either to extra-legal societal pressures or else the individual him/herself. It
will be beneficial to examine these duties.

3.3.2 Duty, Interests, and Others
While Mill does not always make the connection between duties and harm to others
explicit in On Liberty, he alludes to the relationship between duties, interests, and otherregarding acts when criticizing Christian morality. He claims that by stressing the need to obey
and submit, Christian morality succeeds in “disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty from the
interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him
for consulting them” (OL II: 37). This suggests that, for Mill, duties and the interests of others
are intimately connected through morality. When an agent has duties to assignable individuals it
fosters and creates an atmosphere of mutual interest. When someone claims that obeying orders
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Mill claims that “We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to
the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society;
we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most
acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or
conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference
over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes, a person
may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers
these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults
themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment.” [Emphasis added]. This
seems to suggest that we can apply pressure to others and this does not yet infringe on their rights or illegitimately
harm them but when it does pass this point into oppression, then we have crossed the line of legitimacy into rights
infringement.
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and submitting to authority are the reasons to perform duties, the connections and interactions
among individuals is lessened and thus the importance of others in morality is diminished.
When we connect duties and others, especially duties to refrain from harming others, we
highlight the social aspect of morality while at the same time recognizing the liberties that others
have. Mill states that acts that primarily concern the self
may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and selfrespect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a
breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for
himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless
circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The term duty to
oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or selfdevelopment; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow creatures,
because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable
to them (OL IV: 6).
Mill argues that whether the acts of an individual are primarily self-regarding or other-regarding
“makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he
displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we
know that we have not” (OL IV: 7). And it is the conduct that breaches duties to others in which
Mill believes we have a right to control others.
However, if the individual is not breaching a duty that he has toward others, then he is
merely “displeasing” us and
we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as
from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make
his life uncomfortable. … if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not,
for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we
shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may
avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an
object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat
him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing
is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest
or concern for him (OL IV: 7).
So, if an individual is only “harming” himself or performing self-regarding or consensual acts,
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we may show our concern and act benevolently, we can ignore him and separate ourselves from
him but we may not interfere with his liberty or significant interests because he is not interfering
with ours and he is not harming or violating a duty to others.
However, when discussing acts that cross from self-regarding to other-regarding, Mill
notes that
It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his
fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do
not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its
members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose
of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he
is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him,
but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is
not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow
from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we
allow to him in his (OL IV: 7).
So, again the primarily self-regarding acts in the sphere of liberty are outside the domain of
public coercion. Yet, as soon as an act leaves this sphere and enters the sphere of other-regarding
conduct, society does indeed have jurisdiction because these are “questions of social morality, of
duty to others” and “the opinion of the public … though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener
right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the
manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves”
(OL IV: 12). In other words, as soon as the interests of others or our “duties to others” are
invoked, the public not only has a right to interfere, but they are the ones best able to judge the
act because it is their interests that are impacted.
Interestingly, Mill notes that even behavior that generally falls within the self-regarding
realm that interferes with the individual’s ability to perform an obligation/duty to others leaves
the self-regarding realm and becomes other-regarding. For instance,
when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the
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performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of
a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a
soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in
short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and
placed in that of morality or law (OL IV: 10).
But, while it is clear that Mill believes that some duties require coercion and some of that
coercion should come from the law, as this passage suggests, it is not always clear which
particular duties should be covered through the law and which should not. Here he mentions both
the law and morality (or the sphere of moral pressures) as being appropriate but he does not lay
out which is relevant for which case and why.

3.3.3 Utilitarianism V and Duty: Duties of Perfect and Imperfect Obligation
It is at this point that chapter V of Utilitarianism provides interpretive assistance. For
instance, in that chapter Mill claims that “it is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its
forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be
exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we
do not call it his duty” (U V: 14). However, while duties are things we may be expected to do
and coerced to perform, there are different manners of duties and, as we know, different manners
of coercion and punishment.
In this chapter of Utilitarianism, he discusses perfect and imperfect obligations which
provide a clue as to which types of duties Mill believes are relevant for the legal harm principle.
He claims that “in the more precise language of philosophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation
are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of
imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right” (U V: 15).
However, while duties of imperfect obligation are not correlated with a right in another, they are
112

still obligatory and are still thought to be duties that one has. Mill states that “though the act is
obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the case of
charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practice, but not towards any definite
person, nor at any prescribed time” (U V: 15). In other words, morality demands that we observe
these imperfect duties, but it does not indicate a particular individual to whom our duty is toward
and we can exercise our own free choice in how we perform our duty.
With duties of perfect obligation, on the other hand, we do not have a choice in the
matter. With these sorts of duties there is a correlative right in another assignable person. 202 As I
will explain below, Mill believes that duties of perfect obligation are connected to morality
through justice. Duties of imperfect obligations, while within the domain of morality, are not in
the domain of justice or the law. We may have a moral obligation to perform a particular act but
it is not a duty that relates to specific assignable others, and thus is not something that justice
demands, though it is something morality demands. This sentiment is also consistent with views
expressed in On Liberty, especially when Mill claims
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive
injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any
specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable
individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to
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Mill seems to be relying on a distinction that is found in Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation. When Mill discusses the idea that wrongs and harms that are a matter of justice must
correspond to an “assignable individual” he is alluding a division of Bentham’s. When discussing the consequences
of “mischievous acts” Bentham claims that mischief can be divided into a primary and secondary category. The
primary category affects an assignable person (i.e. an assignable person suffers the ill effects) and the secondary acts
of mischief do not have an assignable individual but “extends itself either over the whole community, or over some
other multitude of unassignable individuals” (XII: 3). He further states that
The primary mischief of an act may again be distinguished into two branches: 1. the original: and,
2. The derivative. By the original branch, I mean that which alights upon and is confined to any
person who is a sufferer in the first instance, and on his own account: the person, for instance, who
is beaten, robbed, or murdered. By the derivative branch, I mean any share of mischief which may
befall any other assignable persons in consequence of his being a sufferer, and no otherwise.
These persons must, of course, be persons who in some way or other are connected with him.
(XII: 4)
This division seems to be present in Mill and indeed, it is a likely influence on his interpretation of assignable
individuals here.
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bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom (OL IV: 11 Emphasis
added).
Thus, while we may be morally bound to do or avoid doing things, justice is not always what
demands this but it does demand that other-regarding conduct which violates duties to others are
avoided.

3.3.4 Separation of Morality and Justice
By separating justice from morality more generally in chapter V of Utilitarianism, I
believe Mill is highlighting the distinction between those things that the law can require and
those things that are a part of morality (and are even other-regarding behavior) but are not within
the domain of the law. So, it seems that duties of perfect obligation in which others have a claim
on us are not only relevant for rights but they also—and more centrally—correspond to the legal
harm principle because there is an assignable person who makes a claim on us that we are duty
bound by justice to obey (as well as morality more generally since justice is a part of morality).
Though Mill allows for other considerations of justice to outweigh such general rules, for
instance if the harm that would occur because of the legal compulsion to perform a duty would
be more harmful than allowing the duty infringement to occur, then it may not be the proper
avenue for enforcing such duties. 203 Because duties of imperfect obligation are those that we
have but because they are not towards any definite person, it seems that a lesser sort of coercive
interference would be the appropriate avenue for enforcement. It may be that society can apply
“moral pressures” to ensure that people perform these imperfect obligations. However, it is not
even clear that Mill would endorse this position because these may be instances in which
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See for instance, Mill, Utilitarianism, V: 15; Mill, On Liberty, I: 11, V: 11. This is a matter of applying the
balancing principle and will be discussed further in chapter 6.6.
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individuals would be better left to their own devices and since there is not a specific “other” that
is being harmed, it is not clear that Mill would on balance allow for coercive interference though
these fit within the domain of society. Imperfect duties, then, are things over which we may have
a moral obligation but it is not to an assignable person 204 and thus, because there is not
assignable harm to others is not a proper domain of the law (and perhaps in certain circumstances
not through social pressures either). If we cannot point to those who are wronged, it seems Mill
believes it is not appropriate to prevent the behavior in question through the law. 205
Mill further argues that while we may be morally bound and have a duty to be charitable,
for instance, that charity is not assignable to any particular person. These sorts of duties are not
something over which the law ought to have any say because they are things that we would like
or prefer that people do and would make people “good” but these duties do not have an
assignable person to which we are obliged to give. Some, including Alan E. Fuchs, claim that
Mill here is talking about supererogatory acts, which if he is correct, would not fall within the
domain of society because they are not causing harm. 206 Others, such as Piers Norris Turner,
would argue that since there are negative consequences of not giving to charity, for instance, and
it is a part of morality, that they are in fact within the domain of society and any negative
consequence is harm on Mill’s account. 207 Because my focus is not on the general harm principle
or harm on the lower end of the spectrum, it does not matter for my purposes who is correct in
this matter—whether violations of imperfect obligations cause harm or fail to benefit.
Furthermore, in highlighting the difference between duties of beneficence, which we want people
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Mill seems to borrow this idea from Bentham, Principle of Morals and Legislation, XII: 3–4.
This is perhaps a bit over simple. It is not just that you need to be able to point to an assignable individual but
rather that the assignable individual has a claim on the agent because of the duty the agent has—there is a causal
factor not a mere contributing factor in the harm. This will be discussed more below.
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Alan E. Fuchs, “Mill’s Theory of Morality,” in The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, (Hoboken, NJ:
Blackwell, 2006) 147–50.
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Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle,” 300, 319–26.
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to fulfill and which we ought to attempt to teach others, and duties to not harm, Mill claims that
“in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence [we all] have an unmistakable
interest, but far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the benefits of others; but he
always needs that they should not do him hurt” (U V: 33). This passage of Utilitarianism
highlights the hierarchy of interests, some more important to the interests of humans than others.

3.3.5 A Hierarchy of Interests
This hierarchy also seems to be present in chapter IV of On Liberty. Here Mill makes the
connection between duties, harm, and others much more directly when he claims that “everyone
who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in
society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct
towards the rest” (OL IV: 3). These duties toward society, for Mill, are two-fold. One involves a
straightforward duty not to harm others (perfect duties) and the other seems to involve duties of
beneficence and/or positive aid toward society and individuals within it (imperfect duties). The
first sort of duty or societal obligation is a statement or summation of the general harm principle
and is useful for further examining what Mill intends to count as “harm” for the harm principle
both generally and more specifically as it relates to the law. The second supposed social
obligation or duty seems (initially) to go against many claims Mill makes in On Liberty,
specifically regarding the limits of the harm principle. Leaving aside the second for now, I will
focus on the first. 208
On the social duty regarding conduct aimed toward harm prevention, Mill says, “this
conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests,
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I will examine the second criterion later in chapter 4.4 when discussing the inconsistencies that may appear in On
Liberty.
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which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as
rights” (OL IV: 3). This particular line of thought connects much of what Mill says about harm
and important interests to rights. The connections made here are important in understanding the
legal harm principle, namely, the relationship between interests (of a specific kind), duty, the
law, and rights. He introduces the idea that the types of interests he discusses here, which he
appeals to throughout On Liberty, are or “ought to be considered rights” (OL IV: 3). This
connection of interests and of rights is noteworthy in that it links the harm principle more
directly to the law and helps to point more explicitly to what Mill believes the role of the law
plays in legitimately limiting liberty. As I will discuss in the next chapter, Mill believes that
when an act interferes with certain duties to others—perfect duties—it is a rights infringement
and is an unacceptable sort of harm to others that affects a special sort of interest that individuals
have and the government may interfere to either prevent a violation or punish after the fact. 209
This is consistent with the general harm principle which states that harm to others
(especially their permanent and more important interests 210) is the only legitimate interference in
the liberty of others. As mentioned in the previous section, Mill argues that
Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to
external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the
interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima
facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely
applicable, by general disapprobation (OL I: 11).
These interests are those that are essential to the liberty of citizens. So, we have perfect duties to
respect the permanent interests of humans, which Mill frequently defines as liberties. Such
liberties and interests, when of a certain type are then rights, and when we seriously infringe
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More on Mill’s incorporation of punishment will be explored below.
See chapter 4.
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these rights we are failing to fulfill these certain duties (perfect) which causes harm to others.
Then, it seems, we have duties not to violate rights. And when these rights are violated, Mill here
suggests that the law is the appropriate domain. 211

211
While I will have more to say on the matter below, it may seem as though Mill suggests that breaches of duty can
be punished by social extra-legal means (“general disapprobation”) I will argue that this is only when society is of
the opinion that while the law is the appropriate domain for these violations, it would not be practical or would cause
more harm by prohibiting the violation. Because of this, it falls into the domain of extra-legal coercion and ought to
be prevented that way instead.
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Chapter 4
Rights and the Domain of the Legal Harm Principle

4.1 Rights and the Legal Harm Principle
If, as I claim, Mill depends on an idea of rights to inform where the domain of the legal
harm principle begins, then what does he mean by “rights” and how does this help us to further
understand the legal harm principle as distinct from Mill’s general harm principle? This
connection between rights and the harm principle is an important feature because it provides
another clue into what Mill intends the harm principle to cover regarding the law and
interference in certain interests of others, which we now know to be “rights” (OL IV: 3). Indeed,
he says that these rights may come from “express legal provision” (OL IV: 3). This relationship
is notable because one of the criticisms of Mill is that he lacks a certain depth of explanation
regarding his understanding of harm in On Liberty that makes what he is doing unhelpful or too
vague for practical application. 212 If we can look to what he says of rights to inform us of what
he means by liberties, interests, and harm, we can utilize the harm principle more easily to
interpret the legitimate domain of the penal law. Unfortunately, he does not say much about
rights as such in On Liberty and what he does say does not seem to be particularly illuminating.
For instance, Mill states that “as much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger
specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with”
(OL IV: 3). He recognizes that preventing agents from encroaching the rights of others interferes
with these agents’ liberty but claims that
for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human
development. The means of development which the individual loses by being
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly
212
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obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself
there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature,
rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid
rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which
have the good of others for their object (OL III: 9).
This passage suggests that compulsion and coercion of individuals is acceptable to prevent harm
to others where such harm occurs when others’ rights are encroached because it is good for
everyone, even the agent being restricted yet he still does not say what he means by rights here.
This ties harm prevention and the protections of rights to morality and justice and highlights that
the harm principle is based not on individuality but on community. He hints that others are
injured when rights are infringed and that rights help in the “development of other people,” and
that they relate to the “good of others.”
At times Mill seems to use “rights” interchangeably with “liberties.” Indeed, when he is
setting the stage for his discussion in On Liberty he claims that when citizens were attempting to
determine the proper limits of the government, they were detailing “certain immunities, called
political liberties or rights” (OL I: 2). This suggests that (legal/political) rights and liberties are
intimately connected and may perhaps be one and the same or perhaps these liberties are a sort of
right. 213 Nevertheless, if Mill understands right infringing harm as that which determines when
the law may step in (which I will argue below), then we need to get a better handle on what he
means by rights. And if we can use Mill’s own view and explanation in Utilitarianism to
understand his view of rights, then we can look to him instead of later theorists who may not use
the same theory or idea of rights. 214
213

For a detailed discussion of rights and liberties and how they differ, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1919). Much of what Hohfeld says may be consistent with Mill though Hohfeld does go to great
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because many believe that Mill does not effectively discuss what he means by these terms and Feinberg’s excellent
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4.1.1 Right Versus Rights
While it is easy to import many things into talk of “rights,” Mill is a Utilitarian and does
not believe in inherent rights in the way that many theorists describe them. In On Liberty he
claims “I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract
right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions: but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man
as a progressive being” (OL I: 11). He categorically rejects any interpretation of rights that is not
based on utility—or “the Expedient” as he sometimes calls it in Utilitarianism (U V: 1).
However, because the term ‘right’ is not univocal and is used in many ways, the two most
common being ‘right’ as in a protected interest and ‘right’ as in right and wrong, it is not clear
which term Mill is using here. Indeed, throughout On Liberty he discusses both. So, it may seem
that here he is talking of “abstract right” in terms of right and wrong because he does not talk of
rights (with an s) which is perhaps more common. However, because of the context, i.e. he is
talking of the principle of liberty and interests that individuals have as well as coercion and later
he discusses legal penalties, I take him to be discussing rights (with an s). This seems to be
confirmed when he discusses interests—specifically those that are based on utility grounded in
permanent interests—as rights (OL I: 11, IV: 3). 215 In Utilitarianism chapter V, he also discusses
rights in terms of justice and interests and there, as I will explain below, he ties the idea of rights
to utility and justice, which also seems to confirm my interpretation.
However, even if he is speaking of ‘right’ in terms of right and wrong, he would provide
a similar answer to any talk of legal and/or moral rights. He would still demand all talk of such

and thorough work does this much more obviously. While at times this practice is useful and easier, some of what
Feinberg says is not entirely consistent with Mill.
215
While Mill connects rights and interests in On Liberty as I argued above, this connection becomes very apparent
in Utilitarianism V.
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interests to be strictly in terms of utility and forgo any notion of natural or abstract rights of
which he was very aware that utilitarian Jeremy Bentham famously and colorfully called
“nonsense on stilts.” 216 So even if I am incorrect in interpreting this particular ambiguous
passage as discussing “rights” rather than “right,” the overall methodology of Mill in both On
Liberty and chapter V of Utilitarianism supports use of this passage as evidence or explanation
for the idea that rights are nothing more than interests that have a very high social utility and are
not innate or part of natural law.
Further evidence for this occurs early in On Liberty when Mill is describing the harm
principle. He claims that
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign (OL I: 9).
While again, this passage may also be discussing ‘right’ in terms of right/wrong, Mill seems to
be claiming that individuals have certain rights surrounding self-regarding conduct when he
states that individuals have “sovereignty” over their own body and mind. Mill could mean
nothing more than it is proper, correct, right (as opposed to wrong) that individuals have absolute
power over their mind and body but by invoking sovereignty, he seems to be making the claim
that individuals have a right to this because sovereignty is frequently coupled with “rightful” or
“legitimate” or some kind of “authority” all of which seems to refer to a significant interest that
individuals have that ought to be protected.
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4.1.2 Interpretations of Rights
Some contemporary theorists, Joel Feinberg among them, rely on rights talk that is not
properly utilitarian, and it is possible to take much of what Mill says about rights and interpret it
in, for instance, a Kantian manner or in terms of natural rights. While my interpretation of Mill
does not depend on strict adherence to utilitarianism, it is important to keep in mind that some
interpretations of rights are a loose—or perhaps directly contrary—way in which to use Mill’s
understanding of rights. Because Mill believes that there are degrees of pleasures and goods
which make up those things that provide happiness and that some goods are qualitatively better,
or have greater utility, than others, he can talk of rights as those things that are a necessary or
significant part of happiness or a good life while still adhering to the Principle of Utility and his
utilitarian commitments. 217 Rights, then, are things he believes are beneficial in a greater sense
than many other “goods” as they are “grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being” (OL I: 11). In chapter II of Utilitarianism Mill defines rights as “legitimate
and authorized expectations” (U II: 23) which seem to suggest that the permanent interests he is
discussing are legitimately expected.
Many of the things he—and others, such as Feinberg and even Kant—understands to be
rights would be things that others with different interpretations of rights would also agree
constituted rights and the benefit of Mill’s method is that even when talking about rights through
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a utilitarian theory he can allow for the rights that we have to change as society and even
technology changes. In other words, it is entirely possible and plausible for more rights to be
acquired (that were in fact not rights before) based on the idea that humans are progressive and
that the important interests of humans evolve and develop in such a way that the rights that are of
greatest importance are rights for which we previously had no need (either because they are
based in a new advance in technology or else the needs and expectations of individuals in society
change). As long as we can demonstrate that a particular right is highly socially useful, it seems
Mill would allow them within the theory. This makes many of the things that Mill says regarding
the general harm principle consistent with a variety of interpretations of rights (even some that
upon first blush may seem opposed to a utilitarian interpretation—such as those based on duty)
and it is where the concept of rights—no matter the theory—coincide that we have a relatively
universal, descriptive, and usable understanding of rights which seems to provide substance for
the legal harm principle (but this is getting ahead of myself).

4.2 Connecting Rights to Justice, Morality, and the Law
For Mill—and most others—the law is inextricably intertwined with morality and justice.
The harm principle is essentially a principle of justice which upholds certain moral ideas. Mill
believes that justice is a subspecies of utility and he claims that “justice remains the appropriate
name for certain social utilities which are vastly more important and therefore more absolute and
imperative, than any others are as a class” (U V: 38). Mill also connects justice directly to
morality by claiming it is an attribute of morality (he explicitly says “justice, like many other
moral attributes …” (U V: 2)). Indeed, it is exactly this point—that justice is a feature of
morality and that it is best understood as protecting those interests that are more important than
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others—that Mill is trying to make in chapter V of Utilitarianism. He claims that “people find it
difficult to see, in Justice, only a particular kind or branch of general utility, and think that
[Justice’s] superior binding force requires a totally different origin” (U V: 2). He believes that in
order to understand why this is the case, we must “attempt to ascertain what is the distinguishing
character of justice, or of injustice: what is the quality, or whether there is any quality, attributed
in common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust” to highlight the difference between
justice and mere disapproval (U V: 3).

4.2.1 Some Common Attributes of Justice
In Utilitarianism Mill considers five (possibly six) common aspects of justice that are
presumably universal, or at the very least common, though none are “regarded as absolute” (U
V: 4–8). He claims that
to find the various attributes of a variety of objects, it is necessary to begin by
surveying the objects themselves in the concrete. Let us therefore advert
successively to the various modes of action, and arrangements of human affairs,
which are classed, by universal or widely spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust. The
things well known to excite the sentiments associated with those names, are of a
very multifarious character (U V: 4).
His method here may be interpreted in at least two ways. Either Mill is attempting to list all the
various things that people tend to think about justice, whether they are an actual part or not, or
else he is listing those things that most people agree to be essential (though perhaps not
necessary) “common attributes” of justice. I take him to be doing the former because in his
description and explanation that follows, he seems to be attempting to show that these attributes
of justice stem from a single thing, namely, social utility but that we may be mistaken in some
cases because we do not refine our thoughts and feelings appropriately. The commonalities that
Mill discusses “rapidly in review, without studying any particular arrangement” are 1. It is unjust
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to violate a legal right, 2. It is unjust to violate a moral right, 3. Individuals should get what they
deserve, 4. It is unjust to break faith, and 5. It is unjust to show partiality. There is perhaps a
sixth common attribute that Mill discusses, namely it is just to treat people with equality though
it may be that this is an explanation of or addition to the attribute of impartiality (U V: 4–9).
When people discuss justice, one of the first things that comes up is individual rights to
certain liberties, which are generally thought to be granted and defined by the law. When
something that is thought to be a right is not covered by the law, one of the first steps of activists
is to attempt to change the law to account for such rights. When such a right is violated, it is
generally considered to be unjust and those who violate such rights may be held criminally
liable. Thus, it is descriptive legal rights with which Mill begins (and uses to segue into moral
rights). He claims that “in the first place, it is mostly considered unjust to deprive anyone of his
personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. … It is just to
respect, unjust to violate, the legal rights of anyone” (U V: 5). However, this, in a way, Mill
admits is too simple. For instance, there are some rights that ought not to belong to individuals
even if their legal code grants such a legal right to them because the law that grants the right is
itself unjust, bad, or illegitimate. Mill recognizes that there are different responses to this
problem and different calls to action (or inaction) which are expressed by the public even now.
For instance, it may be the case that one believes that no matter how bad the law is, it ought
never to be violated and violating a law, any law, is unjust. Those who hold this view believe in
“maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law” (U V: 6).
On the other side, it may be the case that individuals believe that it is acceptable to
violate an unjust or bad law. Mill outlines three cases where some may think it is acceptable in
certain circumstances to violate certain laws. The first is that some believe that “any law, judged
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to be bad, may blamelessly be disobeyed, even though it be not judged to be unjust, but only
inexpedient” (U V: 6). In the second case, those who would allow for the willful disobedience of
the law “confine the license of disobedience to the case of unjust laws” (U V: 6). Finally, some
believe that all inexpedient laws are unjust laws because “every law imposes some restriction on
the natural liberty of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by tending to
their good” (U V: 6).
However, even in cases in which individuals believe the law, whether good or bad, just or
unjust, ought to be followed, most agree that the law is not synonymous with justice and when “a
law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which
a breach of law is unjust, namely by infringing somebody’s right” (U V: 6). However, because
these rights cannot be considered (descriptive) legal rights, there must be some other kind of
right that we recognize: moral rights. So, at this point Mill notes that there are two primary
understandings of rights. These understandings of rights, namely legal rights and moral rights,
may, and frequently do, overlap. Some moral rights are also (descriptive) legal rights and some
moral rights are not (descriptive) legal rights. And while it would seem that one could argue that
all legal rights are moral rights, Mill would not go so far because there are some legal rights that
ought not to be legal rights (they are descriptive but not normative). As noted above, they are
derived from a bad law or an immoral law and thus ought not to be a right that one has. If,
however, all legal rights were derived from legitimate laws, it seems that they would be a
subspecies of moral rights (they would be prescriptive or normative).
The third widely accepted understanding of justice is that each person should get what he
or she deserves “whether good or evil” (U V: 7). This concept of desert is present in many
accounts of justice and regulations concerning the criminal law, and in some cases, is believed to
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be a necessary feature of any criminal law. Mill states that most people believe that those who do
bad things should be punished and those who do good things should not (and some believe that
those who do good should get goodness in return, though constructing the criminal law is a bit
different than understanding justice). Mill believes that in the average person, this understanding
of justice is the most pervasive and common.
The fourth commonly held characteristic of justice deals with the idea that it is unjust to
go back on your word or to “break faith” with another. He claims that it is unjust “to violate an
engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our own conduct, at
least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily” (U V: 8). Lying, cheating,
breaking contracts, breaking promises all seem to fall under this idea of (in)justice and all are
thought to be unjust, though we admit in many cases that there may be circumstances in which
other obligations of justice outweigh or “absolve us from our obligation” (U V: 8). Again, as
Mill admits, “like the other obligations of justice already spoken of, this one is not regarded as
absolute” for a variety of reasons (U V: 8).
The fifth concept that is common to ideas of justice is the idea of impartiality, which is
often cached out in terms of equality (perhaps a sixth commonality), though they are not
synonymous. When you show favoritism to individuals or groups “in matters to which favour
and preference do not properly apply,” it is generally understood to be unjust (U V: 9). While
this does not really specify much, Mill recognizes that “impartiality, however, does not seem to
be regarded as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty” (U V: 9) and in
some (many?) instances, favoritism is not unwarranted but rather is quite acceptable and in fact
expected. For instance, in many cases, we expect people to give preference and priority to their
family over others and would tend to believe they are not behaving as they should if they did not.
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While it is obviously the case that there are circumstances in which it is wrong to give partiality
to family—for instance, we generally disapprove of nepotism—in many cases, such as providing
food, shelter, and affection, we are generally supposed to favor our family over others. However,
Mill correctly states that “impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory; but this
is involved in the more general obligation of giving to everyone his right” (U V: 9). I believe this
rests on the common attribute that each person should get what he/she deserves. And further, it
may be the case that rights are essential to getting what one deserves because rights are those
things that are owed to us as Mill claims they are “legitimate and authorized expectations” (U II:
23) that seem to be grounded on the permanent interests that we have.
This idea of impartiality is further connected to the idea that in matters of determining
claims against one another, one ought to consider only desert (which is a matter of impartiality).
“In short,” Mill claims, “as an obligation of justice, [impartiality] may be said to mean, being
exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the
particular case in hand” (U V: 9). And as Mill recognizes, it is difficult to talk about impartiality
without also talking about the related concept of equality because, for many, being impartial and
being just amount to “giving equal protection to the rights of all” (U V: 10). However, Mill
observes that the ideas of equality and impartiality vary greatly. Indeed, this idea was developed
by Amartya Sen when he argued that the idea of equality was not really a uniform or consistent
thing. Indeed, most ideas of equality are based on whatever it is that one is arguing in favor of. If
one favors equality of choice or of income or of rights or whatever else it is that, as Mill would
say, one finds most useful or valuable, then that is how the idea of equality is to be interpreted. It
is important to note that these ideas may differ fundamentally. 218
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Mill claims that if we are talking of equality of rights, even those who enjoy more rights
than others, in part due to radically unjust systems, still believe that theoretically even those with
very little rights ought to have them protected, as meagre as those rights may be. Mill claims that
even in a society which endorses and enforces slavery, the masters of the slaves would admit that
the rights of slaves ought to be upheld, even though those rights are few and far between. He
further states that such slave owning individuals would argue that if these rights are not upheld,
such systems are “wanting in justice” (U V: 10) though, interestingly, these individuals would
think the institutions that withhold rights to the slave are not unjust. This is because, as Sen and
Mill would claim, the equality of upholding the rights is understood as valuable or
useful/expedient but ridding oneself of the unjust institution is not.
Mill recognizes that while pervasive and deemed by most to be fundamental types of
justice, “it is a matter of some difficulty to seize the mental link which holds them [impartiality
and equality as well as the other common ideas of justice] together, and on which the moral
sentiment adhering to the term essentially depends” (U V: 11). To “seize the mental link”
between the various understandings of justice, Mill turns to the etymology of justice to show that
it is primarily derived from either “positive law” or “authoritative custom” and is more closely
connected to the law specifically than morality generally (U V: 12). He claims that “the courts of
justice, the administration of justice, are the courts of law and administration of law” and “there
can, … be no doubt that the idee mere, the primitive element, in the formation of the notion of
justice, was conformity to the law” and it was not until Christianity came about that the
connection to enforcement of all moral ideals broadly became featured (U V: 12). 219
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Indeed, he claims that conformity to the law “constituted the entire idea [of justice] among the Hebrews, up to the
birth of Christianity; as might be expected in the case of a people whose laws attempted to embrace all subjects on
which precepts were required, and who believed those laws to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being. But
other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who knew that their laws had been made originally, and still
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It is this attempt or tendency to make all of morality a feature of the law which I believe
led to the confusion and conflation between morality and justice (which in turn confuses which
things ought to be considered rights relevant to the law). Because the idea of justice surrounded a
conformity to the law, justice continued to be connected to the law and most “knew that their
laws had been made originally, and still continued to be made, by men, [and] were not afraid to
admit that those men might make bad laws; might do, by law, the same things, and from the
same motives, which, if done by individuals without the sanction of law, would be called unjust”
(U V: 12).
Because of these two features (connection to the law and realization that humans could
create bad laws) justice continued to be connected to the law but
the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, not to all violations of law, but
only to violations of such laws as ought to exist, including such as ought to exist
but do not; and to laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be
law. In this manner the idea of law and of its injunctions was still predominant in
the notion of justice even when the laws actually in force ceased to be accepted as
the standard of it (U V: 12).
So, while it is the case that justice and the law are intimately connected, most recognize that they
are not synonymous in actuality and that it may be the case that a law is unjust or that justice
demands that certain things not be enforced through the law. This does not mean that the law is
not a function of justice, only that we as humans may get it wrong. This also does not mean that
we should not attempt to create principles that govern the law as it ought to function and to
determine which things ought to be considered rights within the law. Indeed, it seems that the
purpose of deriving a legal harm principle from Mill’s general one is to create a principled way
in which to decide which sorts of behavior properly belong within the domain of the criminal

continued to be made, by men, were not afraid to admit that those men might make bad laws; might do, by law, the
same things, and from the same motives, which, if done by individuals without the sanction of law, would be called
unjust.”
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law, which are rights, and which are not. Whether we then actually prohibit these actions through
the law is a different question altogether.
Understanding which “rights” ought to be legal rights seems to be the focus of what Mill
is doing in Utilitarianism chapter V and is key to understanding my account of the legal harm
principle. In other words, Mill looks at common notions of rights in order to delineate justice and
morality. In doing so, he refines these ideas of rights in order to pinpoint matters of justice. I
believe this refinement and the definition of rights provides the division between the general
harm principle and legal harm principle. This shows the way in which moral duties and
obligations overlap with and inform rights and obligations of justice but also helps to show how
they come apart. 220

4.2.2 Separating Justice from General Morality
To Mill (and most others) it is obvious that we apply the idea of justice to things which
we believe the law should not interfere, which further supports the idea that the law and justice in
the real world are not synonymous. It seems that for Mill, the domain or jurisdiction of legal
enforcement depends on where the line is drawn which separates justice from morality more
generally. It is at this point in chapter V of Utilitarianism that Mill suggests that there is
something incorrect about the way we tend to discuss, describe, or understand rights because
they are derived from obligations and duty and it seems like all obligations, as they have been
described thus far in Utilitarianism V, can be described in pretty much the same way. By rights
most people (as indicated by the beginning of Mill’s chapter) think they are things that are due to
us or things that morality demands we get, but this would not distinguish morality and justice
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and he argues (and most of us tend to agree here) that morality and justice are not the same (and
since they are not the same we need to be clearer on what is meant). That morality and justice are
different is evident when we study our feelings which indicate that in many cases we do not want
the law to interfere in “the whole detail of private life” (U V: 13) and that it may be an injustice
to have the law cover some things to which we may think morality demands. 221 Mill claims that
as he has described it thus far, justice does not appear to differ from an idea of moral obligations
in general and all of what he has said so far also applies to how we tend to view morality as a
whole.
He believes his account of the commonalities and etymology of justice are accurate and
are “a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and progressive growth of the idea of justice.
But we must observe, that it contains, as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral
obligation in general” (U V: 14). He claims that both justice and morality contain the idea that
each should get what he/she deserves and that when someone does something that goes against
this (i.e. something wrong), there ought to be repercussions. But there must be something that
separates them still further because we recognize that they are not always the same and different
methods of interference are necessary in different cases.
When Mill begins to separate the role of justice (those things that may be covered by the
law) from that of morality, he highlights this disparity and focuses on the idea that morality is
separated from general utility through duty and our notions of desert/punishment and
wrongfulness. He claims that though we do not want the law to interfere in many things that we
consider to be “wrong,” “it would always give us pleasure, and chime in with our feelings of
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fitness, that acts which we deem unjust should be punished, though we do not always think it
expedient that this should be done by the tribunals” (U V: 13). This, I believe is where problems
regarding alternate liberty limiting principles, such as legal moralism and paternalism, occur
because the overlapping ideas of morality and justice cloud where the proper realm of legitimate
government intervention falls. Because we often conflate morality as a whole and the specific
narrow version of morality that is justice, we fail to maintain a clear and principled division. 222
Mill claims that
the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not
only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not
call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in
some way or other for doing it; if not by the law, by the opinion of his fellow
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience (U V: 14).
Yet, it is finding the line between legal punishment and societal/moral pressures that creates a
tension with rights enforcement.
Mill claims that what distinguishes morality in general from utility is 1. We believe the
act to be wrong and 2. We demand/expect/desire punishment for the act (whereas utility focuses
on the useful or expedient and withholds any opinion on matters of punishment). While these
two criteria are also a part of justice, there is something more that distinguishes justice from
morality more generally. The rest of Utilitarianism chapter V explores this differentiation and
rests upon a notion and refinement of rights which in turn defines justice and the proper domain
of the law.
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4.2.3 Utilitarianism Chapter V: Rights, Perfect Obligations, and the Law
So, Utilitarianism V indicates that Mill believes there are different criteria for those
moral “rights” that are subject to the law through, what I call, the legal harm principle. Both
morality and justice require 1. a wrong done and 2. a desire for retribution but justice adds
another criterion, namely, 3. harm to an assignable person—a claim. This is where Mill brings in
the notions of perfect and imperfect duties. 223 Perfect obligations seem to align with the domain
of the legal harm principle and notions of justice. Mill claims that “in our survey of the popular
acceptations of justice, the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a personal right—a
claim on the part of one or more individuals, like that which the law gives when it confers a
proprietary or other legal right” (U V: 15). 224 So, while morality generally covers a broader class
of things, justice (as a narrow part of morality) covers something more specific in demanding a
claim-right. Morality covers all wrongs, such as a failure to be generous or beneficent, justice
covers those wrongs to which others have a claim against us. This claim is that some other has
violated something which is due to the victim.
Mill’s idea of justice, then, relies on a wrong done to some assignable person (i.e. a harm
done to an assignable person). This contrasts with morality more generally which also includes
imperfect duties and obligations (which morality demands of us) which do not violate or infringe
right-claims when we fail to fulfill these obligations. Mill claims that with those things that ought
to be rights/comprise justice
Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in
breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse than
other people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies two
things—a wrong done, and some assignable person who is wronged. … It seems
to me that this feature in the case—a right in some person, correlative to the moral
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obligation—constitutes the specific difference between justice, and [moral
obligations in general such as] generosity or beneficence. Justice implies
something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some
individual person can claim from us as his moral right (U V: 15).
So, it seems that (moral) rights are those that we can claim as our due from another. While we
may have a variety of moral duties, not all are toward specific individuals and if specific
individuals cannot claim it as their due, there is not a correlative rights-claim that is being
infringed or violated. So, Mill refines what he means by rights here. All moral obligations and
duties then, are not “rights” in this same sense because there is not a claim by an assignable
person in some cases, such as Mill’s examples of beneficence and generosity. Mill claims that
“wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence: and
whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general where we have
now placed it, will be found to make no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality
into justice” (U V: 15). This, of course, is a critique of legal moralism and paternalism which
attempt to overextend the idea of justice to incorporate more wrongs into the domain of the law
that are not rights violations or infringements (where an assignable individual has a claim on
another) but rather are issues of moral obligations more generally. 225
This helps to make a distinction between harm that is within the domain of the law and
harm that is not. In both morality and justice there is a likelihood of a violation if harm is done.
However, the key distinction rests on whether there is a claim or not. Mill states that “the two
essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice [which is conceptually related to the law] are, the
desire to punish a person who has done harm [i.e. done wrong], and the knowledge or belief that
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there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done [i.e. infringed or
violated a right]” (U V: 18). If an individual causes a rights-infringing harm (harm to an
important and significant interest as progressive beings), the law may be invoked. If an
individual fails to prevent harm or contributes to harm (but does not cause it), then it is not a
rights violation or infringement but is still harm and can still be covered by the general harm
principle, though not the legal harm principle.
For instance, in “bad Samaritan” cases where individuals fail to prevent already occurring
harm but do not cause it, they could be censured by social/moral pressures but not by the law.
We may have a “right to life” which means we have a right not to be (unjustly) killed by another
but this does not mean that others must give us things that are not ours in order to keep us alive,
i.e. no one owes us things that would save us such as food or water—they only owe us not to
harm us. We may have a “right to food” but this is just a right to that which we already have but
we do not have a right that anyone give this to us, only that they not take it from us. Others have
moral obligations to help others but others do not have this as their due. We do not owe specific
individuals food or assistance (unless there is a special relationship such as parental or familial
obligations, etc.) but if we give it to them, we are doing a morally good thing. We have this
extra-legal (imperfect) moral obligation but it is not a legislatable moral right that can be
demanded of us through the law.
In the case of the general harm principle’s use of moral pressures, it seems that one can
argue that any time harm to others occurs, whether there is a duty toward the specific individual
or not, society may step in in the form of moral pressures. So, when someone is being harmed,
even if the other agent did not cause the harm or the individual being censured by moral
pressures contributed to the harm though did not violate or infringe another’s rights, society can
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legitimately step in to prevent the harm using moral pressures. So, if I have the means to give to
charity and do not and harm occurs that could have been prevented, society may criticize and
ostracize me for the harm but may not create a law demanding that I give charitably. If I offend
someone else’s moral sensibilities or say something shocking, I may be causing harm but I am
not violating or infringing their rights (there is not a significant interest not to be offended and
indeed Mill would likely argue that offense does not even count here) and so may be subject to
social controls but not legal.

4.2.4 But What of Retribution?
One potential issue that arises when discussing the division between justice and morality
generally is that we often talk of a desire for punishment even when there is not a rightsinfringing harm. However, this retributive element is still consistent with a division between
morality and justice. When we talk of a desire that we have that those who do a wrong be
punished, sometimes we may mean nothing more than wrongdoers getting what they deserve and
that may mean nothing more than being called out for doing something wrong (i.e. application of
moral pressures, extra-legal social pressures). Mill even says that we may be obligated to help
people and inform them when they are doing something we think to be wrong. But this does not
mean they are infringing or violating a right. Furthermore, Mill claims “that the desire to punish
a person who has done harm to some individual, is a spontaneous outgrowth from two
sentiments, … the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling of sympathy” (U V: 19). These two
sentiments, according to Mill, are natural and “it is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any
harm done or attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathize” (U: V:
20). This sympathy, extends not only to ourselves and our offspring or family, but to any other
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that we see as similar to ourselves, which is all of humanity because “a human being is capable
of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he
forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, is
threatening to his own” (U V: 20). This social element is what makes us consider the way in
which our actions affect others and fosters a feeling of community which makes the important
interests we have of a high utility. This creates a “rule of conduct, and a sentiment which
sanctions the rule” which is “common to all mankind, and intended for their good” (U V: 23).
Thus, when someone violates or infringes on a claim-right of another, this sense of community is
threatened and the desire for retribution is a natural result.

4.2.5 Defining Rights and Their Domain
As Mill explains it, this rule of conduct is invoked when someone’s “rights (to use the
expression appropriated to the case) are violated” (U V: 23). Here Mill defines what exactly he
means by “rights.” He claims that “all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right …
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect
him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion” (U V:
24). While I will come back to the latter part of this definition momentarily, it is helpful to look
further at what Mill means by this definition. He states that
to have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to
defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can
give him no other reason than general utility. … [which is derived] from the
extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned (U V:
25).
This links rights more clearly to the harm principle that is found in On Liberty and more
specifically to the legal harm principle because Mill is claiming that society ought to protect
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against infringements on rights because they are “extraordinarily important and impressive”
interests. If they are these sorts of interests, when they are infringed harm is being caused. So, to
infringe or violate another’s rights, one is causing harm (it seems any amount of harm) to
significant interests and the more important the interest/claim, the more society must protect it.
Mill continues his analysis of rights by looking at what he sees as the single most
important and significant of the social utilities to which we have a right. This key interest he is
describing is security. Security of self and one’s possessions is a common feature that is
presented as an essential claim that individuals have on one another. Mill states that
The interest involved [in rights] is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the most
vital of all interests. Nearly all other earthly benefits are needed by one person,
not needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary be cheerfully
foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human being can
possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the
whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but
the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived
of everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than
ourselves. Now this most indispensable of all necessaries, after physical
nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery for providing it is kept
unintermittedly in active play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our
fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our
existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned
in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is
often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind (U V: 25
Emphasis added).
Here Mill makes clear that when it comes to those vital human interests, security is generally that
which is considered the most important social utility and while it resides at the top of our list of
goods, it also seems to change in kind in proportion to the degree of importance. This is in part
because if we do not have security in our person and property, we are unable to flourish and be
happy because we are in constant fear. If we have security, then we have the ability to strive for
happiness without worrying that our lives or our liberty will be taken.
He claims that “the feelings concerned are so powerful, and we count so positively on
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finding a responsive feeling in others (all being alike interested), that ought and should grow into
must, and recognised indispensability becomes a moral necessity, analogous to physical, and
often not inferior to it in binding force exhorted” (U V: 25). In other words, while it is the case
that we must have food, shelter, and clothing to survive (we have physical necessities) without
security, even these necessary features are in peril. So, justice and the legal harm principle focus
on security—which focuses on protecting rights, or really protecting from certain harms which
others have a claim on us to prevent—which is of utmost social importance, i.e. socially useful.
As Mill states it, justice is
incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name
for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human wellbeing more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other
rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the
essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual implies and
testifies to this more binding obligation (U V: 32).
Because it is so important, this changes it to a kind of obligation toward others or right that we
have to claim against others which is so binding that the use of legal force becomes the domain
for enforcement and “the moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we
must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to
human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of
managing some department of human affairs” (U V: 33 Emphasis added). It seems then, that this
lends support not only for a separate legal criteria for the harm principle but also for the reason
why we need a division, i.e. these sorts of harm become a difference in kind.
More evidence for a separate legal harm principle also seems to be suggested when Mill
claims that as far as enforcement of interference goes, we have the highest interest in preventing
these significant kinds of interference. He says that
in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence [we] have an
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unmistakable interest, but far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the
benefits of others; but he always needs that they should not do him hurt. Thus the
moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others, either
directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once
those which he himself has most at heart, and those which he has the strongest
interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed (U V: 33 Emphasis added).
To me, the latter part of this quote suggests that since we have the “strongest interest” in
preventing harm by others, which includes the self-regarding freedoms to pursue happiness, we
have more of a reason to enforce, i.e. use legal recourse, these than any others and thus, they
would fall into the jurisdiction of the legal principle.
He then seems to provide more explanation of the sorts of rights which fall within the
legal harm principle. He says
Now it is these moralities primarily which compose the obligations of justice. The
most marked cases of injustice, and those which give the tone to the feeling of
repugnance which characterises the sentiment, are acts of wrongful aggression, or
wrongful exercise of power over some one; the next are those which consist in
wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due; in both cases,
inflicting on him a positive hurt, either in the form of direct suffering, or of the
privation of some good which he had reasonable ground, either of a physical or
of a social kind, for counting upon (U V: 33 Emphasis added).
These cases of injustice echo those that are explored in On Liberty and seem to reinforce the idea
that the legal harm principle protects individuals from certain liberty encroachments which cause
rights-infringing harm.

4.3 Is Mill’s Understanding of Rights Consistent with Other Theories?
Interestingly, oftentimes when Mill speaks of rights he seems to talk as if there are things
that ought to be treated as if they are rights and lays aside whether or not there are actually things
that are in fact rights. He even uses this language in On Liberty when he discusses “certain
interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be
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considered as rights” (OL IV: 3 Emphasis added). Whether or not they are rights as a real and
independent thing does not seem to matter for Mill because his purpose is to look to those things
that are treated as rights. There are things that Mill classes as having more or less utility and
justice amounts to protecting the rights that people have because they are grounded in the most
useful and permanent social interests of people. So, Mill does not claim or purport to claim that
Justice, rights, and interest are independent of utility. This is a useful thing to understand because
it seems that those with differing interpretations of rights, i.e. the Kantian, could agree that rights
are useful and important, indeed more important than other sorts of interest that humans have.
Thus, it seems that (my understanding of) Mill’s explanation of legal rights as being the most
useful and important interests we have (as progressive beings) is consistent with a myriad of
moral and ethical views and as a legal principle can be maintained by most theorists no matter
their personal morality.
Mill makes the claim that certain things he says are not inconsistent with Kantianism,
specifically regarding rights and justice (U V: 22). Mill claims that justice is a social feeling that
is derived from sympathy and self-defense. We do not wish to be harmed or have our rights
violated, i.e. we seek security for ourselves and those like us (all of society). And while in
particular cases we may not be thinking of the general good when we condemn an act that
violated or infringed our rights, this does not mean that the principle or the general points Mill
makes are wrong. Rather, he allows that “it is common enough certainly, though the reverse of
commendable, to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain” (U V: 22). However,
this does not mean that the social feeling he describes is not a dictate of justice. Indeed, he claims
that
a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers
whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it—such a person,
143

though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest
of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of
others as well as for his own. If he is not feeling this—if he is regarding the act
solely as it affects him individually—he is not consciously just; he is not
concerning himself about the justice of his actions. This is admitted even by antiutilitarian moralists. When Kant … propounds as the fundamental principle of
morals, ‘So act, that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational
beings,’ he virtually acknowledges that the interest of mankind collectively, or at
least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind of the agent when
conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. Otherwise he uses words
without a meaning: for, that a rule even of utter selfishness could not possibly be
adopted by all rational beings—that there is any insuperable obstacle in the nature
of things to its adoption—cannot be even plausibly maintained. To give any
meaning to Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape
our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their
collective interest (U V: 22). 226
Mill creates a concept of rights that he carefully delineates, but there may be other people who
bring up other ideas of rights and they are often completely consistent with Mill. And thus, what
he says about justice and harm is not inconsistent with other theories. It may be derived from
utilitarianism but that does not mean it is inconsistent with other theories and it seems that no
matter a person’s personal morality, most would agree that in matters of social interaction and
justice, the harm principle is necessary. Many specific rights that people claim to have fall under
many of the rights that Mill talks about. We think that there is some special feature of justice that
transcends utility but it really does not. It is merely a special form of utility. Especially when we
consider the role of the law and what is typically demanded of it. It must consider the practical
aspects of regulation, provide clear rules of conduct, and protect the interests of society and the
individual. When we consider these aspects of the law, we can see that most of the rights that we
consider to be in our significant interest are protected or outlined under the harm principle and
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It is not clear here that Mill’s interpretation of Kant is actually Kantian. However, for my purposes it does not
matter if Mill is relaying Kant correctly or misinterpreting Kant.
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are consistent with a wide range of rights theories, most of which, like Mill’s, center around the
idea of security. There is a kind of communal and practical aspect of what is going on with the
law that Mill can defend using his concept of rights. If it is useful, practical, and easy to
implement, then it is more likely to be enacted through the penal law. One advantage is that it
makes the notion of rights dependent on the needs and interests of society. As the times change,
it allows a fluidity and alteration when situations change. For instance, you may have a right to
protection or a “right to bear arms,” but this does not mean (and should not mean) that we have a
right to every means of protection at our disposal. Different forms of protection are, at different
times, more and less useful and some forms of protection directly endanger the general safety
and rights of others. If one form infringes on the rights or the liberties of others, then it may be
the case that it is not a right which ought to be protected through the criminal law.
Interestingly, it seems that the harm principle and Mill’s views on rights as related to a
legal harm principle are not inconsistent with other moral views. Mill relies on Utilitarianism to
justify when an act is or is not prohibited. But remember, the harm principle is not really
answering a question of justification but rather one of domain. When addressing the balancing
principle and attempting to decide if a particular act ought to be regulated, this is a matter of
justification. Mill believes that Utilitarianism is the way to determine this justification. Other
theories may be used to justify prohibition while adhering to the domain division Mill makes
with the jurisdiction principle and adhering to what he says about rights in general. I even think
that most theorists would agree with the claim (or maybe they would at least not dispute the
claim) that rights are those things that are most socially useful and often focus on the security of
citizens, which is what his idea of rights depends upon.
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4.4 Inconsistencies? Mill on Benefitting Others
It is now useful to stop and examine two passages in On Liberty that may seem on first
read to present difficulties for the view I present. In chapter IV Mill presents the second of what
he calls social obligations that individuals have toward one another. The other passage related to
this idea of social obligations is in chapter I of On Liberty and is a section in which Mill makes
some similar claims about duties that citizens have toward each other. These two passages are
interesting because they tie into Mill’s view of duties and obligations from Utilitarianism chapter
V. They are also of note because upon first read they seem problematic and potentially
inconsistent with the view of interests and rights of individuals that I present as well as the harm
principle more generally. However, these conflicts are superficial and the claims Mill makes in
these passages are consistent with his general harm principle as well as the legal harm principle I
propose.
In chapter IV of On Liberty Mill claims that there are two social obligations that
individuals have toward one another. The first social obligation covers conduct regarding rights
infringements and “this conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought
to be considered as rights” (OL IV: 3). This social obligation is not only consistent with my
classification of the general harm principle but helps to construct my legal harm principle.
However, the second required social duty toward others consists
in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the
labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from
injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all
costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society
may do (OL IV: 3).
This second social obligation still discusses the security and safety of others but also seems to
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require quite a lot of citizens. This makes not only refraining from harming others an obligation
but also protecting them from harm from others. In other words, it makes it a duty to prevent
harm to others and by doing so, seems to require us to benefit others as well. Even if these are
legitimate expectations of citizens, the government seems to be given quite a lot of enforcement
power, i.e. “enforcing at all costs.”
Along a similar vein, in the earlier passage (I: 11) Mill claims that in addition to
refraining from harming others and their interests,
There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may
rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice;
to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary
to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform
certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or
interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it
is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society
for not doing (OL I: 11 Emphasis added).
So, in these passages, Mill seems to suggest that it is not only the case that the state may coerce
individuals when they cause harm to others but it may also interfere in the liberty of its citizens
to require them to benefit others, to benefit the state, and to aid others.
In some cases, it actually seems as though Mill is allowing for legal moralism to sneak in
and take over. However, I think that much of this apparent inconsistency in Mill can be
explained away in one of two ways. First, it is important to remember that Mill is not only (or
even primarily) discussing state coercion or interference in liberty, as noted throughout, he is
also discussing societal pressures and pressures that one puts on oneself when other options are
too invasive. Second, while some of these duties may seem to be overly invasive of the state,
most (if not all) of them are in fact consistent with the harm principle.
Regarding interference in liberty, in both passages (at I: 11 and IV: 3), Mill is still
speaking relatively generally and it is important to keep in mind that throughout On Liberty he
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does not always distinguish between those acts that fall into the domain of moral/social pressures
and those that the law may enforce. Furthermore, he does not distinguish between types of laws,
such as tort and penal or administrative. It may very well be the case that the tort law may be
called upon to remedy a supposed grievance against another, but this does not entail that the
penal law is the proper avenue for restraint. Rather it seems to me that Mill is consistently
providing examples that fit all the situations he discusses, whether the domain of the law, social
coercion, or self-discipline. It is also useful to recognize that all the instances Mill lists as
required of citizens in passage I: 11 are those in which harm is very likely to occur to others, so
while the agent may not be causing the harm, the general harm principle applies to all duties that
individuals have, including imperfect duties which oblige us to prevent harm, even if you are not
the one to cause it. And while there are many ways to enforce moral duties, Mill does not
indicate that the law is the domain of these duties.
That these acts are not intended to be within the domain of the law for Mill also appears
to be the case because he is very reluctant to apply compulsion to acts that force an agent to
prevent evil to others while he readily accepts the fact that preventing someone from “doing” an
act that harms another is “the rule” and admits that “preventing” harm is “the exception.” Mill
claims that
A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and
in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is
true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To
make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him
answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet
there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In
all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure
amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as
their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the
responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the
case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act
better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which
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society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise
control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent.
When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the
conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and
protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging
himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made
accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures (OL I: 11).
This highlights Mill’s general way of speaking about harm in On Liberty. When he claims that
inaction can cause harm he is highlighting instances of actually causing harm, though not all acts
of inaction will cause harm (though many may contribute to the harm). He also recognizes that
preventing evil to others is, generally speaking, morally required but this does not mean that
others have a claim to this aid and that it should be covered by the law. However, he suggests
that requiring (say through moral pressures) aid to others in some situations would actually cause
more harm than good, so while it may be in the domain (the jurisdiction principle) of social
pressures, there may be good reason not to punish (the balancing principle).
Similarly, when discussing those social obligations that individual have (at IV: 3) Mill
claims that
The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration
for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted
rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law.
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to
discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a
person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not
affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the
ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect
freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences (OL IV: 3).
And while he claims that certain situations in which an agent’s inaction or failure to prevent
harm are grave enough to justify coercion, he is careful to note that this is an exception and he
does not claim the law as the appropriate domain. However, again this is not clear and I think it
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would be inconsistent if Mill believes that the penal law is the proper domain for this sort of
harm prevention. Especially because he cautions on the exercise of compulsion in these cases it
would seem that public pressure or moral education is the relevant answer to such inaction or
failure. Another reason to think Mill would not apply the penal law in these cases is that he
makes the claim that even acts that are specifically harmful to others are not always properly
regulated through the criminal law because such penalties are not always “safely applicable” (OL
I: 11). Even if one were to make the case that the harms that are not safely applicable are those
that are too minor or would cause more harm if regulated, it seems that even a severe instance of
harm that is allowed to occur or that is not prevented would not fit Mill’s criteria for legal
penalties of the strictness that the penal law enacts for the same reasons.
Mill claims that because coercing someone because they failed to prevent evil is the
exception to the coercive rule and I would argue that since it is an exception to the rule, it seems
that even if Mill believes that “in all things which regard the external relations if the individual,
he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their
protector” (OL I: 11) it does not necessarily follow that the part of the law responsible is penal
law. It would seem that since it is an exception, tort law, a less serious form of coercion, would
be a more appropriate avenue for compensation. If it is the exception, it seems the burden of
proof would be to show that the case fits the exception and deserves a legal response. If it does
not, then it seems that the social pressures become the relevant method of punishment.
It is in these two places above all others where it seems that Mill introduces an
inconsistency into his discussion of the harm principle—1. we may be required to do things
which benefit others and 2. We may be required to prevent harm (which we have not caused
directly) from occurring to others. In the first case, one could argue that the “benefits” that Mill
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provides as examples here would actually lead to or significantly risk harm to others. For
instance, Mill claims that we may be required to
give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence,
or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he
enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such
as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against
ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may
rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil
to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly
accountable to them for the injury (OL I: 11).
These things seem to be instances in which there is harm to others but the agent in question is
not the cause of the harm. In these cases, we may have a moral obligation to help but the victims
in these cases do not have a right that we aid them.
Regarding Mill’s claim that we may be required to prevent harm from occurring, not
merely avoid causing harm, I believe that this is a non-issue for not only Mill but also for the
legal harm principle I am suggesting. Essentially, we have a right that agents not harm us but we
do not have a right that harm not befall us. This addresses the distinction between when social
coercion can occur and when legal coercion can occur. If there is harm befalling us, we may
(rightly or wrongly) expect that agents ought to aid us but we do not have a right to this. We
have a right that agents not harm us but we do not have a right that agents aid us when we are in
harm. If this were the case, then justice would demand all manner of things that would likely
lead to more harm than good and to greater risk of danger for those who did not do anything
wrong. We do however, expect that agents aid us in many situations where there is harm
befalling another and we may think society may have jurisdiction over it since it affects others
but we would not allow for the law to prevent it but rather, since there is not rights-infringing
harm, we would expect extra-legal social pressures to be the appropriate domain for correction.
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4.4.1 Why Certain Things are not Rights Infringements
This may lead to the question of why some things that we have a substantial and
important interest in are not considered to be rights that we have a claim to. For instance, what
about things like food, water, and shelter? These are necessary parts of the good life and
arguably security, i.e. you must have these in order to have anything approaching a good life, but
are these things rights in the sense that Mill is talking about? It seems that they are not because
while food, water, shelter, etc. are necessary and it may seem that everyone has a right to these
things, we do not have a specific duty to an assignable individual to clothe and feed the
individual (other than those toward whom we have a special relationship, such as children or
those for whom we have accepted responsibility). We may, one could argue, have an imperfect
duty toward individuals in these situations but we do not owe specific individuals these
“benefits” and it is a sort of charitable giving when we do give them. These “rights” (food,
shelter, etc.) are things which we have a duty, but not to assignable individuals and they more
closely align with what Mill says about imperfect duties or duties surrounding special
relationships. 227
So, while we have a significant and important interest in these things, indeed we cannot
live without them, we do not have a right that others provide them for us. Of course, while we
have a right to them once we already have them and they cannot be taken away from us by force,
we do not have proper rights claims on others that they give us food, shelter, etc. if they have it
(or have extra of it). Do they have a moral obligation to give it to us? Yes, I believe they do and
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This view admittedly seems to have certain problems, such as accounting for the injustices that are present in
society that creates imbalances of goods for certain groups. However, I do not believe that this is a matter for the
criminal law but rather for administrative laws or even education and civic engagement. There may even be social
programs or laws that are implemented to remedy these imbalances that are incentives or social welfare programs
which are entirely consistent with the legal harm principle and the general harm principle.
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morality would dictate that if they have more than they need, they should share but this does not
mean we have a right to the food nor does it mean that we can take it from them. Should we
chastise and criticize and ostracize (apply moral pressures to) those who do not help others who
are in need, yes. And the general harm principle rightly allows for this; however, we do not have
the right to forcibly take it away from them or enact laws that require such “donation.” So, while
it is clear that harm is occurring when individuals are starving or homeless and while I also
believe that it is clear that, morally speaking, we ought to do something, I do not believe that, nor
do I think Mill would believe that the law is the proper domain for such charitable, moral
obligation.

4.5 Conclusion
Some may think that this sort of a legal harm principle seems to open up legal
punishment for a lot more than people generally expect 228 and lend credence to the view that
such a legal harm principle is not useful because it includes even very minor harms as rightsinfringing harms. While the domain of the legal harm principle is indeed quite wide on this
account, I am addressing what acts may be considered for coercion. I am asking a domain
question. And on this account any harm to a right is within the domain of the law. So, if we have
a right to X and even a very minor harm to X occurs, it falls within the domain of the law.
Importantly, there is no obligation to actually enforce these rights-infringing harms and indeed it
seems that most infringements will either be judged to be too minor to fall within the law, or if it
does fall within the law will require a much smaller censure than criminal legislation—which
would only be reserved for the most egregious rights violations when the balancing principle is
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And some may argue it covers too little.
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applied. However, I think that Mill, in discussing a jurisdiction question, recognizes from the
start that the harm principle and more specifically a legal harm principle must also take all those
practical considerations (such as cost, balance of harm, etc.) into account and so it may be
imprudent to cover many actions through the law, in which case, the social realm steps in and
take care of the wrongdoing. Mill claims that “all that we mean when we speak of violation of a
right … when we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and
opinion” (U V: 24 Emphasis added). This, I believe, shows that even if the infringement is one of
justice (or a rights-infringing harm) which would fall within the domain of the law, it may be
judged to be even more harmful to regulate through the law, so it would instead be better
regulated through the extra-legal domain. So, while a great many actions may in fact fall within
the domain of the legal harm principle (or general harm principle), this does not mean that it
must be covered by the law (or extra-legal means) only that it may be covered. It is a question of
the jurisdiction principle—determining if the law or social pressures are the appropriate
domain. 229 If it is deemed too harmful to cover through the law, which many of the things that
fall within the domain may, it will be covered by the harm principle in some fashion (i.e. through
the social pressures or individual reproach). Mill requires a separate justificatory question which
falls to the balancing principle—if it is in the domain of the law (or society) should it be covered
and to what degree (i.e. how steep should the penalty be)? 230 This means that those things toward
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See Chapter 3.1.2 for a discussion of Mill’s 2 maxims and the jurisdiction principle and the balancing principle.
The second maxim states “that for such actions as are prejudicial [harmful] to the interests of others, the individual
is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or
the other is requisite for its protection” (OL V: 2 Emphasis added). The jurisdiction principle is that individuals
“may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment” and the balancing principle is that either social or legal
punishment can be applied “if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.”
230
Again, because the question of the balancing principle involves application of balancing principles, the “should”
here always implies “should on balance” or “should, all things considered.”

154

the top or middle of the harm scale, more specifically those acts that are rights-infringing harm,
will always be covered or punished in some way. So, if in applying the jurisdiction principle the
state/society decides that it is within the domain of the law but in applying the balancing
principle they decide that it causes more harm to cover the act through the law, it will still be
covered just not through the criminal law or even civil law. It will just fall to social pressures to
prevent the act (or if it falls within the extra-legal domain, it may still be deemed too harmful to
be covered by social/moral pressures and would thus be subject to individual reproach or
conscience).
So, Mill’s general harm principle may prevent all harm to others, potentially even those
acts that the individual did not cause but failed to prevent, while the domain of the legal harm
principle covers rights-infringing harms (of which there may be many more than people are
comfortable with). However, if we decide that there is more harm caused by legislating the
rights-infringing harm than not, it will fall to the general harm principle to prevent and the social
pressures to punish those wrongdoers. Mill claims that justice is the social aspect of utility in
which the law is called upon to protect those most useful of social utilities. If it becomes worse
(more harmful) or less socially useful to cover something, then Mill allows that it should not in
actuality be covered by the law but could then be covered through the realm of social
pressures—though it is still within the domain of the law. Similarly, if the harms on the lower
end of the scale (extra-legal) are deemed more harmful to discipline through social means, it is
then left to the individual him/herself to rebuke.
All the harms to others on a higher scale (rights-infringing harms), on my view, can also
be covered by those on the lower end of the scale. If something can be prevented or punished
through a more invasive domain, it can also be covered by those that are less invasive. All harms
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to others may be punished through individual reproach (i.e. the individual can punish
him/herself), those more serious may be punished by both individual reproach and social/moral
extra-legal pressures, and those most serious (i.e. rights-infringing harm) may be prevented
through the law, social/moral pressures, or individual reproach. This process is not reversed—
those on the lower end cannot be prevented through the level above because doing so would
cause more harm than the initial harm that was committed and violate the purpose of the harm
principle.
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Chapter 5
Liberties of Conscience and Expression: Mill on the Limits of Speech

5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Speech and Harm
In the spirit of Mill, I want to “offer, not so much applications, as specimens of
application” to “illustrate the principle” I described (OL V: 1). In the next two chapters, I will
attempt to apply my legal harm principle to a particularly tricky—yet important—area of otherregarding behavior that Mill spends a good deal of time on in On Liberty: expression of speech.
Mill argues that we have a right to the expression and publication of speech because of its utility
in our well-being and significant interests as progressive beings. So any infringement 231 (harm)
to our right to free speech would violate our rights and place that action in the legal domain.
There is an important point to make regarding rights-infringing harm and rights-violating
harm. Rights-infringing harm is any harm to a right. 232 Rights-infringing harm, I have argued,
defines the domain of the law. 233 If it is a rights-infringing harm it falls within the domain of the
law. If, when we apply our balancing tests, the infringement is judged to be serious or significant
enough on balance to outweigh all other normative considerations, then it is a rights-violating
harm and should be prevented through the law. Rights-infringing harm puts the act in the domain
of the law (the jurisdiction principle), rights-violating harm justifies regulation (the balancing
principle). 234
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I will show that he utilizes a seemingly absolutist interpretation of liberties to speech that is not actually
consistent and that he does not actually hold. He frequently overstates his position.
232
By this I do not mean there is harm or threat to actual “rights” but rather that there is harm to individuals that
implicate rights. The harm is always to the individual and while I will utilize language that suggests the harm is to
the rights but this is never the case. Such as protection of rights, violating rights, infringing rights, harm to rights,
etc. In this instance I mean something like any harm to us that implicates our rights.
233
See chapters 3–4.
234
For my discussion on domain versus justification, see chapter 2.2.3. For my discussion on the jurisdiction
principle and the balancing principle, see chapter 3.1.2–6. The second maxim states “that for such actions as are
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But if, as I will argue, Mill’s argument really rests on the idea that speech enhances our
deliberative faculties 235 and that is why it is so valuable, then it seems that some speech does not
do this and may be prevented. In some cases of speech, deliberative faculties may actually be
enhanced by some speech being censored through the law. Mill, I believe, is not concerned in
chapter II with a domain determination, he is concerned with whether or not we should restrict
speech. He thinks we should not restrict speech generally because it is ultimately more useful to
allow expansive speech rights than to restrict them but it is not clear that he does not think that
they may fall within the domain of the law, only that they are more valuable or there is a higher
utility in allowing speech to be expressed undeterred. This is not to say that expression of speech,
especially published speech, is not in the legal domain, it is merely to say that most should not be
regulated (or if it is, it may be better regulated through the extra-legal domain). This does not
deny that some should fall within the domain of the law. There are some instances, instances in
which Mill agrees, that expressions of speech themselves cause or are likely to cause rightsinfringing harm. But when such expressions infringe on other rights, how do we determine
whether we should prevent them through the law or leave it to less restrictive extra-legal or legal
methods? In understanding Mill’s position, I will focus specifically on hate speech in the next
chapter. In applying the legal harm principle to hate speech I will need to go beyond my question
of domain and attempt to apply the balancing principles Mill suggests are needed.

prejudicial [harmful] to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or
to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection” (OL V: 2
Emphasis added). The jurisdiction principle is that individuals “may be subjected either to social or to legal
punishment” and the balancing principle is that either social or legal punishment can be applied “if society is of
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.”
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Theory 7 (2001): 119–57) though it was heavily edited and some of the points he makes in the article are not in the
text. I will utilize Brink’s terminology in what follows. His use of “deliberative faculties,” “deliberative values,” and
“deliberative capacities” are useful classifications and reflect the core ideas of Mill’s argument in favor of free
speech in On Liberty as depending on active reflection, thinking, reasoning, and discussion.
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5.1.2 Strategy
In this chapter I will first examine what Mill says about speech and why causing or
risking harm to our liberty of speech expression may violate our rights, i.e. see why he thinks
speech and expression of speech is an important interest in which we have a claim on others to
respect us in performing. Next I need to show that Mill allows at least some limitations on
speech. I will look to the corn dealer example (OL III: 1) to discuss a limit that Mill places on
speech; where he thinks some speech causes rights-infringing harm and in principle actually falls
within the legal domain.
Once I have determined that Mill, in principle, allows that speech may be limited, in the
subsequent chapter I will then discuss Jeremy Waldron and Mari J. Matsuda’s suggestions on the
proper limitations to hate speech. Waldron and Matsuda propose that the dignity and equal status
of individuals under the law are threatened by certain types of hate speech, specifically the
publication of such speech. I believe that using their analysis of the harms that hate speech
causes I can turn to Mill to show that Mill allows that we have a right that would correspond to
such harms. I will look at two proposed rights that Mill suggests we have, namely equality or
impartiality under the law (U V: 36) and the highly valuable interest we have in personal choice
which involves individuality and diversity—as he puts it, liberties of “tastes, pursuits, and life
plans.” 236 If it is the case that hate speech seems to infringe one of these rights (or both), then it
seems that we may have a claim against others not to express hate speech in the form of
publications and we can then proceed to the sorts of questions and balancing tests Mill may
utilize to determine if legislation would be acceptable or not. I am not attempting to argue that
we should enact legislation, but I want to explore ways in which such suppression may be
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acceptable to Mill.
Because my goal in constructing a legal harm principle was to maintain consistency with
Mill as much as possible, I aim to do the same in applying the legal harm principle to hate
speech. I will look to the various interests and rights Mill thinks are of most use in contributing
to our well-being in order to evaluate hate speech. I will rely as much as possible on insights that
Mill provides in On Liberty as well as sections of Utilitarianism and my attempts to fill in any
gaps will rely on interpretations that I believe are consistent with Mill or if they are not, I will
show why they may fit within the legal harm principle despite his reservations.
There are many suggested reasons for why some types of hate speech ought to be
restricted. My question is not whether we should 237 adopt speech restrictions, but rather to
determine 1. if some types of hate speech infringe rights and thus may fall within the domain of
the legal harm principle, and 2. what sorts of Millian decision making procedures can we use to
justify legislation (even if we ultimately judge such laws to be inappropriate). So the question is:
what is the significant interest that such speech is infringing and would Mill support such
restrictions? The arguments I present are not meant to be conclusive but are meant as an attempt
to reevaluate some of the arguments against speech regulation that Mill presents in On Liberty as
well as to apply them to a kind of speech to which he did not give adequate consideration—hate
speech.

5.2 Rights and the Domain of the Law
5.2.1 Rights-Infringing Harm
The domain of the legal harm principle falls where a person causes or threatens harm
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(any harm) to the rights of another—this is what I call rights-infringing harm. In the previous
chapter I noted that once someone performs an act that harms or threatens harm to a right—even
minimally—it falls within the domain of the law and may be considered for regulation. 238 Other
sorts of harm, such as contributing to harm but not causing harm, allowing harm to befall an
agent but not causing it, or failing to benefit an agent are all harmful and may be imperfect duties
that we have toward others, but they do not infringe or violate the rights that we have toward
others because they cannot claim these as their due. These latter harms would fall under the
general harm principle though not the legal harm principle. So, the legal harm principle then, is a
very broad category and is only helpful in narrowing the discussion of regulations so far.
We can see how general Mill’s understanding of a rights-infringing harm is once we
understand what he means by a right that one has. A right is 1. something that when encroached
we consider to be a wrong, 2. Something that when encroached we demand the violator to be
punished (in some way) 239, and 3. Something we can claim against others as our due (U V: 14–5,
V: 23–5). Mill argues that these correlate with perfect duties (U V:15). For instance, we have
claims against others not to cause or unjustifiably risk causing hurt or harm to us. These have to
do with safety and security and for Mill are the most significant sorts of claims we have against
others because they are (the most) significant interests we have. So the risk of virtually any
wrongful act done by another that physically or psychologically harms us or risks harm to us
counts as a rights infringement and may violate rights—even minor ones. The job of determining
if something fits within the domain of the law, then may seem relatively simple. Was a
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significant interest that I have, one that contributes to my well-being, infringed by someone that
has a duty to not interfere in my exercise of it (even minimally)? If the answer is yes, then it is in
the domain of the law.
Now should we enforce these is a different question. Mill provides many different
balancing principles that one can use in determining if regulation would be justified—if a rights
violation occurs—but this is different than the question of domain. In most cases we should not
regulate because the harm of regulating (as well as other normative considerations) would
outweigh the harm of allowing it. Even being pinched for no good reason infringes my rights in
bodily integrity because someone is unjustifiably, or without good cause interfering with a
socially useful and significant interest I have (right). The mediating maxims 240 or the balancing
principles must be brought in to evaluate the harm that is occurring. So it is a matter of applying
the balancing principle which then weighs the relative strength of the claims against the harm
that regulation would cause (as well as other relevant considerations). In an attempt to explain
what Mill meant by rights, I assessed his discussion in On Liberty and chapter V of
Utilitarianism.241 However, even after analyzing what Mill says about rights and deriving a legal
harm principle that depends on this endeavor, this principle is still admittedly vague. There is a
question as to which sorts of values or interests are most socially useful and significant. And
while Mill depends on these as an integral feature of the harm principle, he does not provide a
method for determining this. Presumably because it is an empirical matter as to whether
something is or is not in our interests and Mill would call for us to provide our best argument in
defense of why such things are or are not significantly socially useful.
Again, while Mill seems to set out the criteria for rights-infringing harm, he does not
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indicate a very clear method for determining what precisely we have a right to or which interests
are more socially useful than others or contribute to our well-being as thinking beings. And while
he mentions that it is rights-infringing harm to encroach on those liberties/values that are most
socially useful and that we have the most significant interests in as progressive beings, the legal
harm principle, as such, gives little help in either determining how to decide this or on
application of these considerations to formulate legislation. Mill seems to provide some help
when he lays out those self-regarding liberties which we have the strongest interests in because
they are primarily in the self-regarding realm and most contribute to our well-being and
individuality as deliberative beings. Yet, even looking to these three categories of liberty—
“Liberties of conscience and expression,” “Liberties of tastes, pursuits, and life-plans,” and
“Liberties of association” (OL I: 12)—offers little help. He also provides some insight in
Utilitarianism when he highlights the significance of the claim right to safety and security.
Because he focuses on the idea of claims as being significant in determining a rights-infringing
harm, and he says that we also have liberty rights, it may be useful to pause and consider the
difference.

5.2.2 Claim Rights and Liberty Rights
If it is the case that an act that results in a rights-infringing harm is what determines the
domain, and a rights-infringing harm is defined as 1. any harm that encroaches on one of our
significant interests as progressive beings; 2. a wrong thought to be applicable for punishment; 3.
having a claim against another; and 4. the actor does not have just cause to perform such an act,
then it seems that a great many acts fall within the domain of the law. 242
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Because Mill discusses both our rights to certain liberties and claims that we have on
others, it is important to make a distinction that Mill does not make clear between different kinds
of rights. We have two general types of rights: claim rights and liberty rights. 243 Claim rights are
rights “to have done (by someone else)” and liberty rights are rights “to do (yourself).” 244 All
claim rights have three components: a subject, an object, and content. The subject is the person
who has the right, the object is the person (or group) the person can claim the right from, and the
content outlines that to which I have a right (our important interests as progressive beings
according to Mill). These types of rights are called “claim rights.” The object of my claim right
may be one person, it may be a group of people or it may be all of society. For instance, I have a
claim right against everyone not to be (unjustly) killed. I also have that claim against a particular
person in a given situation. In some cases, circumstances dictate a claim right I have against a
particular person. I may have a claim right against my plumber to fix my pipes because he agreed
to fix my pipes. I do not have this claim right against everyone. 245 Claims are correlated with
duties and “in general, A’s claim against B that B do X is equivalent to B’s duty toward A to do
X.” 246 The claim right that Mill discusses as being most vital to our well-being and deliberative
faculties is our claim right to safety and security. Which is a claim that others not cause or risk
causing us unjustified harm. Rights can only be violated or infringed by a person. We have

people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies two things—a wrong done, and some
assignable person who is wronged. … It seems to me that this feature in the case—a right in some person,
correlative to the moral obligation” (U V: 15), “When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid
claim on society to protect him in the possession of it” (U V: 24); “…to have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have
something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can
give him no other reason than general utility. … [which is derived] from the extraordinarily important and
impressive kind of utility which is concerned (U V: 25). See my chapters 3–4 for a discussion of rights.
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claims against people.
On Mill’s account it is enough that someone do something that causes or risks causing a
rights-infringing harm even if that person is not the person that actually violates the right. If my
action (including speech acts) is such that it will likely cause another to violate your rights (even
if I am not the one who violates the actual right), then I am doing something that may be
considered for legislation. Your right was violated by X but X would not have done it if Y did
not cause or increase the likelihood of X infringing your right. So both X and Y’s action can be
restricted because both lead to a rights-infringing harm that results in a rights violation.
Liberty rights on the other hand are liberties that you, the individual, have to do (or not
do) something. For instance, you have a liberty right to use your property as you see fit. This
may not appear to correspond to an obligation or duty on the part of you or anyone else but it in
fact does. In general, these liberty rights are typically protected by a duty of non-interference on
the part of others. 247 I have a liberty right to use my toothbrush and you have a duty not to
prevent me from doing so. So, liberty rights also have a subject (the rights holder), and object
(everyone has a duty of non-interference) and content (the use of the toothbrush in this case).
Again, Mill claims that the three kinds of basic liberties that are necessary for well-being are
“Liberties of conscience and expression,” “Liberties of tastes, pursuits, and life-plans,” and
“Liberties of association” (OL I: 12).
All rights have restrictions or limits. Mill’s restrictions are outlined by the harm principle
but it is the balancing factors that actually determine whether a right is violated or not. These
limits may result “from conflict between the right and some other normative consideration (such
as a competing right) of equal or greater strength. In that case, the rival consideration can be said

247

Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene, 6–7.

165

to override or trump the expressive right.”

248

Some rights are stronger than others. So the

strength of the right may factor in on considerations of the limits of rights, “the strength of a
right is its level of resistance to rival normative considerations, such as competing rights or the
promotion of worthwhile goals.” 249 Rights protect individuals but they also have “a threshold.”
And while “rights raise thresholds against considerations of social utility, … these thresholds are
seldom insurmountable.” 250 So what sorts of limits would Mill accept regarding our liberty right
to speech? Where we seem to get the most help from Mill in determining the limits of speech is
when he is talking generally about balancing and justifying the restrictions we have (applying the
balancing principle).

5.2.3 The Necessity of Balancing Principles
The justificatory questions provide much needed information because the legal harm
principle, and really any harm principle, is a general principle of justice and needs supplementary
balancing principles to help in giving it any practical use in decision making. As Feinberg
claims, these general principles often provide insufficient information for practical consideration
because
genuinely problematic cases … have a common form: a certain kind of activity
has a tendency to cause [in my case, rights-infringing] harm to people who are
affected by it, but effective prohibition of that activity would tend to cause [rightsinfringing] harm to those who have an interest in engaging in it, and not merely in
the often trivial respect in which all restrictions of liberty … are pro tanto harmful
to the persons whose alternatives are narrowed, but rather because other
substantial interests [rights] of these persons are totally thwarted. In all such
cases, to prevent A from harming B’s interest in Y would be to harm A’s interest
in X. … So the legislator must decide whether B’s interest in Y is more or less
important—more or less worth protecting—in itself … than A’s interest in X. …
The [legal] harm principle, as so far clarified, tells him that protecting B’s interest
248
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from [rights-infringing] harm is a good and relevant reason for restraining A [i.e.
placing it in the legal domain] but that is all it tells him.” 251
This highlights a problem with the legal harm principle, it only considers whether something is a
rights-infringing harm and if it is, it is a sufficient reason to consider it for prohibition. But it
does not consider 1. how likely the rights-infringing harm is to cause or risk harm, 2. whether
there is a competing right that would be infringed or violated were it to be restricted, 3. how
harmful the act is that infringes the right, nor 4. how to balance these things.
The legal harm principle tells us how to put things into the legal domain. So, the question
becomes, now what? In Mill’s argument in favor of free speech he relies on many of these
balancing factors to show that it is, on the whole, more harmful to infringe one’s speech rights
than to allow censorship of almost any kind. He focuses on showing the manner in which our
rights are infringed when speech is subject to censorship.

5.3 Mill’s General Argument in Favor of Free Speech
While Mill begins his general argument in Chapter II of On Liberty defending freedom of
speech and thought as well as freedom of the Press (which he believes to be an extension of free
speech), he begins laying the groundwork for his argument in Chapter I by outlining those areas
of liberty to which we have a right. He claims that
the appropriate region of human liberty … comprises … the inward domain of
consciousness; … liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and
sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a
different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual
which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the
liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is
practically inseparable from it (OL I: 12; Emphasis added).

251

Feinberg, Harm to Others, 203.

167

Mill acknowledges that expressing and publishing ideas does indeed fall into the other-regarding
realm but believes that it is so intimately connected to freedom of opinion that many of the
reasons why freedom of opinion are essential to human well-being also apply to expression of
such speech and its publication. Additionally, just because it falls into the other-regarding realm,
does not automatically include it in the harm principle. It must also be likely to cause harm. Most
speech does not do this.

5.3.1 “Absolute and Unqualified” Liberty of Speech?
On the whole Mill believes these liberties need to exist as “absolute and unqualified”
freedoms (OL I: 12) which would mean they do not fall within the domain of the law. However,
he then immediately claims that “the only freedom which deserves that name, is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it” (OL I: 12; emphasis added). Despite the fact that immediately
prior to this Mill claimed that these freedoms needed to be absolute, it seems that he allows for
these liberties, specifically freedom of expression, to be restricted (not absolute) if they prevent
or interfere with others in the others pursuing their own good. This seems to (rightly) open the
door for some restrictions on the free expression of speech if it causes or threatens rightsinfringing harm to others which would allow for it to (in some cases) fall within the domain of
the law. So, if absolute, the right to free speech seems to include the clause: “unless such rights
deprive others of their well-being or impede their efforts to obtain well-being,” in which case, it
is not so absolute after all and open for consideration for legislation. As I will discuss below,
Mill frequently overstates this position as an absolute position and I do not think he really means
it to be.
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However, in chapter II Mill again takes a seemingly absolutist position on freedom of
thought and the press—despite his qualification that most liberties can be prevented if they cause
harm or threaten harm to others. Mill begins his argument that free speech is necessary for our
well-being by citing the great benefit of free speech (its utility). He claims that speech aims
toward truth and when speech is silenced, it harms not only the individual silenced, but everyone
else as well. The harm is a result of the suppression of truth—an important and significant
good/interest. Speech is one of the most useful tools in getting at the truth and so suppression or
interference in speech is generally unacceptable for Mill. 252 He claims that people are
capable of rectifying … mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by
experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be
interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument:
but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought
before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to
bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment,
depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance
can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at
hand (OL II: 7).
Mill argues that censorship can prevent us from learning the truth because if the opinion is true
and/or contains a part of the truth, censorship could prohibit us from getting at the truth, in which
case, he believes we all lose.
When one silences opinion, according to Mill, it both prevents individuals from learning
and implies that those who silence are infallible (OL II: 3). 253 It is only through discourse and
dialogue, Mill’s argument goes, that we can fully express our individuality (autonomy) and
diversity, better understand the truth, and have a fully robust liberty. Indeed, Mill believes that
“truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for
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himself than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer to think
for themselves” (OL II: 20). Thus, a robust liberty of speech is instrumentally valuable in that it
allows one to aim toward true beliefs and use the “deliberative faculties” (to borrow the term
from Brink), which Mill (and almost everyone else) believes is valuable, in order to fully utilize
their liberty. 254 So he is showing that speech and a generally permissive attitude toward speech is
an important interest we have. He is not in fact claiming that it does not in some cases fall within
the domain of the law, only that it should not be regulated.

5.3.2 The Two Horns of the Argument
Mill’s argument for speech has two main points. First, he claims that if we censor speech
that is true or partially true, we are causing significant harm to those censored as well as society
generally because getting at the truth is of fundamental importance and is not only a socially
useful interest that we have but is also a necessary tool to craft our character as “progressive
beings” (OL I: 11) and to “assert our mental freedom” (OL II: 20). 255 The second point is that
even if speech is false, it is still harmful and wrong to censor because by hearing false views and
opinions we are able to better understand the truth because we are utilizing and exercising our
deliberative faculties in order to improve ourselves and make choices that increase our autonomy
and individuality. 256 He claims that “the fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a
thing when it is no longer doubtful is the cause of half of their errors” (OL II: 30). It is the
exposure to error that prevents dogma, according to Mill. He states that “we can never be sure
that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it
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would be an evil still” (OL II: 2) because
the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from
the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error (OL II: 1).
The main point that Mill is making about free speech is that we can never really know if what we
are doing is silencing the truth or partial truths. And even if we know that the view is false, any
such silencing is harmful if our goal is to exercise our deliberative faculties in order to get at the
truth which is essential to enhancing our well-being.

5.3.3 Deliberative Faculties as Progressive Beings
Mill’s free speech argument relies on the premise that we are “thinking beings” that seek
the truth in order to be happy and that such happiness rests on our nature as “progressive beings”
(OL I: 11). So the interest we have in progressing as thinking beings depends on the exercise of
what Brink calls our “deliberative capacities, especially our capacities for practical deliberation
… [which] involves reflective decision-making.” 257 This deliberation allows us to choose how
we will live our lives and what “experiments in living” (OL III: 1) we will adopt, how we will
utilize our liberties (of not only speech but life plan/individuality and assembly as well), and as
Mill says “he who chooses his plan for himself employs all of his faculties. … and when he has
decided, [he uses] firmness and self-control to hold his deliberate decision” (OL III: 4). So,
again, freedom of speech is an important value because of its indispensability in coming to
understand the truth and because we need to interact with others in order to fully develop our
deliberative capacities (OL II: 39) which, in turn, allow us to act in those ways that we believe
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are most conducive to our well-being. 258

5.3.4 Limits to Speech?
Mill goes so far as to claim that his argument in On Liberty shows the “necessity” of the
freedom of opinion “on the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being
depends)” (OL II: 40 Emphasis added). If all of our well-being depends on our mental well-being
(utilizing our deliberative faculties), and truth enhances our mental well-being, then a robust
freedom of speech does indeed seem essential to our overall well-being. Free speech then, seems
to be the cornerstone not only of getting to the truth, as Mill argues, but also of self-expression,
autonomy, and liberty. This focus highlights why censorship is problematic. Though, as Brink
notes, “Mill’s appeal to deliberative values explains why it is often wrong to censor even false
beliefs without implying that censorship is always wrong” 259 because in some cases, it may be
that certain sorts of censorship actually do more to promote and enhance deliberative values than
allowing such speech. Some censorship does so by recognizing that other liberties or rights than
the liberty of speech may be necessary for the mental well-being of agents (and some liberties
more so than others). 260 For instance, Mill suggests that his argument for speech also applies to
the liberties of choosing our life plan. The liberty of acting on our choices is an additional way to
exercise our deliberative faculties because thinking alone does not exercise our progressive
nature; action and experience are also necessary to exercising our deliberative faculties. Our
mental and deliberative faculties that are exercised are exercised so that we may act on them and
express our individuality. So if speech interferes with our ability to put our choices into action,

258

Brink, “Millian Principles,” 125.
Ibid. Emphasis added.
260
Ibid., 127.
259

172

there may be a conflict. In which case, restricting the speech may increase our ability to act on
our liberty to express and seek our life plans which is another essential aspect of exercising our
nature as progressive beings. 261
Like Mill, Kent Greenawalt claims that “freedom of thought and expression promote
individual autonomy.” 262 He further argues that even if free speech does not “actually [promote]
autonomy and rational decision, granting liberty of speech may itself constitute a recognition of
people, both speakers and listeners, as autonomous and rational. … [and] free speech for all may
constitute public recognition that people have dignity and are equal.” 263 A state that has
expansive and (nearly) absolute speech rights may seem like a victory for truth, liberty, and
autonomy as Greenawalt (and Mill) claims; yet, there are some controversial areas of free
speech, more specifically “hate speech,” that many argue actually cause significant harm to vital
interests we have (rights) and their arguments highlight instances in which deliberation and the
utilization of our deliberative faculties are hindered (or even stopped) by certain types of speech
by others because they prevent us from being able to seek our happiness or well-being as we see
fit. 264

5.4 The Limits of Free Speech
I hinted at a potential reason for limited free speech, namely, to enhance our deliberative
faculties which, in turn, best promote our well-being as progressive beings. This limit may be
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approached when two or more of the liberties Mill argues for come into conflict. However, I
want to look to Mill to see if and where he would begin to place the limits of speech. I will
examine areas where Mill seems to suggest a limit.

5.4.1 An Important Distinction: Harm and Offense
As noted, some expressions of speech fall within the other-regarding realm but that does
not necessarily mean that they may be prevented through even the general harm principle
because they are not harmful. One widely held belief is that when people wish to prevent certain
sorts of speech through the law, it is because such speech is merely offensive (and the
assumption is that it is not harmful). This, I believe, is generally a misconception. The speech
that is generally considered for legislation causes some kind of harm. The issue that such critics
are alluding to is that certain sorts of speech are known to be offensive but what they fail to
recognize is that they are also harmful. It is not the offense that is actionable. What is actionable
about them is the oftentimes-unrecognized harm that they may cause. And if such speech acts are
not merely offensive, but are also harmful, the question about prevention is really a matter of the
harm not the offense. This is not to say that there is not speech that is in fact merely offensive
(though some would argue that offense is at least minimally harmful to our interests 265), but that
when certain speech acts are to be considered for legal prohibition, it must be because the harm
is such that it is rights-infringing.
Part of the reason that people confuse harmful speech with merely offensive speech is
because of the focus we tend to have on physical harm. This is captured in the popular children’s
adage, “sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.” This is, strictly
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speaking, false. The focus that we have on harms that are physical ignores a large portion of
harms, significant harms, which are not necessarily directly harmful to the body. But over time,
the harms that are caused may be worse than physical harm. It used to be the case that verbal
abuse was not thought to be a harm at all and especially not one that should be prevented. It even
seems that Mill does not recognize certain forms of abuse as harmful in this way, in part because
of the time in which he lived and ideas about mental abuse. Though I believe his empiricism
would allow him to admit that these sorts of harms are indeed significant and ought to be
regarded when considering harm. We now recognize the significant harm that verbal abuse can
cause. If we only focus on those physical threats and ignore the verbal, we are doing not only a
disservice to those whose rights are significantly impacted, but we are also violating the harm
principle and doing more harm than good.
Another reason that confusion may arise regarding offense is that harm may be defined in
many ways. One understanding of harm is that harm is any negative consequence that someone
faces. This broad understanding of harm would also include harm befalling you such as dying a
natural death, falling and breaking your own arm, getting pricked by a thorn, or being annoyed
by a flying insect. This is how Piers Norris Turner believes Mill must understand the harm
principle because, as a utilitarian, Mill ought to focus on harm as any negative consequence. 266
This, however, is not the typical understanding of harm that people use when understanding
Mill’s principle. And Mill himself makes an effort to separate harm and offense as I noted
previously. 267
However, even if offense is considered “harmful” there are two other important
distinctions to make. The first is that we must have a claim against others not to offend us. Mill
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does not believe this is the case. Second and relatedly, there is a range of harms from less serious
to more serious. And Mill would argue that we do not have a significant interest (right) not to be
offended because it does not have any lasting effects on our ability to lead our lives and we do
not have a claim on others that they not merely hurt our feelings or shock us. It is also important
to keep in mind that Mill has a range of methods for interference from less invasive to more
invasive or less coercive to more coercive, so even if one could argue that we have a right not to
be offended and that offense is harmful, it would never be the case that mere offense would
outweigh the value of expressing such views. We can see how the “punishment can fit the crime”
so to speak, on Mill’s account. Those instances of harm—even to our significant interests—that
are very minor Mill would argue ought to only be prevented through the extra-legal domain or if
they should not be covered by extra-legal means, they will be restricted by the individual
him/herself.
Again, it seems however, that Mill would not even class offense as harm. But if we
understand harm as any negative effect then offense surely fits here. As Feinberg claimed, while
states of offense are technically also harms (i.e. everyone has an interest in not being offended) it
seems necessary to treat them as a separate category. 268 The reason for this, I believe is that if
offense could be considered a harm (which I do not think we have any indication that Mill thinks
it is), it falls toward the lower end of the scale and we do not have a significant interest in not
being offended so it would not come close to the legal domain. However, the issue that arises is
that there is a general overlap that occurs between those things that are offensive and those things
that are harmful. In the case of speech, these two realms frequently overlap and when individuals
claim that others are reacting to mere offense, it is often the case that the offense is not what
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people are objecting to but rather they are objecting to the harmful aspect of such offensive (and
harmful) speech. This seems to frequently be the objection to regulating hate speech.
If such speech acts are harmful, then they fall within the domain of the general harm
principle. Many speech acts that fall within the domain of the general harm principle may be
legitimately prevented or discouraged through the extra-legal domain and, in fact, in many places
in chapter II of On Liberty Mill seems to suggest that this is the appropriate domain for
preventing most of these harms caused by speech. But the question I want to address is, when
they are harmful and fall within the domain of the general harm principle, when and why can
such speech acts be classified as rights-infringing harms and fall within the legal domain?

5.4.2 Censorship and Preventing Rights Violations
If Mill is serious both about preventing rights violations and enhancing well-being
through the utilization of our deliberative faculties, then it seems that certain sorts of speech
should be/may be prevented because they may cause or risk causing rights-infringing harm. As
indicated above, it is implausible to claim that Mill would allow for absolute rights to speech,
though it seems in some passages that he calls for exactly this. To revisit and expand on this
problem, he notably claims
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or
theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall
under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an
individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance
as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is
practically inseparable from it” (I: 12 Emphasis added).
This passage suggests that at least the liberty of thought is absolute. That we may not be

177

restricted in our opinions whatsoever. This, perhaps is not very controversial—we can indeed
think whatever we want to think without much interference from others. But he links expression
and publication to this absolute right because it is almost as important and is practically
inseparable from it. The right to expression, though crosses into the other-regarding realm and
has the potential to cause rights-infringing harm as a result. He then states that
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan
of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such
consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual,
follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals;
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others (OL I: 12).
These other liberties, of framing our life to suit our needs (autonomy) and liberty of assembly,
are also listed alongside the liberty of speech. He does not suggest that they are any less
significant than that of speech and actually claims that the argument for speech that he presents
in chapter II of On Liberty may be applied in a similar manner to these other liberties. These are
very strong claims.
Mill also boldly claims that
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free,
whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which
they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the
name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual.
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest (OL I: 13
Emphasis added).
Much of On Liberty chapter II reflects this apparently absolutist sentiment. And Chapter III of
On Liberty, which discusses the liberty to choose how one shall live one’s life is similarly robust.
Importantly though, he notes throughout On Liberty and in the passage above that any
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liberty right may be restricted if it causes or threatens harm to the significant interests (rights) of
others. Mill, it seems, would allow us to legally prevent speech that is designed to “deprive
others of [the pursuit of their own good], or impede their efforts to obtain it” (OL I: 12), that
impede their efforts to live their life as they see fit (as progressive beings utilizing their
deliberative faculties), or that prevent them from exercising their liberties (so long as they do not
interfere with the liberty of others). This suggests that he recognizes the liberties of speech and
of life pursuits may, at times, conflict. But because he frames the argument in terms of speech, it
seems that he sets strict limitations on its interference that does not apply to the other liberties.
This interpretation would be a mistake because he claims that he is going to defend the
idea that all the liberties he enumerates ought to be as robust as possible and
It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the
general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it,
on which the principle here stated is … recognised by the current opinions. This
one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to separate the
cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these liberties, to some
considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries … the
grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so
familiar … Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider
application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration
of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder
(OL I: 16 Emphasis added).
So, while he provides a strong defense of speech, the argument is meant to apply to all three
areas of liberty. Because this is sometimes overlooked, his argument in favor of free speech has
been used to defend certain types of speech that, I would say, Mill should want to prohibit either
because they interfere with one of the other liberties or else they have the effect of reducing our
deliberative faculties. This is to say, that while Mill provides a very strong defense of free
speech, he recognizes its limits as well. To this end, Mill rather boldly overstates his position and
later suggests when we may in fact limit speech.
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5.4.3 Incitement and the Corn Dealer Example
After his strong defense of the (absolute?) liberty of speech and expression in chapter II,
Mill himself provides what he sees as a reasonable limit to free speech when he says
let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be
free to act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without
hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their
own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends
that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose
their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as
to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act (OL
III: 1 Emphasis added).
Here he is making a distinction between freedom of opinion and freedom of expressing that
opinion through acts which increase the risk of others’ rights being infringed or violated. He is
obviously setting at least one limit on the expression of free speech, so it is not absolute.
The example that Mill uses to highlight when “even opinions lose their immunity” is the
corn dealer example where “the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to
constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act” (OL III: 1 Emphasis
added). Mill claims
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but
may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled
before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in
the form of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do
harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be,
controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active
interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he
must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from
molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons
which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed,
without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost (OL III: 1).
In this example he is making a distinction between the harmless expression of an opinion and the
expression of an opinion that causes what has been called an immediate breach of the peace or
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imminent harm/violence/lawlessness. 269 At first glance it may appear that he is comparing verbal
speech and published speech, but this is not the case because while he allows that the (written)
opinion can be “simply circulated through the press,” the (written) opinion cannot be “handed
about among the same mob in the form of a placard” and the verbal opinion is equally
problematic in this case.
Speech that leads to an instigation of some physically harmful act, then, may be
prevented because he believes we have a significant interest in not being physically harmed.
Here he does not yet say how it may be prevented but if we read this as instigating an act of
violence against another then it would be an instance of rights-infringing harm or a harm to the
safety and security of others, because it “unjustifiably” (to use Mill’s term) increases the risk of
rights-infringing harm. This type of act is commonly called “incitement” and is generally
admitted as providing legitimate grounds for discussing legal interference. 270 However, his claim
(OL III:1) seems to be much more general than discussing only physical harm as he claims “a
positive instigation to some mischievous act” is enough.
What Mill seems to be doing here is looking to the situational context to determine the
permissibility of the act and whether it is competing with other rights that we have. When an
opinion is stated in a paper or other publication, Mill seems to suggest the risk of rightsinfringing harm to another is low and perhaps there is not a duty that we have to refrain from
expressing the opinion, we only have a duty not to express an opinion in a situation that is likely
to cause rights-infringing harm. The expression of the opinion itself is a criticism of the way in
which corn dealers conduct their business/participate in their occupation. On the other hand, if an
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angry group of people are exposed to the same speech expression and are likely to hear it as
encouragement to a rights-infringing act, Mill allows that this is at least one case in which it may
be prevented or punished. And it may be prevented because it unjustifiably causes or risks a
rights-infringing harm. Mill claims that when a person performs something that is generally in
the self-regarding realm in such a way that it crosses over into the other-regarding realm in
which we have duties to others, then “whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite
risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of
liberty, and placed in that of morality or law (OL IV: 10).” If it risks damage to a significant
interest we have—“if any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a primâ facie case for
punishing him by law” (OL I: 11)—then it is a rights-infringing harm and is placed in the
domain of the law.

5.4.4 Incitement and Clear and Present Danger
As Brink notes, Mill seems to hold something like the “clear and present danger” test
represented in the now famous example of falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. This act
and those like them are seen to be not merely harmful but a rights-infringing harm because it is
likely to cause a panic (in the case of shouting “Fire!”) or violent action (in the corn dealer case)
which would, in turn, risk wrongful and unjustifiable harm to those present which could violate
their rights. 271 This “clear and present danger” test was suggested by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in 1919. Holmes states that
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force [as in the
271
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corn dealer case]. …The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that … [the law] has
a right to prevent. 272
The substantive evils that are rightfully prevented by government, Mill argues, would include
causing wrongful acts of aggression (U V: 32)—it does not seem to matter whether the speaker is
the one who does the actual assault, only that the speech is such that it caused the violation by
the other—and the speech in this case does just that. It is wrongful in that it is knowingly false
and done in a situation that is likely to escalate and an aggression in that it is inciting violence
which is harmful to our interest in not being accosted. Because of the high risk of danger in the
“Fire!” and corn dealer cases, most people correctly assess that such speech infringes the right to
safety and security that individuals have because it is unjustly creating a dangerous situation.
This assessment is also supported by the criteria that Mill set out when discussing
tyrannicide. 273 Mill claims in this case that advocating for tyrannicide is not enough. But rather,
“the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an
overt act has followed, and at least a probable connexion can be established between the act and
the instigation” (OL II: 1 FN1). This “probable connexion” is looking for the causal relationship
between the two. If the act could be said to cause it or likely cause it (be probable) then it may be
prevented. So is seems that Mill allows for restrictions in cases in which there is a likelihood of
the event causing the rights-infringing harm. Feinberg describes it by claiming that the act in
question “must have been a genuine causal factor (condition, element) in the production of the
harm, and it must be an especially substantial (important, direct, crucial) causal contributor.” 274
So, speech that is dangerous—read likely to cause harm to personal security (in this case
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bodily) which is a significant interest of individuals—may not be protected. In this case, the
context and circumstances in which the speech is uttered becomes important. Additionally, I
think that the context is important because in many cases they are uttered in situations which
result in our deliberative faculties being overridden. In other words, such speech acts actually
prevent us from deliberating and force us to react without thinking. They are relying on fear,
intimidation, and threat, all of which impede our deliberative abilities.
If the situation in which the speech act is uttered unjustifiably increases the risk or causes
rights-infringing harm, it is within the domain of the law. The central idea is that the crime
would not have occurred or is less likely to have occurred if not for the encouragement. And in
this case Mill would judge that it falls within the domain of the law and likely that such
legislation is acceptable. This latter determination is exceeding the legal harm principle’s domain
question and is entering the determinations required by the balancing principle. If we are
comparing the right to the liberty of expression of speech and a right to be free from violence
(which would be a result of both our liberty right of life pursuits and our claim right of security
and safety), Mill weighs our interest in avoiding harm as higher than the harm to our speech
liberty.
However, according to Mill, this balancing test does not weigh in favor of restriction
when an individual writes an opinion piece in a newspaper that merely argues that, for instance
“corn dealers are starvers of the poor.” In the one case the context of the incident results in a
harm that is a direct result of the opinion. In the latter the expression of opinion is worth more on
balance than whatever harm may befall the corn dealers if this opinion is circulated in the papers
(and I would assume did not cause another to assault the corn dealers as a direct result). This
conclusion, I think is in part based on the idea that circulating the idea in the papers has a
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tendency not to negate but engage our deliberative faculties.
I want to revisit my parenthetical assumption. This situation—where the opinion
circulated directly led to some individual attacking the corn dealer—is interesting because if Mill
would argue that such an opinion could be circulated in the paper even when it would directly
cause another to violate the rights of the corn dealers, then it seems the difference may be how
such speech would contribute to our ability to rely on our deliberative faculties or not. Perhaps
the distinction is that in the incitement case our deliberative faculties are interfered with and
overridden and so the cause of the harm is a direct result of the shouting “Fire!” or exclaiming
that corn dealers starve the poor when we are already impaired, it is perhaps equivalent to a
mental attack or “psychic assault.” 275 When such an opinion is circulated in the press on the
other hand, our deliberative faculties are more likely to be engaged rather than overridden. This
may also explain why we may think that the latter case, if it did result in harm to the corn dealer,
say, the author would not be found at fault because rather than contributing to a rights violation,
they would, on the whole, be doing us a favor by aiding us in getting to the truth. If this is an
accurate account of what Mill would say, then would this analysis also hold for something like
hate speech?
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Chapter 6
Hate Speech

6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I showed that, in principle, Mill allows limitations on at least one
kind of speech—incitement or speech that risks or causes violence to occur (whether the speaker
is the one who performs the violent act or another does). I think that he would allow such
limitation not only through the extra-legal domain, but would also allow for such speech to be
considered for regulation through the legal domain because it can cause or risk causing a rightsinfringing harm. And in some cases, for instance the corn dealer incitement case, Mill would
likely claim that legislation should be enacted because the liberty right of speech is outweighed
by our claim right of protection from physical assault (right to safety and security, right not to be
wrongly assaulted, liberty of personal choice) when he applies his balancing principle and thus a
rights violation would occur. 276 My next goal is to determine whether there is a right that could
be infringed that would place so-called “hate speech” in the domain of the legal harm principle
and eligible to be considered for legislation.
In this chapter I will first briefly outline types of speech expression that fall within the
category of speech before giving a definition and general description of hate speech. I will then
turn to Jeremy Waldron and Mari J. Matsuda’s attempts to narrow the definition of legislatable
hate speech and show that such hate speech risks or causes infringement of rights to dignity,
safety, and equality. Using Waldron and Matsuda’s analysis, and considering Brink’s suggestion

276
Mill does not separate the domain and the justification questions so he addresses both simultaneously. He
discusses the domain and justification questions together, which often causes them to bleed together. In this case he
judges that these acts would be not only rights-infringing harm, which puts it into the domain of the law, but would
be an actual rights violation once weighed against other balancing considerations—it is justified by the balancing
principle as well.

186

that Mill’s goal is to first and foremost enhance and utilize deliberative faculties, I will look to
what Mill says about equality, dignity, and safety in Utilitarianism chapter V to see if he could
make the claim that hate speech causes rights-infringing harm and falls within the domain of the
legal harm principle. I will then attempt to gauge how Mill would apply the balancing principle.

6.2 What Constitutes Speech?
6.2.1 Opinion and Verbal Utterances
Liberty of opinion/thought is that which is most free. These are personal thoughts, ideas,
views, and/or beliefs. These are purely within the self-regarding realm. Liberty of expressing that
opinion falls within the other-regarding realm but, as Mill argues, expression of opinion is almost
as important as merely having opinion that the same reasons in favor of freedom of opinion hold
for expression. Some expressions of speech clearly fall within the (primarily) self-regarding
realm which may not be violated, and others that fall within the other-regarding realm such as
expressing the opinion that “caramel apples with nuts are the best desserts” or “School should be
held year-round” do not really interfere with the significant and socially useful interests of others
and thus, really ought to be considered as part of the self-regarding realm. In other words, those
expressing opinions that do not have any negative impact on the significant interests of others
and thus cause them no harm cannot be prevented or infringed by any means—legal or extralegal. 277 Arguably, the majority of speech acts fit within this category. When we hear the term
‘freedom of speech’ we often only think of verbal utterances. But such freedom of expressing
opinion in the form of private conversations and the consensual freedom to unite to express such
opinions are not necessarily what is problematic and are generally protected under the same
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argument Mill provides in chapter II of On Liberty.
Some categories of verbal utterances, though, clearly fall within the other-regarding
realm, are harmful, and are not protected. For example, incitement, threat, and harassment
increase the likelihood of danger to safety and security or other rights and thus constitute rightsinfringing harm and are generally regarded as being acceptably prevented through the legal harm
principle. When Mill is discussing fair competitions, such as two people competing for the same
job, he claims these sorts of speech acts are illegitimate. He says that the only reason for
interference in the case of legitimate competitions is when “means of success have been
employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery, and
force” (OL V: 3). So, Mill allows for interference in activities that employ fraud, treachery, and
force. Force need not be physical. Threats are a way of forcing which Mill would find
illegitimate.
In all of these cases, it seems that Mill would allow for interference because they all
involve methods of interfering with deliberative capacities which are necessary for improvement
as a progressive being. Merely saying something false (in good faith) or providing a bad
argument is not generally meant to interfere with deliberative capacities but to commit fraud or
treachery is to undermine our deliberation and decision-making which makes it more likely that
we would act in manners that we do not truly choose. 278 It is directing it at specific agents or
groups in a way that attempts to interfere with our rights to personal choice. Similarly, force is a
way to prevent actors from doing what they legitimately want to do by forcing a choice that is
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not freely made. In cases where one’s deliberative capacities are purposely undermined by
another, Mill would allow for interference to prevent such illegitimate means of interference.
Remember any harm to a right 279 puts the action within the domain of the law and Mill
claims that our right to safety and security is one of the most vital interests we have. The
increased danger in these situations places them in the legal domain for discussion of legislation.
Mill acknowledges this limitation when he claims that opinions can lose their protected status
when without justifiable cause they are used to cause harm to others (OL III: 1).

6.2.2 Publishing Opinions
Speech encompasses much more than merely verbal utterances and “calling something
speech is perfectly compatible with also calling it an action that may be harmful in itself or that
may have harmful consequences.” 280 Waldron notes that this dual understanding of speech
introduces complications in addressing speech regulations. He claims that “if we say we are
interested in restrictions on … speech, we convey the idea that the state is proposing to interfere
with the spoken word, with conversation, and perhaps with vocabulary (interference that will
result in our use of epithets being controlled by political correctness).” 281 But while restrictions
on this sort of speech may be called for (and some is legitimately regulated, such as those that
violate the clear and present danger test and those that incite violence 282), there are other
categories of speech acts that are frequently of concern.
There are acts, such as publication and display of language, that are also considered to be
speech and fall within the other-regarding realm. Many of these sorts of speech, though, Mill
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thinks ought to be left as free as possible because of the benefits of them. But it is these other
sorts of “speech” or expression that may interfere in the rights of others or cause rightsinfringing harm in ways that verbal speech does not.
These are what Mill calls the “liberty of expressing and publishing opinions” that may
encroach upon rights or harm others more so than the spoken word. Things such as publications,
public speeches, billboards or placards, among others, represent this sort of speech and amount
to “published” word and are thought to be a more “fixed” expression of speech and this fixity
may increase the likelihood of harm in ways that verbal speech in the moment cannot. Waldron
includes in this category those that are “printed, published, pasted up, or posted on the internet—
expressions that become a permanent or semi-permanent part of the visible environment in
which our lives … have to be lived.” 283 But, of course, not all or even most of these kinds of
speech are eligible for restriction. Though, as I will discuss below, Waldron believes these types
of speech when directed as hate speech toward certain groups may constitute one of the more
harmful sorts of speech (other than those that are generally accepted and protected through the
law).

6.2.3 Non-Verbal Speech and Expression of Opinion
In addition to expressing and publishing opinions, there are other things that have been
categorized as “speech acts” that express opinion without any kind of actual speech or language
use at all. Examples of this category are the use of certain symbols, flags, images, and other
regalia that are known to represent an idea, view, or historical moment. This category represents
“signs … that have no meaning on their own, but that convey a powerful message to both user
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and the recipient of the sign in context. Here we must look to the history of these signs to
understand what they mean.” 284
For instance, the swastika, Nazi flag, or Nazi uniform in many contexts represents
support for, acceptance of, or endorsement of the views of Nazi Germany during its historical
period. 285 Though, of course a Buddhist’s or a Hindu’s use of the swastika has a very different
meaning and would not indicate support of Nazi Germany. Similarly, a flag in a museum would
not necessarily be endorsing a position and may be attempting to educate about a historical event
rather than take a position in favor of it. Other examples of not-necessarily-verbal or non-verbal
speech acts would be cross-burning, marching, voting, or a variety of forms of protesting. Some
of the acts or use of these non-verbal speech acts are often seen as harmful in the same way that
other forms of speech are harmful and thus, eligible for legislation (as Matsuda and Waldron
argue).

6.3 Defining Hate Speech
6.3.1 A General Understanding of Hate Speech
Hate speech is most commonly understood to be a form of “targeted vilification” and
may amount to “extremely harsh personal insults and epithets directed against one’s race,
religion, ethnic origin, gender, or sexual preference [/orientation].” 286 In all of these cases
(except religion 287) these are things that individuals in the groups have no choice over 288 and
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targeting people as members of the group is not the same as attacking beliefs of people, which it
seems, Mill would generally consider to be protected because of the deliberative value that we
get from comparing a variety of opinions. 289 Greenawalt notes that hate speech also “aims to
make the other feel degraded and hated, and [the speaker] chooses words to achieve that
effect.” 290
Waldron notes that the term ‘hate speech’ is problematic because it is ambiguous and
unclear in part because of the term ‘hate’ and in part because of ‘speech.’ A focus on ‘hate,’ he
argues, is distracting to the point that is being made about the legitimacy of legislation on this
kind of speech. A general restriction of all speech that is hateful—expressive of hate—is not
what is being called for. Hate speech, unlike hate crimes, need not focus on the motivations of
the individual expressing them and indeed the term “makes it sound as though their primary
function is expressive.” 291 Hate speech legislation is not necessarily concerned with the
emotions, passions, attitudes, or thoughts of the individuals expressing such speech, but rather on
the effects and the results of the speech. As Waldron notes, “in most hate speech legislation,
hatred is relevant not as the motivation of certain acts, but as a possible effect of certain forms of
speech. … the element of ‘hatred’ [is] relevant as an aim or purpose, something that people are
trying to bring about or incite.” 292 As such, hatred is still misleading because an emphasis on
hate ignores what hate speech legislation is really aiming at, namely protecting groups from
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harm. Matsuda calls for the same thing—“the focus on effects.” 293
So, it seems that an essential feature of hate speech involves an aim or goal to target an
ascriptive group of people in order to intentionally or recklessly incite hatred of that group. 294
And while one may be able to argue that the users of hate speech are expressing opinion, most of
the speech is targeted and has an additional purpose—namely, bringing about a specific negative
consequence as a result of the speech. The harmful consequences of these encounters are various
and the effects, such as “emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral,” are similar to those experienced
by victims of sexual abuse and violence. 295 The indirect effects are also significant and include
the changes to the social and systemic environment such as heightened discrimination and
inequality against target groups as well as an increase in violence against them. As their goal,
people who use hate speech seek a “subtle and pervasive attitudinal change” 296 in the general
public which contributes to the inequality experienced by the victims of such speech. Greenawalt
notes that “in what they accomplish, insults of this sort are a form of psychic assault; they do not
differ much from physical assaults, like slaps or pinches, that cause no serious physical pain.” 297
While I think Greenawalt’s analysis that the psychic assault is akin to physical assault is correct,
I disagree that the psychic assault is always as minor as he suggests and there is a broad range of
hate speech that may indeed enter a more serious realm of psychic assault that would amount to
the equivalent of serious physical pain (for instance certain sorts of abuse of this nature may lead
to a mental breakdown).
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There are cases in which psychological trauma, post-traumatic stress, or verbal abuse lead
to extreme mental harm. There are cases of bullying in which children who are constantly told
that they are worthless or that they ought to kill themselves, do just that. There are also cases in
which an individual may be constantly told that people in group X are worthless, animals,
rapists, murderers, child molesters, etc. and the individual belongs to that group and internalizes
the message. Some parents who are religious conservatives with gay children often inflict this
sort of psychic harm when they tell the children that they are unworthy, that they are going to
hell, that they are damaged in some way, or sending them to gay conversion therapy. There are
cases in which posters and placards are posted that denigrate groups and individuals or that make
claims that make their lives and safety feel threatened.
The Skokie case in 1977 is an example of such extreme psychic assault. In this case the
American Nazi Party attempted to march through a predominantly Jewish neighborhood in
Skokie, Illinois. It “was a rare pure case of symbolic conduct” being used to express race
hatred. 298 The use of “speech” in this case was intended to terrorize, threaten, or intimidate—
undermine deliberative capacities—and whether it was meant to express a legitimate political
position would not undo the harm. As Feinberg notes in his assessment of the case,
their avowed purpose was to march in the Village parks without giving speeches
and without distributing literature, but dressed in authentic stormtroopers’
uniforms, wearing swastikas, and carrying taunting signs. Free expression of
opinion, a preemptive constitutional value, was not obviously involved. … [the
predominantly Jewish] village was to be a scene of a celebration of Hitler’s
birthday by jackbooted youths in the same Nazi uniforms. The American Nazis
had deliberately sought them out; their ‘message’ was not primarily for nonJews. 299
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In this case, they were relying on non-verbal speech to support a particular historical position,
which was that of the Nazis who killed those of Jewish descent. While they may be expressing a
political view, calling for the death of a group of people and attempting to represent the horrors
of the Holocaust is a psychic assault. As one Skokie resident recalled
To traumatized survivors [of the Holocaust who lived] in Skokie, this was not the
First Amendment debate that would be litigated all the way up to the U.S.
Supreme Court. To them, the issue was much simpler than that: The Nazis were
back and promising to continue their quest.
As then-village counsel Harvey Schwartz [said] … ‘When someone wants
to come marching into your town, with the announced intention to kill you, there
was hardly anything left to discuss.’ 300
As Greenawalt notes, these sorts of speech “pose a serious problem for democratic theory
and practice. Should such comments be forbidden because they lead to violence, because they
hurt, or because they contribute to domination and hostility? Or should they be part of a person’s
freedom to speak his or her mind? Any liberal democracy faces this dilemma.” 301

6.3.2 Narrowing the Focus and Definition of Hate Speech: Publication
In order to target the most serious kinds of hate speech that produce the most harm—and
that may be thought to be protected by arguments that limit the infringement of free speech—
Waldron proposes to limit his discussion (and discussions over the legislation) of “hate speech”
to “publications which express profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for the members of
minority groups.” 302 This limitation does two things. First it focuses on publications and the
printed word (and other non-verbal expressive symbols). He does this because these are a more
permanent expression that tend to maximize exposure in order to reach a wider audience which
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may, in turn, produce more harm. He includes many things under publication, as noted above,
such as those that are “printed, published, pasted up, or posted on the internet—expressions that
become a permanent or semi-permanent part of the visible environment in which our lives …
have to be lived.” 303 These would also include non-verbal symbols such as flags that are
connected to a specific meaning. Matsuda suggests that “formal criminal and administrative
sanction—public as opposed to private prosecution—is also an appropriate response to racist
[and other forms of hate] speech.” 304
I think that a strong case can be made that Mill may accept limitations to hate speech
publication that Matsuda and Waldron propose based on Mill’s objection to the public display of
certain things that are in themselves harmless when done privately—though I am not arguing that
hate speech is in itself harmless. He claims that
Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents
themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a
violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences
against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against
decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only
connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally
strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed
to be so (OL V: 7 Emphasis added).
So Waldron’s argument that narrows the sort of prohibitable hate speech to public displays
seems to be in line with Mill’s assessment especially if we consider that Mill here is allowing
things that are entirely within the self-regarding realm to be covered through the law and hate
speech publication is not entirely within the self-regarding realm but rather is in the otherregarding realm. He uses the example of decency but one could argue that the harm that is
caused by hate speech propaganda is much more harmful than issues of indecency and Mill also
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argues that this objection applies to many things that he does not explicitly mention. 305
Furthermore, Mill’s argument in favor of restricting incitement shows this same sentiment, that
stating an opinion and stating an opinion publicly in certain contexts changes the permissibility
or at least the domain in which it may fall.

6.3.3 Narrowing the Focus and Definition of Hate Speech: Historically Oppressed Groups
The second way this definition narrows the scope of hate speech is by singling out speech
directed toward minority groups. This seems to be based on a distinction Matsuda (and others 306)
make between the harm that dominant groups experience when confronted with hate speech
versus the harm that the dominated groups experience. Matsuda refers to these groups as
“historically oppressed groups” who have been neglected members of the state. 307 This limitation
in scope to focus on the harm that occurs to historically oppressed groups seems to be a common
contemporary strategy when analyzing hate speech and fits with Mill’s focus on the situational
context to determine when speech crosses the threshold of limitation and may be prohibited. The
historical situation contributes to the sort of harm that is perpetuated and done to the victims of
hate speech.
Like Waldron’s narrow definition, Matsuda’s suggested definition of hate speech eligible
for legislative interference focuses very narrowly on a subset of such speech. While Matsuda
focuses on racist speech 308 and defines the sort of speech that she believes should (I would say

305

I am not entirely sure that Mill’s argument here would stand in the case of indecency (see Feinberg’s Bus
examples in Offense to Others), but I do think it would hold for hate speech propaganda. In the case of indecency, it
is not entirely clear what harm is being done. Though I suppose that Catherine McKinnon in Only Words may argue
that in some cases of indecency women are harmed. Though I am not committed to this view.
306
For instance, Catherine McKinnon, Only Words.
307
Matsuda, “Public Response,” 2357–8.
308
By racist speech Matsuda means “the ideology of racial supremacy and the mechanisms for keeping selected
victim groups in subordinated positions. The implements of racism include:
1. Violence and genocide;

197

‘may’) legitimately be restricted in such a light, I believe that these restrictions would also stand
for any member of a historically oppressed group or those toward whom domination or
subjugation was common, such as those in the LGBT+ community, women, and members of
religious groups. She claims that
In order to distinguish the worst, paradigm example of … hate messages from
other forms of … speech, three identifying characteristics are suggested here:
1. The message is of … inferiority; 309
2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group; and
3. The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.
Making each element a prerequisite to prosecution prevents opening of the
dreaded floodgates of censorship. 310
These three requirements for limiting certain kinds of speech prevent some of the more insidious
and harmful types of speech while still allowing for a robust commitment to free speech. What
both Matsuda and Waldron are doing is focusing on the most extreme cases in order to highlight
the limits of speech expression that Mill suggests. I will refer to this as “displays of extreme hate
speech.”

6.3.4 The Effects of Hate Speech
These focused definitions of hate speech are not without their critics. For instance,
Greenawalt claims
Professor Matsuda actually includes as part of the definition of racist speech that
it be directed against a historically oppressed group. Whatever virtue that
approach may have for legal categorization, common usage, which I follow,
assumes that blacks may make racist remarks about whites and that women may
2. Racial hate messages, disparagement, and threats;
3. Overt disparate treatment; and
4. Covert disparate treatment and sanitized racist comments.
In addition to physical violence, there is the violence of the word. Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and
disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group” (Matsuda, 2332).
I think that hate speech for any oppressed group must fit these requirements as well.
309
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make sexist remarks against men. Given the heavy condemnatory tones of the
words ‘racist’ and ‘sexist’ in our culture, it strikes me as unfair to stipulate by
definition that racism and sexism are a ‘one-way street.’ The argument over what
the law should do should be carried on in terms different from a one-way
definition of racism. 311
However, I believe that Matsuda’s and Waldron’s definition of hate speech gets closer to the
issue than the overly general categories Greenawalt and other legal scholars discuss precisely
because it is an attempt to aid in “legal categorization.” Part of the limitations of some legal
scholars, Greenawalt included, is first amendment jurisprudential considerations. However, these
are not necessarily relevant to this discussion because we need not be bound by what the U. S.
courts can and cannot allow. What I am concerned with is applying the legal harm principle to
prevent acts of harm that infringe on rights that we have. If the actual criterion for speech to be
regulated through the law is a rights-infringing harm, then it may be the case that the “common”
understanding of racism is not what we are addressing.
That a black person can make a racist remark against a white person, for instance, does
not fulfill the requirement for legislation because there is not the same kind of a threat to the
safety and security of the white person. Matsuda acknowledges this common criticism to her
view claiming
Expressions of hatred, revulsion, and anger directed against dominant-group
members by subordinated-group members are not criminalized by the definition
of racist hate messages used here. Malcolm X’s “white devil” statements—which
he later retracted—are an example. Some would find this troublesome, arguing
that any attack on any person’s ethnicity is harmful. The harm and hurt is there,
but it is of a different degree. Because the attack is not tied to the perpetuation of
racist vertical relationships, it is not the paradigm worst example of hate
propaganda. The dominant-group member hurt by conflict with the angry
nationalist is more likely to have access to a safe harbor of exclusive dominantgroup interactions. Retreat and reaffirmation of personhood are more easily
attained for historically non-subjugated-group members. 312
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Importantly, though, neither Waldron nor Matsuda actually claim that the oppressed groups
cannot be racist or sexist or that their working definitions are the common definitions of racism
or hate speech. What they claim is that any regulation that focuses on harm needs to recognize
the disparity between the harm that occurs for the dominant groups versus the oppressed groups,
the latter being the more serious and lasting sort of infringement because of the cultural context
in which it exists. In part, what they are arguing is that hate speech regulation may fail so often
to be implemented precisely because the general open definition includes too much, which, on
balance would not be prohibitable—yes, there is harm, but it is relatively minor and on balance
would not be serious enough to consider for regulations.
Certain dominant groups that fall within the general definition of such speech are not
(usually) significantly harmed by the sorts of speech that “expresses profound disrespect, hatred
and vilification” or that “attacks, threatens, or insults” 313 because they are members of a
privileged group and the speech does not have the same psychological and tangible effects. They
are better able to escape the consequences or effects of the speech precisely because they have a
safe place to return to that oppressed groups do not. Interestingly, Greenawalt makes note of this
very point when he claims “Differences in harm may concern kind as well as amount. Epithets
used against minority members of oppressed groups may reinforce feelings of inferiority and fear
of violence in a way not characteristic of epithets used against groups that have been dominant
historically.” 314 Additionally, he states that “those who are in a secure and favored status can
accept denigrating terms that apply to their privileged position with less distress that can those
who know the terms reflect a wide dislike of their group.” 315
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An overly general account of hate speech legislation fails to take into account the real
differences that exist between groups and that disadvantaged groups are affected and harmed by
speech that advantaged groups are not. There is real and tangible harm that occurs to victims of
racist (and other similar forms of) speech that the law has a tendency to ignore or underestimate.
Matsuda claims that
The kinds of injuries and harms historically left to private individuals to absorb
and resist through private means is no accident. The places where the law does
not go to redress harm have tended to be the places where women, children,
people of color, and poor people live. This absence of law is itself another story
with a message, perhaps unintended, about the relative value of different human
lives. A legal response to racist [and hate speech] speech is a statement that
victims of [hate speech] are valued members of our polity. 316
The fact that such groups have not historically had a place at the legal table suggests that the
harms they experience—that those who generally craft the law do not—have not been adequately
taken into account. Matsuda notes that
racist speech is so common that it is seen as part of the ordinary jostling and
conflict people are expected to tolerate, rather than as fighting words. Another
problem is that the effect of dehumanizing racist language is often flight rather
than fight. Targets choose to avoid racist encounters whenever possible,
internalizing the harm rather than escalating the conflict. Lack of a fight and
admirable self-restraint then defines the words as nonactionable. 317
Because of the lack of violent response—which those in vulnerable positions do not tend to rely
upon—and the saturation of such speech in everyday life, the resultant harm is generally
underestimated. Historically oppressed groups are thus more affected because hate speech helps
to perpetuate and institutionalize behaviors, ideas 318, and prejudices that impact their physical
well-being, things like mental health, job security, securing things such as loans, and protection
under the law, etc.
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To make a distinction is not “unfair,” as Greenawalt claims, and does not encroach on
justice, but actually helps to secure fairness and justice—it is redressing an imbalance. These
groups are in positions where they lack power and such speech impacts them directly and the
likelihood of consequential rights-infringing harm occurring rises as a result. Matsuda argues “If
the harm of racist [or other] hate messages is significant, and the truth value marginal, the
doctrinal space for regulation of such speech is a possibility.” 319 Lynne Tirrell describes such
speech as “toxic” and argues that “toxic speech, like any toxin, is a threat to the well-being and
even the very lives of those against whom it is deployed” 320 and “toxic effects vary depending on
one’s epistemic position, access, and authority.” 321 These are category differences and important
distinctions. The restrictions that Matsuda outlines prevent the sorts of speech that have a
tendency to become entrenched in society and institutions and “the definitive elements are
discrimination, connection to violence, and messages of inferiority, hatred, or persecution. Thus
the entire spectrum of what could be called racist speech is not prohibited.” 322 Matsuda and
Waldron are thus attempting to respect the balance between the benefits of free speech and the
harm that vulnerable members of society may experience as a result of free speech.
If, as Mill states (U V: 25) and I concur, the harm to significant interests in safety are
what matter, a more specific definition may be needed to actually get at the crux of the issue. It is
not those in a position of power or dominance that need protection because this sort of speech
does not significantly harm their interests in safety and security. Previously oppressed groups,
minorities, and those with precarious positions in society have a higher risk of harm to their
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rights by such speech than those whose position is unlikely to be affected by such speech.
Matsuda claims that the “presence and the active dissemination of racist propaganda [and other
sorts of harmful speech] means that citizens are denied personal security and liberty as they go
about their daily lives” 323 because “victims are restricted in their personal freedom. In order to
avoid receiving hate messages, victims have had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their homes,
avoid certain public places, curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify
their behavior and demeanor.” 324 These effects are persistent and inescapable in a society that
protects such hate speech.
The distinctions between the sorts of harm to the victimized groups and other more
privileged groups that Matsuda and Waldron propose are not always recognized and Matsuda
notes that in part this is because in analyzing the harm of hate speech
The identity of the person doing the analysis often seems to make the difference
… in responding to racist speech. In advocating legal restriction of hate speech, I
have found my most sympathetic audience in people who identify with target
groups, while I have encountered incredulity, skepticism, and even hostility from
others. 325
And while we could interpret Mill as being sympathetic to the position, he also expresses
skepticism that it is the law’s business to prevent what he calls “vituperative language” (OL II:
44). I think this is in part because he is not considering hate speech as such. In assessing
“hateful” language he is not addressing it as an attempt to stir up hatred of groups but rather as a
distasteful or unfortunate instance of emotions getting the better of people—as a way of speaking
not a message with an effect which incites hatred. The instances he notes are those of expressing
frustration or anger and are not targeted vilification. This is not the same as the sort of speech
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that I, following Matsuda and Waldron, am addressing.

6.3.5 Mill on Vituperative Language
It may be useful to discuss Mill’s analysis of vituperative language at more length since
he seems to recognize the need to protect historically oppressed groups from harmful speech but
then seems to reject it as being justifiably prohibited or within the domain of the law. I think this
is because of a key difference in the cases that I wish to bring out. Mill begins his discussion of
“intemperate” or “vituperative” speech by stating that
Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one,
may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. … The gravest of
them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the
elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the
most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons
who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be
considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds
conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less
could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct (OL II:
44 Emphasis added).
The sort of speech Mill is discussing in this passage is more like a misrepresentation of the facts
or utilizing bad methods of argumentation than engaging in anything like hate speech (though
this may be a feature of some sorts of hate speech). This is sometimes done on purpose, but
frequently such methods are the result of honest mistakes which can be corrected or pointed out
in discussion and one could argue on Millian lines that the harm of censoring such speech would
be worse than allowing it. And while Mill is discussing true opinion, even expressing false
information, while harmful, is less harmful than allowing the suppression of it for Mill.
However, one thing that is important to note about the selection above is that Mill says that there
are “rarely” grounds good enough to prohibit it and that if the grounds are found, that the law has
even less reason to interfere—but he does not discount it altogether. He seems to allow that there
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may be some instances of such speech that may be either prevented through the law or else that
may be considered for prevention.
The next set of considerations Mill discusses has to do not with misstatements or
misrepresentations but with ways of speaking—what he calls “intemperate discussion.” Mill
states that
With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely
invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons
would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally
to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the
prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without
general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise
of honest zeal and righteous indignation (OL II: 44).
The use of these methods in discussion has many purposes and some of them may be
inappropriate in some instances and some of them may be offensive and hurtful (to feelings, etc.)
but sometimes it is a matter of emotions, anger, or frustration getting the better of people and
while it would be better if everyone spoke civilly and calmly, this is not always possible and
some methods of “intemperate discussion” may encourage discussion. But, he notes that there is
an instance where the use of such vituperative language is most problematic—when it is used
against those vulnerable members of society in order to silence them.
Interestingly, here Mill is again alluding to the tendency of the majority to assert power
over the minority (or really the powerful over the oppressed). He claims that part of the problem
with preventing intemperate discussion is that it is not applied equally to all interlocutors and it
will actually lead to those we wish to help (vulnerable members of society) being silenced more
often than the dominant speakers. He claims that
whatever mischief arises from their use [vituperative language], is greatest when
they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair
advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues
almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can
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be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion
as bad and immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular
opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential,
and nobody but themselves feels much interested in seeing justice done them; but
this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a
prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they
could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause (OL II:44).
The benefit of using this sort of language and method of communication is almost exclusively on
the side of those in a privileged position.
If those who are expressing contrary or unpopular views use this language, it tends to
only further delegitimize their position because the majority will choose not to listen when it is
spoken in a way that is aggressive. Mill defends this point by claiming that
In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a
hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of
unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree
without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the
prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions,
and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth
and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative
language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there
would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on
religion (OL II: 44).
Mill recognizes the effects of such intemperate language on those who are in positions of relative
powerlessness and distinguishes between an opinion of vulnerable groups of people who must be
careful in their statements not to cause listeners to react negatively and those of the majority or
“received” opinion who can mostly say what they wish (no matter who they offend, harm, etc.).
In the first case, there are groups of people who are not really at liberty to discuss their
opinions or views because of the backlash that may occur. They are, in a sense, silenced. In the
other case, because such language is spoken by the majority (or more powerful groups), it “really
does deter people from professing contrary opinions and from listening to those who profess
them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice it is far more important to restrain this
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employment of vituperative language than the other ... . (OL II: 44).” This seems to concur with
the analysis of hate speech above pretty clearly. In the case where the powerful may say what it
wishes without impunity, the negative language that is spoken is much more harmful than similar
language spoken by those who do not have the power or authority of the dominant group.
The opinions of one group, then, are actually given more weight and are believed more
readily and thus contribute to the infringement of the liberty right to speech of the oppressed
groups. As Catherine McKinnon says it “understanding that there is a relationship between these
two issues—the less speech you have, the more the speech of those who have it keeps you
unequal; the more the speech of the dominant is protected, the more dominant they become and
the less the subordinated are heard from—is virtually nonexistent.” 326 The point that Mill seems
to be making is that the minority or historically oppressed and subjugated groups are more
vulnerable and their opinions are often silenced whereas the majority can, in large part, say what
it wants without fear of the negative repercussions that the minorities face when voicing their
opinions. As Brink says, “Mill recognizes the disparate impact of intemperate speech when
employed by a majority and by a minority. If intemperate speech by the majority excludes and
marginalizes minority opinions on issues that affect their interests, this looks like a harm that
might justify intervention.” 327 It is, at the very minimum, a clash of speech rights between the
two groups.
However, despite this apparent agreement with Matsuda and Waldron’s position
restricting certain forms of hate speech, Mill goes on to claim that
It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining
either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the
circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of
the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of
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candour, or malignity, bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves; but
not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the
contrary side of the question to our own: and giving merited honour to every one,
whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what
his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their
discredit, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their
favour. This is the real morality of public discussion: and if often violated, I am
happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe
it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it (OL II: 44).
This assessment seems to state outright that Mill would say the law has no business legislating
against hate speech. I am not so sure this is the case. Because again, Mill is considering here not
hate speech but intemperate language that is used to express an opinion that may be bigoted or
angry but that is expressing an opinion. In the sorts of hate speech that Matsuda and Waldron are
appealing to, displays of extreme hate speech, it is not the case that the goal is the statement of
opinion but rather the incitement of hatred of a group of people not an idea or belief that the
group holds, but rather they are attempting to do something much closer to incitement of
violence.
In addition to this, it is not merely the mode of advocacy, the “intemperance” of the
speech that is problematic, but the consequences of the speech on the groups—the harm. Mill
himself admits that the consequences of such methods often result in the vulnerable groups being
unable to participate on an equal footing in the discussion. The vulnerable groups must not only
forward their opinions in ways that are least likely to evoke a negative and excessive response in
their opponents, but they are also subjected to more rigorous standards than their opponents. This
results in an imbalance and inequality in the ability to exercise their rights to free speech. And
while it seems that we have a rights-infringing harm occurring, Mill seems to suggest that, when
the balancing principle is applied, the infringement is not enough to allow for prohibition.
However, again, Mill does concede that this rights-infringing harm happens more
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frequently to those who are already vulnerable and thus the harm to the rights of the vulnerable
groups is much steeper than that of the dominant group. If a member of the dominant group
expresses hate speech, it has a tendency to silence or impair the oppressed individual’s right to
speech. It limits how the oppressed groups are able to express their rights to speech. They need
to temper their emotions, speak in moderate tones, be sure not to offend the sensibilities of those
who are in the position of power, and modify their behavior generally. This is interfering with
the right to free expression. Yet, if it is the case that Mill believes that we have claims on society
to protect us regarding certain liberties, then it seems that we ought to have our right to liberty
protected against others who are utilizing their liberty of free speech in order to disrupt ours. In
other words, if someone else’s speech rights are in competition with my rights and the
consequences of the speech are harmful, it does not make sense to privilege the aggressor’s
rights over the victim’s. We ought to protect the victim in the case where two individuals’ rights
are in competition.
In addition to this, it is important to remember that in the cases I am discussing, displays
of extreme hate speech, the groups being attacked are not merely defending their opinions and it
is not a mere difference of opinion that is at issue, but rather the vulnerable members of society
are either defending their very position in society or, in cases where there is not dialogue, their
position in society is being threatened or undermined. As Matsuda notes, “what the emerging
global standard [against hate speech] prohibits is the kind of expression that most interferes with
the rights of subordinated-group members to participate equally in society, maintaining their
basic sense of security and worth as human beings.” 328 So it seems that hate speech, at minimum,
causes harm that infringes on the free expression of speech which would place it within the
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domain of the law. However, while the rights to speech are in conflict in this manner, it seems
that much more than the competing rights to free speech are at issue which would place it on an
even firmer footing in the legal domain.

6.4 Does Hate Speech Implicate Other Millian Rights?
6.4.1 Dignity, Equality, Personal Choice, and Diversity
Both Waldron and Matsuda rely on the idea of human dignity as a protected area for
individuals because of the impact it has on an individual’s well-being. Indeed, Mill even notes in
Utilitarianism that “a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or another,
and in some … proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the
happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise
than momentarily, an object of desire to them” (U II: 6). Waldron defines dignity as “basic social
standing” which recognizes that all people “are members of society in good standing … [and are]
proper objects of society’s protection and concern.” 329 Furthermore, he claims it is not just a
“Kantian aura. It is their social standing, the fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle them to
be treated as equals in the ordinary operations of society” and as such fosters the value of
inclusiveness 330 and diversity which Mill frequently cited as important to individuality or
autonomy and the liberty of personal choice.
Waldron believes that this harm to a person’s personal dignity is a harm to the liberty of
personal choice and the importance of diversity as well. 331 He claims that
there is something socially and legally significant at stake. … there is a sort of
public good of inclusiveness that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.
We are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions. And
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we embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these
sorts of differences. … Hate speech undermines this public good. 332
These considerations mimic the language of Mill in On Liberty who calls for diversity,
individuality, and experiments in living. Waldron argues that hate speech
aims to compromise the dignity of those at whom it is targeted, both in their eyes
and in the eyes of other members of the society. … it aims to besmirch the basics
of their reputation, by associating ascriptive characteristics like ethnicity, or race,
or religion with conduct or attributes that should disqualify someone from being
treated as a member of society in good standing. 333
Thus, when members are attacked in such a way it contributes not only to the harm to one’s
liberty of personal choice, but also to one’s claim right to safety and security because there is,
among other things, a perpetuation of inequality which results in a higher likelihood of rightsinfringing harm. This tendency of hate speech to risk rights-infringing harm would seem to take
the speech out of the protected realm and place it into the domain of the law. When an agent
exhibits this sort of behavior, Mill claims
he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures,
individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on
himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must
retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment,
and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender
at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one
shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part
to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our
using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him
in his (OL IV: 7).
However, while I argued above that Mill would recognize some kinds of hate speech as a
competition between both party’s rights to free speech, I have not shown that Mill could appeal
to other sorts of rights that such displays of extreme hate speech would infringe. I believe there
are two other sorts of rights that such speech would infringe: the right to equality and the right to
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personal choice.

6.4.2 Mill on the Right to Equality
In Utilitarianism when Mill is looking to legislation specifically, he claims that the courts
(law) have elaborated maxims in an attempt to “fulfil their double function, of inflicting
punishment when due, and of awarding to each person his right” (U V: 35). In doing so they
have enacted specifically legal maxims to determine when a rights violation ought to be
prevented through the penal law. Two duties that he believes we ought to rely on when
considering legislation are impartiality and equality. He claims
That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obligation of justice, partly … as
being a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice.
But this is not the only source of the exalted rank, among human obligations, of
those maxims of equality and impartiality, which, both in popular estimation and
in that of the most enlightened, are included among the precepts of justice. In one
point of view, they may be considered as corollaries from the principles already
laid down. If it is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, returning good for
good as well as repressing evil by evil, it necessarily follows that we should treat
all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have deserved equally well of
us, and that society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well
of it, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely. This is the highest
abstract standard of social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions,
and the efforts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible
degree to converge (U V: 36).
So, not only does Mill believe that impartiality and equality are obligations that the state
has toward citizens but he says that they are the highest standards of justice to which we
ought to strive. This suggests not only that we have a right to such treatment but that this
right is to be considered one of the most socially useful. In part he believes impartiality
and equal treatment are important because they are a logical extension of the principle of
utility itself (upon which all of his talk of rights depend). He states that
But this great moral duty [to treat all equally well] rests upon a still deeper
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foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and not a
mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is involved in the
very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle. That principle is a
mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s happiness,
supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted
for exactly as much as another’s. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham’s
dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,’ might be written
under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary. The equal claim of
everybody to happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator,
involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as the
inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of
every individual is included, set limits to the maxim; and those limits ought to be
strictly construed. As every other maxim of justice, so this is by no means applied
or held applicable universally; on the contrary, as I have already remarked, it
bends to every person’s ideas of social expediency. But in whatever case it is
deemed applicable at all, it is held to be the dictate of justice. All persons are
deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognised
social expediency requires the reverse (U V: 36).
But again, even equality of treatment is limited if social utility calls for inequality. This may
happen in the case of a conflict of rights, such as that of speech and equality of treatment. So
while we have a right to equal treatment, it may be the case that another right we have comes
into conflict with it and forces a weighing or balancing of the rights against one another to
determine which is most socially useful. But this shows us that it is at least plausible that Mill
would allow for considerations of our liberty to free speech to be balanced against our right to
equal treatment.
Interestingly and in line with his argument in chapter II of On Liberty, Mill continues his
line of thought by claiming that allowing inequalities based on an idea of social utility or
expediency is what has led to marked injustices. And perhaps allowing for this is problematic.
He claims that
all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the
character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical,
that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful
that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken
notion of expediency, the correction of which would make that which they
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approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one
custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity of
social existence, has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatised injustice and
tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and
serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex (U V: 36 emphasis added).
So here he adopts the idea that the interests of each person should count equally (making
allowances for the importance of each interest) and protecting everyone’s interest is essential to
their well-being. So the speaker’s right to speech is only more important than the victim’s right
to safety, security, speech, autonomy, dignity, etc. if the benefit of the speech outweighs the
harm to the victim. Considering Waldron and Matsuda’s arguments on the real and significant
harm to those exposed to hate speech, I do not believe it does.
It seems that Mill would support fostering equality or pluralism and a corresponding right
in individuals in its protection. In Utilitarianism he outlines the commonly held ideas of justice
and in doing so briefly discusses impartiality and equality. While he admits these are vague and
such values/interests are not always so obvious, in applying rights he claims that impartiality is
commonly understood as useful and indeed is instrumental in fulfilling our duties. He claims that
“impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory; but this is involved in the more
general obligation of giving to everyone his right” (U V: 9). And while Mill admits that the
concepts of equality and impartiality may be understood in different ways, he admits that for
many, being impartial and being just amount to “giving equal protection to the rights of all” (U
V: 10).
He also claims in On Liberty that citizens have duties to “observe a certain line of
conduct toward the rest” which not only involves not violating others’ rights but also amounts to
“each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and
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sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation” (OL
IV: 3). And if it is the case that minorities and socially vulnerable groups are not having their
rights protected by some equitable principle and are bearing more than their share of the
sacrifices of defending themselves and others, the situation that contributes to this would be
violating their rights. So hate speech would be infringing on their right to have their rights
protected equally and “as soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests
of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or
will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion” (OL IV: 3).

6.4.3 Mill on the Value and Interests of Individuality and Diversity for Well-being
While I think that there is an argument that can be made that hate speech against
vulnerable groups may be considered for legislation on the basis of Mill’s right to equality, I
think a better argument can be made that Mill would consider displays of extreme hate speech to
risk or cause rights-infringing harm regarding our liberty of personal choice. In discussing
autonomy and the liberties of choice and action, in chapter III of On Liberty, Mill spends a good
deal of time both defending individuality, diversity, and choosing one’s own path in life as
necessary features of progressing humanity and well-being and lamenting the yoke of custom,
the tendency toward mediocrity, and the attempt to foist assimilation on those who express
individuality. Being able to choose for oneself how to live and what sort of life one will have
without undue interference by others is something that Mill argues is of the utmost importance.
Mill generally understood this interference to involve government overreach and was
particularly worried about the government’s use of censorship but I do not think he adequately
considers the role the government can play in censoring in order to foster an atmosphere that is
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conducive not only to a broader sense of free speech but individuality and autonomy. Just like
we restrict actions that harm others, speech (as an action) also causes harm to others especially
their individuality and autonomy, their abilities to go about their lives and choose how they shall
live, so restricting some speech has the same effect as restricting some liberty (as he is calling for
in On Liberty), namely: more liberty overall.
In chapter II he claims that there is
so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how
it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the
intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value—to see that it is good
there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may
appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are
ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the
enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be
successfully made against the encroachment. The demand that all other people
shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is
reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be
considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind
speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time
unaccustomed to see it (OL III: 19).
It seems then that while Mill calls for tolerance, he has in mind those vulnerable members of
society who express diversity, individuality, and progress. He seems to recognize that custom has
a tendency to erase ideas that are contrary to received opinion and that free speech protects this.
However, what happens when “resistance waits” and is silenced? It seems that in protecting
diversity, he would want to protect the speech rights of those most vulnerable groups and if it is
by restraining the speech rights of the oppressors that we can protect the vulnerable, it seems
Mill would be favorable to it. He claims that
Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but
in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow.
Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius
are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people—less capable,
consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the
small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the
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trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced
into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot
expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better for
their genius (OL III: 11).
If our goal is to foster the use of deliberative faculties, then it seems fostering an atmosphere of
freedom would be key. It seems unlikely that allowing speech that interferes with both the
deliberative faculties and those who best express individuality fosters individuality and if these
aspects of well-being are prevented, then restricting this speech seems consistent with enacting
legislation that protects such rights-infringing harm.
Mill claims that “but indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is
one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into
commonplaces, but which all experience refutes” (OL II: 17). He further states that
if either of the two opinions [for or against a particular position] has a better claim
than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced,
it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority.
That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests,
the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share
(OL II: 36).
The final clause seems problematic. It is not the case that preventing certain harmful speech will
reduce the significant and socially useful interests or well-being of the speaker but it very well
may be the case that those in danger of getting less than their fair share are those toward whom
such “vitriol” is spewed. In these two places Mill is speaking against legislating free speech but
the problem is, in some cases it is not the purveyors of these harmful views that are being
persecuted but their victims. Our goal should not be free speech at whatever cost, it should be
free speech until such speech is a rights-infringing harm and interferes with the right to safety
and security. And such speech must fit Mill’s criteria for rights-infringing harm which would be
“acts of wrongful aggression, or wrongful exercise of power over some one; [or] … those which
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consist in wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due” (U V: 33). And it is
indeed preventing persecution of innocent groups/individuals from these wrongful acts that is the
goal of certain speech laws. Mill sees the freedom of speech as the bulwark against persecution
and the views and examples he discusses tend to be the intolerant preventing the freedom and
liberty of others to go about their life and he sees free speech as the protector of those groups
who lack power and are persecuted (see God, Socrates, and Marcus Aurelius examples OL II:
11–17 and English court cases II: 18–19). However, I think that in some cases extending the
freedom of speech to encompass and allow for these intolerant views—those that are harmful-toothers which he is arguing ought not be allowed to enact legislation and which he refers to as
bigoted views (OL II: 19)—is actually opening the floodgates for persecution and harm. It seems
that it would be consistent and plausible to prevent these harms through the general harm
principle, which is consistent with Mill, and that it is also plausible that these types of harm may
be rights-infringing harm and fall within the domain of the law.
Mill discusses the usefulness of a variety of characters and types of people and
“experiments of living” but he qualifies that this has a limit: “short of injury to others” (OL III:
1). And further that these opinions, acts, and ideas are those that “do not primarily concern
others” (OL III: 1) is a requirement that some speech does not seem to fulfill. Mill believes that
free speech enhances and tends toward the well-being, flourishing, and individuality of people
but he seems to ignore questions that ask whether certain kinds of speech, such as false or racist
or sexist speech, even if valuable in the ways that Mill claims they are, are really more valuable
than the interest we have in things like dignity and security. Brink claims that
It must certainly be an empirical claim that it is harder to draw principled and
salient lines here than elsewhere. Absent empirical support for this claim, it seems
irresponsible to give up regulating hate speech without seriously trying. If it
should turn out that our best efforts at a principled and salient conception of hate
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speech and its regulation not only have an unavoidably chilling effect on highvalue speech but actually harm the legitimate speech interests of the very groups
hate speech regulations are designed to protect, then that would be a good
pragmatic objection to hate speech regulation. Hate speech regulation would then
be a failed experiment. But the experiment has not even begun yet; claims that it
fails are, therefore, premature. 334
Part of Mill’s motivation is to protect individuality or autonomy, and aiming for our own wellbeing in a way that we see fit and historically, legislation on speech had lots of negative
repercussions because the speech was overly restrictive and impacted those most likely to
express diversity an individuality. It was disproportionately shouldered by those who were most
likely to contribute to the well-being and progressive nature of humans. The minority positions
tended to be overregulated and regulated into silence.
But if what Mill wants is to protect such opinions, then it seems not regulating the speech
of others may actually increase instances of this occurring. Protecting the opinions that highlight
alternate ways of life and opinion which enhance our deliberative faculties would actually
require censorship of others who impinge on this valuable social utility/interest. The display of
extreme hate speech is minimally valuable and does not contribute to enhancing our deliberative
faculties and if considering regulation over these speech acts does enhance our well-being and
deliberative faculties, then Mill is ignoring the overall enhancement of well-being and
deliberation that would occur if such speech is restricted. Speech absolutely contributes to our
overall well-being and our deliberative faculties but it is not the only thing that contributes and
other values may weigh more on the scales. This is where Matsuda and Waldron come in when
they bring in other considerations that add value to the deliberative faculties. There is an
overstatement of the value of speech and I think that Mill could say that preventing displays of
extreme hate speech would be beneficial for those who are censored as well because
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for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human
development. The means of development which the individual loses by being
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly
obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself
there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature,
rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid
rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which
have the good of others for their object (OL III: 9).
So, perhaps in restricting the liberties of speech, the overall benefit to liberties as a whole is
increased.

6.5 Hate Speech and the Legal Harm Principle
6.5.1 The Extra Legal-Domain
What then, would Mill, using the method I propose, say about displays of extreme hate
speech? If we recall that Mill’s general harm principle is a multi-step process that first considers
whether there is harm—any harm—occurring, then we should begin with the general harm
principle which distinguishes between primarily self-regarding acts and other-regarding acts. The
general harm principle places actions within its domain—extra-legal—if there is harm to
others. 335 This is what Mill’s first maxim discusses. 336 In the case of displays of extreme hate
speech it seems that the general harm principle would place such speech acts within its domain
because of the clearly harmful effects of such speech that were outlined in 6.3.4. These effects
harm individuals. Once we determine that there is harm, we need to apply maxim 2 in order to
figure out the domain question, i.e. apply the jurisdiction principle (which is separate from the
balancing principle). 337
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6.5.2 Causing or Contributing to Rights-Infringing Harm?
So, the next question is whether such harms would fit within the legal domain. 338 Harm
that would be placed within the legal domain would be rights-infringing harms. Rights-infringing
harm is harm in the other-regarding domain that we have a claim against society to protect us in,
that impacts our significant interests, and that is thought to be wrong and subject to
punishment. 339 In many cases of extreme displays of hate speech we can see that they are no
longer within the self-regarding domain and fall within the other-regarding domain. There is also
harm, so it is harmful other-regarding behavior. This harm is also caused by the others and there
is, in many cases, a tangible link from the hate speech to the rights implicated in such speech.
This is in keeping with what Mill claims about an agent calling for tyrannicide (OL II: 1 FN1). If
it is the case that a probable causal link can be established between the expression of the idea and
the harm, it is firmly within the domain of the law because it is a rights-infringement. We do not
yet know if it is a rights violation—rights violations are not a determination of the jurisdiction
principle. We can only determine rights violations once the balancing principle is applied.
In the previous chapter I claim that if an individual fails to prevent harm or contributes to
harm (but does not cause it), 340 then it is not rights-infringing harm but is still harm and can still
be covered by the general harm principle, though not the legal harm principle. 341 The question is,
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when an agent uses free speech in the form of displays of extreme hate speech and this speech is
then used—by the agent or another—as an impetus for a rights violation or rights-infringing
harm, are they causing or contributing to the rights-infringing/violating harm? On the one hand,
we may argue that it is the sum total of the displays of extreme hate speech that adds up to
contribute to the rights-infringing harm and that it is not any one piece of literature that causes
the rights-infringing harm. On the other hand we may claim that it does not make sense to think
of it in these terms because the literature increases the likelihood of the rights-infringing harm
occurring. To draw an analogy, in the case of pollution while it may be the case that a particular
tailpipe does not cause any more pollution than anyone else’s, it does not then make sense to say
that that tailpipe is not causing pollution. Reducing that tailpipe’s emissions will reduce
pollution. Similarly, preventing an individual’s expression of hate speech reduces the likelihood
of rights-infringing harm. Yes, the expression of hate speech contributes to the harm but can also
be said to cause the rights-infringing harm.
There is a difference between actively engaging in hate speech which increases the
likelihood of rights-infringing harm (causing harm) and for instance, failing to assist someone
who is drowning (contributing but not causing harm). While the drowning individual is in a
harmful situation—drowning—and there is a risk to safety and security, the bystander did not
cause the individual to be in that situation. This is not the case with someone engaged in hate
speech. They were a causal factor in the harmful situation, they did not merely refuse to
interfere. So it is the difference between someone engaging in hate speech (causing/increasing
the likelihood of rights-infringing harm) and a bystander not interfering when someone is
engaging in hate speech (contributing to the rights-infringing harm but not causing the rightsinfringing harm). As a bystander witnessing the hate speech, he/she should intervene but if that
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person does not, the bystander is not violating or infringing a right, the bystander is contributing
to the harmful situation but not causing it. The bystander’s failure to act would be contributing to
the harm and thus could be morally or extra-legally censured but not censured through the law.

6.5.3 Competing Rights: Infringing the Right to Free Speech
As I claimed above using Mill’s section on vituperative language, it seems that, at the
very least, this hate speech is at odds with the oppressed person’s right to speech. 342 So we have
an instance of rights-infringing harm occurring when both the speaker and the victim’s right to
speech come into conflict. This would place hate speech in the domain of the law because the
speaker is silencing or making it much more difficult for the victim of the hate speech to utilize
his/her own right to speech—thus, infringing this right. However, it seems that if the rightsinfringing harm is just a matter of the two rights coming into conflict, then Mill would almost
never allow for such speech to be prevented because the harm of legislating such speech would
far outweigh the balancing harm of allowing it to continue unfettered by legal means—though he
would call for it to be prevented or at least discouraged through the extra-legal domain.
However, because such displays of extreme hate speech are much worse than other sorts of
vituperative language or bigoted ideas, a further question arises, namely, are there other rights
that are implicated in displays of extreme hate speech that would aid in the balancing test that
may tip the scales in favor of legislation? In other words, while displays of extreme hate speech
are in the legal domain and eligible for consideration for legislation, is it the case that there are
additional rights that are infringed that would provide a better defense for legislation when the
balancing principle is applied?
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6.5.4 Other Millian Rights Implicated in Displays of Extreme Hate Speech
It seems that there are several other rights and interests that are implicated in displays of
extreme hate speech. First, Mill claims that most people, including those whose deliberative
faculties are excellent, have shown that a right to equality under the law is in everyone’s interests
and is socially useful. In many cases displays of extreme hate speech cause rights-infringing
harm and implicate our right to such equality. Matsuda and Waldron base this right on the
concept of dignity. 343 Our dignity is our social standing and if we are all supposed to have an
equal social standing then actions that infringe on this right are within the domain of the law.
There are many instances in which displays of extreme hate speech cause or significantly risk
unequal protection under the law, unequal circumstances in fair competitions, as well as
undermining the victim’s legitimate position in society. Our dignity and equal social standing are
significant interests that we have and if displays of extreme hate speech cause harm to this right,
it seems that there is an additional factor that places it in the legal domain and another sort of
harm to consider when applying the balancing principle.
In addition to the right to equality, it seems that our liberty right to personal choice and
our interests in individuality, diversity, and autonomy are implicated through displays of extreme
hate speech. Mill claims that the strength of his argument for free speech applies equally to our
liberty rights to personal choice and the freedom to unite (OL I: 16). These three areas of liberty,
he believes, are necessary for our well-being and the use of our deliberative faculties. If a
person’s right to speech interferes with our abilities to choose how we want to live or makes it
more difficult for us to make those choices that are within our rights, then it seems that there is
an additional rights-infringing harm to consider. The right to personal choice aids in the
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development of individuality and diversity by making it more likely that individuals can choose
their own experiments in living, and even being exposed to others acting on this right makes it
more likely that individuals engage and utilize their deliberative capacities because in seeing
how others live and chose their lives, one can see the consequences and benefits/drawbacks of
choosing such a life which contributes to our well-being.
So, while it may be the case that Mill would not allow for displays of extreme hate
speech to be prevented through the law if only the equivalent right to free speech was at stake, he
at least would have to recognize that it falls into the domain of the law even if it would not weigh
enough to justify legislation. However, when one considers that other rights and interests besides
the right to free speech, such as the right to equal social standing, right to personal choice, and
our significant interests in individuality and diversity, are implicated when someone utilizes their
right to free speech to display extreme hate speech, it seems that there are much more rightsinfringing harms to consider when applying the balancing principle of maxim 2. Many other
rights are implicated with hate speech than a mere competition between each person’s right to
speech and these other rights-infringing harms help to place displays of extreme hate speech
more firmly into the domain of the law and in contention for legislation. All of these rightsinfringing harms must be weighed and balanced against the harm to the speaker of hate speech
and the infringements to the speaker’s liberty that would necessarily occur if such speech was to
be regulated. 344 However, my project only applies the jurisdiction principle and helps to place it
within the domain of the law. It does not say whether such legislation on displays of extreme
hate speech is a good idea, all things considered. If we decide that, all things considered, it ought
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to be prevented, we are saying that it is a rights violation. To determine that it is a rights
violation, one needs to weigh the relative harm that results from regulation versus toleration. I
am not going to give such maxims that ought to be considered in applying the balancing
principle and my project is not meant to provide guidance as to which regulations ought to be a
law.

6.6 Mill’s Balancing Principles
However, I would like to close with a few thoughts on Mill’s use of the balancing
principle which is thought to justify legislating against those acts that are in the legal domain.
Part of the problem that arises with applying the legal harm principle based on Mill’s very
general description of rights is that we must utilize other decision-making principles in order to
interpret the harm principle. In discussing whether something like speech fits within the law we
need to discuss specifics of the cases at hand, practical considerations. Feinberg calls these
“mediating maxims” 345 and many of the maxims or considerations he relies upon are consistent
with Mill’s discussion in On Liberty and Utilitarianism. Feinberg claims in relation to his own
formulation of the harm principle that
whatever … the harm principle gains in plausibility, … it loses in practical utility
as a guide to legislative decisions. Legislators must decide not only whether to use
the harm principle in this somewhat dilute formulation, but also how to use it in
cases of merely minor harms, moderately probable harms, harms to some interests
preventable only at the cost of harms to other interests irreconcilable with them,
structured competitive harms, accumulative harms, and so on. Solutions to these
problems cannot be provided by the harm principle in its simply stated form, but
absolutely require the help of supplementary principles. 346
The same mediating maxims are necessary to determine whether legislation is warranted or not.
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Two considerations that are relevant to determining if there is a rights-infringing harm or not is
the magnitude of the harm and the probability of the harm occurring.
One way in which we may weigh the relative importance of interests against each other is
in its level of importance in other interests that we have. Sumner summarizes the issue nicely
when he claims that
when two important social values (such as liberty and equality) conflict, the
optimal tradeoff or balance between them is that point at which further gains in
one of the values would be outweighed by greater losses in the other. Freedom of
expression would be better protected were there no legal constraints whatever on
hate propaganda, while the equal status of minority groups would (arguably) be
better safeguarded by legislation more restrictive than the hate propaganda law …
Somewhere between these extremes lies a balance point at which the greater
protection for these groups afforded by more restrictive legislation would be
outweighed by the greater impairment of expression, while the greater protection
for expression afforded by more permissive legislation would be outweighed by
the greater risk of discrimination. 347
Many of our interests are interconnected and in some cases harming one of the interests we have
may cause harm to other interests of ours which contributes to a greater degree of harm to our
overall well-being. To use Feinberg’s analogy, “harm to one’s heart or brain will do more
damage to one’s bodily health than an equal degree of harm to less vital organs.” 348 So
determining how central the interest is to the entire web of interests may aid in weighing the
interest against the interests of others.
Another consideration that Mill seems to allow in weighing the relative strength in
liberties is the intention of the speaker. If the speaker utilizes his/her right to speech in order to
incite or bring about harm or encourage others to bring about harm, then they are an important
causal factor in the harm occurring and the individual’s speech may be restricted or punished
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after the fact for the effect of the speech by third parties. This is advocating or encouraging
violence or harm. It is an unjustified increase in the risk of rights-infringing harm and as
Feinberg notes “one party can be a cause of the voluntary actions of another party, and thus be
coresponsible with him for the harmful consequences to a third party.” 349 The right that is
violated is the interest in safety and security of bodily integrity or property that Mill and most
legal scholars agree is a significant and important interest. Indeed Mill goes so far as to say it is
perhaps the most important of our interests.
In Utilitarianism Mill claims that many of the common maxims of justice are
instrumentally valuable in applying his balancing principle. Several of the maxims he endorses
as useful in considering legislation are
That a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily, or could
voluntarily have avoided; that it is unjust to condemn any person unheard; that the
punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence, and [these] ... are maxims
intended to prevent the just principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the
infliction of evil without that justification (U V: 35).
It seems he counts these among acceptable mediating maxims that will help in the application of
justice which is the foundation of the harm principle generally.
When Mill develops the harm principle he talks in terms of harm and risk of harm. So,
for the law it may be proper to talk in terms of rights violations or risk of rights infringement.
Those things which undermine rights or contribute to a higher risk of rights violations may be
included in the domain of the law. And if more harm results from such restrictions, such as
increased cost to the public in terms of policing, decreased freedoms, monetary losses, etc., then
it may not be prudent to have a legal restriction but a social or extra-legal restriction on it. The
risk or likelihood of harm or infringement of a right is what matters for the legal harm principle
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and the risk of harm is different for different groups. Those groups who are or were previously
oppressed may have a higher risk of harm from certain speech acts than those who are either in a
privileged position or a position of power. While freedom of thought and expression promotes
autonomy, in a similar manner it can also restrict the freedom and autonomy of others. If certain
kinds of expression lead to illegitimate oppression or defamation and/or to risk of safety and
security of others, then it seems the speech acts in question ought to be prevented.
One of the benefits of Mill’s view is that rights are fluid and adaptable. We create new
laws based on protecting those interests that are most socially useful and that contribute to our
improvement as progressive beings. This is what Mill means by moral rights. So, rights that
previously were not necessary become necessary and rights that are no longer needed can be
removed. Issues with speech that contradict the safety and security of individuals and groups
may be needed in societies in which there are unjust social institutions that prevent safety and
security. However, once the previously oppressed groups actually do become the dominant
group, such protections would no longer be afforded to them. This idea is reflected in Matsuda
when she acknowledges that “should history change course, placing former victim groups in a
dominant or equalized position, the newly equalized group will lose the special protection
suggested here for expression of nationalist anger.” 350 Now there are difficulties with applying
this and I acknowledge that application requires interpretation but that is not a criticism against
this view alone. All views have difficulty in application. The question for my approach is over
the domain of the law. This categorization and understanding of the sort of speech that could be
prevented asks whether rights are infringed. I believe that they are in the case of hate speech
because of the very real risks of safety and security and rights-infringing harm that accompany
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them. Interpreting application of the law is a separate and important question. 351
It seems that while certain forms of speech are indeed harmful and studies concur that
such things are harmful, Mill still has an important point about the importance of free speech. In
arguing for free speech, Mill discusses many instances where those in power suppress the
opinion of others because the contrary opinion is so strongly thought and believed to be true. The
most notable example is a belief in a god (OL II: 11-12). If this is true and “everyone” (most
people, the majority, all but the crazies, etc.) knows it to be true, then surely there is no harm in
suppressing the opposite opinion, namely that a god does not exist. What harm can be done? Mill
argues that a great harm can be done, especially when one considers that no matter how certain
one feels about a proposition, it still may very well be true (OL II). Mill provides an additional
apt example (though at the time he did not realize how apt) of Newtonian mechanics (OL II: 8).
Even if people are so sure that they are right, they may still be wrong. Now, what does that have
to do with the suppression of the speech, materials, and information that we know to be harmful
(and obviously-to-us false)? For instance, a Ku Klux Klan member wishes to publish a racist
book, billboard, etc. We know not only that the material is false but that it is harmful to
individual African Americans and African Americans as a group (through the perpetuation of
systemic racism, etc.). Why should we allow it? Mill’s point to this example is two-fold.
First, it may be the case that in order to prevent our views from being dismissed, silenced,
and suppressed we must allow others with crazy racist, sexist, whatever-other-views-opposed-tothose-that-we-know-to-be-the-truth, etc. to be expressed in various ways because it then allows
us to express our views which may turn out to be true though not the dominant opinion. In other
words, if we should not be silenced when we dissent, we ought not silence others. Mill argues
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that “unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute
others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must
beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to
ourselves” (OL IV: 15). In a way, if we want to be able to exercise our free speech, press, etc. in
order to further the goal of truth seeking and develop our deliberative faculties, we must allow
(at least not have laws that prevent) the views that we consider to not only be wrong but harmful
in order to prevent a greater wrong.
Now, this argument is not without its valid criticisms. For instance, it is all well and good
for me to make these claims since I likely have never experienced the racism, sexism, abuse, etc.
that these harmful views engender and perpetuate which makes me underestimate the degree of
harm that is actually occurring in these instances. This may be (and I think is likely) the case.
However, it seems that those views that we are fighting to suppress (i.e. those we know to be
false) could only be fought by allowing the free and open use of reason and discussion. We know
these things to be false because we were able to argue against these harmful views.
Second, Mill’s argument about free speech highlights the progressive abilities of open
dialogue. When we come across a particularly heinous view, we can and ought to refute it or
show why it is mistaken (just because the law may create more harm than good does not mean it
is not interfered with at all, but rather it is the extra-legal social pressures that must prevent it).
This allows us to educate and change the dialogue. The worry is, with the suppression of speech,
we may inadvertently suppress the very speech we ought to allow to occur. It seems that instead
of using the criminal law to punish those who express harmful views, we ought to redirect our
efforts to educating, engaging, and utilizing legitimate social pressures. However, this view is
also making several assumptions. It is assuming that the harm of suppressing such speech is
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worse than allowing it. This is a big assumption and I am not convinced that this is the correct
assumption to make.
Regarding application of such speech regulation, Mill is concerned that such legislation
would be difficult to control and maintain because those in power would likely do one of several
things: misinterpret the scope of such laws, apply them prejudicially, or over reach its legitimate
bounds. All of these are fair considerations in applying the balancing principle. These concerns
do not really impact whether or not the sorts of speech regulation I claim are within the domain
of the law, they apply to the question of creating actual legislation and the practical concerns that
arise. Most of Mill’s arguments are not an application of the jurisdiction principle and in fact he
admits that expression and publication of opinion is, by its very nature, other-regarding but he
notes that more harm would likely result if such restrictions were enacted, not that they do not fit
in the domain. This makes sense considering Mill was concerned with liberty and coercion much
more generally than I am and in crafting his principle recognized a multi-step process for
determining the domain and the practical application of the domain in legislation but did not
discuss these as separate goals but rather intertwined both the jurisdiction principle and the
balancing principle throughout his discussion. This explains his emphasis on the need to limit
legislation for free speech while at the same time acknowledging that by its nature, publication
and certain speech acts are other-regarding and that they also may cause harm that infringes
rights. He notes that these acts are “almost” as important as the liberty of thought and that it is
“practically inseparable from it” (OL I: 12) but practical matters aside, they are separate and part
of the separateness rests on the fact that some of these publications and forms of expression (not
all) may actually violate others’ rights. I have an inclination to accept most of what Mill says
about free speech and recognize the practical problems that arise with what is commonly called
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“censorship” and how likely it is to be abused. However, this argument against free speech does
not actually impact my argument that the legal domain has jurisdiction in these cases and that a
review of such speech acts and legislation is due.

6.6 Conclusion
In writing On Liberty Mill is, in part, attempting to define the limits of liberty. In doing
so he highlights the value of speech and for the most part, I believe that he is accurate in his
assessment. Speech and expressing our opinions is essential to our autonomy and freedom. But
part of the problem with Mill’s account is that it seems to prioritize speech in such a way that
actually undermines part of his project. If his desire is to prevent violations of those socially
useful actions that promote a robust and progressive well-being, then he is ignoring or at least
downplaying part of the harm to other important values and rights such as dignity, equal social
standing, safety and security, and liberties of personal choice (among others). All of these rights
and interests aid in the development of our deliberative faculties and if displays of extreme hate
speech undermine this project, then it seems that on balance, it may be better to prevent it. As
Stanley Fish argues, in placing speech as a value above others that may have just as much if not
more social utility, we are dismissing competing values without providing a proper argument. He
claims that unless we compare these values, we are giving undue priority to speech and
“mystifying—presenting as an arbitrary and untheorized fiat—a policy that will seem whimsical
or worse to those whose interests it harms or dismisses.” 352 And while Fish is not arguing from a
harm principle, the point is that Mill seems to ignore other values that he recognizes as being in
our significant interest in discussing free speech. Some speech is specifically designed to silence
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groups of people and to intimidate or threaten. This seems to interfere in the liberty of others and
cause harm. But Mill seems to resist that it is rights-infringing harm that should be prevented by
legal means.
Mill’s argument seems to be parsed in the following way: unless we can convince the
other side that they are wrong and unless opinions to the contrary can be heard and defeated or
defended, we are appealing to mere dogma. What matters is getting the truth of the opinion to be
understood by the others. While this may be the ideal case, what happens in the meantime is
people are harmed, for example by displays of extreme hate speech. If it is the case, as Mill
claims, that the reason why free speech is so valuable is because of the opportunity to gain
insight into the truth, then certain sorts of speech that do not attempt to reflect an argument,
position, or belief but are merely defamatory or meant to provoke, ought not to be protected
through the law. Hate speech does not enhance, but rather undermines, our deliberative faculties.
It is not just that we think such speech is false or offensive, though it may be, it is that such
speech is not actually doing the work that Mill claims it is meant to do. And if it fails to do the
work that contributes to our well-being, there seems to be little reason to protect it.
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